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Administrative Management in the Army Service Forces	
Editors' Note	255
Management	<i>Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell</i> 257
Management Control in the Army Service Forces	<i>Maj. Gen. C. F. Robinson</i> 260
The Organizational Structure of the Army Service Forces	<i>Lt. Col. John D. Millett</i> 268
Statistics as a Tool of Management	<i>Col. John D. Witten</i> 279
Standardization of Procedures	<i>Col. Oliver A. Gottschalk</i> 287
Control Activities in the Quartermaster Corps	<i>Brig. Gen. H. A. Barnes</i> 298
Reconversion of the Federal Administrative Machinery from War to Peace	<i>Louis Brownlow</i> 309
Civil Service as Usual	<i>Floyd W. Reeves</i> 327
Louisville Plans Its Future	<i>Kenneth P. Vinsel</i> 341
The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems	<i>Harold J. Laski</i> 347
A Response to Mr. Laski	<i>Lt. Don K. Price</i> 360
Reviews of Books and Documents	
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations	<i>Carl H. Chatters</i> 364
Looking at Under-all Management	<i>Fritz Morstein Marx</i> 368
Fable for Wise Men	<i>Rowland Egger</i> 371
News of the Society	377

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IN THIS NUMBER

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BREHON SOMERVELL has been commanding general, Army Service Forces, since the reorganization of the War Department on March 9, 1942. He was graduated from West Point in 1914, served overseas in World War I, and was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross and the Distinguished Service Medal. In the postwar period he filled various engineering assignments, in addition to making two surveys with the late Walter D. Hines—one on the Danube and one on the economic resources of Turkey. He served with the National Emergency Council for a time in 1935 and became administrator of the New York City WPA in 1936. He was chief of the construction division of the War Department from November, 1940, to November, 1941, and G-4 of the War Department general staff from November, 1941, to March, 1942.

MAJOR GENERAL C. F. ROBINSON, West Point 1924, served with the corps of engineers until detailed to the New York City WPA in 1935. He returned in 1937 to become director of operations and, later, deputy administrator. He was chief of a control branch in the construction division, office of the quartermaster general, and in G-4 before becoming director of the control division, office of the commanding general, ASF.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN D. MILLETT has served in the administrative management branch, control division, ASF, since July, 1942. Prior to that time, he was special assistant to the director of the National Resources Planning Board and for three years worked for the Social Science Research Council in New York City. He has taught at Columbia University and Rutgers University. He also served on the staff of the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1936.

COLONEL JOHN D. WITTEN is a graduate of the Columbia University School of Business and following graduate work in economics and statistics ran his own research business in New York City. He became statistician for the Senate Banking Committee during the Pecora investigation and then served in turn as chief statistician for the New York City WPA, for the office of the quartermaster general, and now for the ASF. He is chief of the statistics and progress branch in the control division.

COLONEL OLIVER A. GOTTSCHALK served in the air corps during World War I and retired from the Army in 1922. After graduating from the Harvard School of Business Administration he served as an executive with a mining equipment company and then with two airway lines. He worked for the NRA and became director of finance for the New York City WPA under General Johnson in 1935. He succeeded General Somervell as acting administrator of the New York City WPA in 1940. Subsequently he became director of finance for the construction division, office of the quartermaster general. He returned to active military duty to become chief of the procedures branch in the control division, ASF. Colonel Gottschalk was awarded a plaque by the Municipal Finance Officers Association in 1940 for his outstanding work in New York City.

BRIGADIER GENERAL H. A. BARNES is deputy the quartermaster general and chief of the organization planning and control division in the office of the quartermaster general. He originally enlisted in the Army in 1908 and rose from the ranks to his present position. He has served in various supply positions for the Army in the United States and overseas and was director of civilian personnel for the office of the quartermaster general before assuming his present position. He made the study of management his principal hobby and introduced organizational planning into the office of the quartermaster general as a part of civilian personnel administration.

LOUIS BROWNLOW is director of Public Administration Clearing House, was chairman of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, and is a past president of the American Society for Public Administration.

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KENNETH P. VINSEL is executive director, Louisville Area Development Association. He was formerly head of the department of political science and history at the University of Louisville. He has served as director of welfare, City of Louisville, and Chief, emergency welfare services, Louisville Civilian Defense Council. He has also been assistant to the executive secretary, War Production Board, and chief, community war information section, Office of Civilian Defense.

HAROLD J. LASKI is professor of political science, The London School of Economics and Political Science. He has served as lecturer at McGill, Harvard, and Yale Universities and Amherst College. He has been a member of a number of governmental committees in Great Britain and is a member of the Fabian Society and the British Labour Party. He has published numerous books in the field of political science, among them *Parliamentary Government in England*, 1938, and *The American Presidency*, 1940. He has also written many articles for British and American periodicals.

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Public Administration Review is intended to promote the exchange of ideas among public officials and students of administration. The various views of public policy and public administration expressed herein are the private opinions of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the official views of the agencies for which they work or the opinions of the editors of this journal.


Administrative Management in the Army Service Forces

EDITORS' NOTE

The editors of *Public Administration Review* have devoted a major section of the Autumn issue to a group of articles on administrative management in the Army Service Forces. These articles are of unusual significance for the following reasons:

1. They are the first detailed exposition of a new arrangement of functions in the Army of the United States under which the concept of "service" comes to include on the broadest conceivable scale the combined functions of "service" and "supply." This new array of functions releases the concentrated training and combat energies of ground forces and air forces by providing in the service forces practically all services required by them and affords an integration of service and supply which transcends anything remotely contemplated in our World War I organization known as "Services of Supply."
2. They make a contribution to the literature of military administration, which at this moment occupies such a large sector of the total administrative field.
3. They constitute the first published statement available to civilians of the top philosophy and practice in the field of administrative management of the ASF, one of the three principal components of the new Army.
4. The activities of the ASF are not only global in function but in geography, variety, and magnitude, thus affording, as it were, an enlarged administrative image in which every element can be studied as if under a microscope and in a manner which is not possible in smaller undertakings.
5. The practices of the ASF are translatable into terms that civilian administrators can understand and apply. For many of the problems of control, planning, organization, method, interplays of line and staff, and of relations between headquarters, region, and field are common denominator problems of all administration.

To Lieutenant General Somervell, commanding general, ASF, who incidentally was the first president of the ASPA New York Chapter, and to his associates, the *Review* wishes to acknowledge its appreciation for this important contribution to administrative science and history.



Management

By LIEUTENANT GENERAL BREHON SOMERVELL

Commanding General, Army Service Forces

EVERY executive, in private business, in civil administration, or in the military service, carries the responsibility for efficient management.

Successful management depends on five factors. The first factor is a precise understanding of the job to be done. The second is qualified and capable men in key positions. The third is a workable organization properly adapted to the job to be done. The fourth is a simple, direct system for carrying on the activities involved in the job. The fifth is a positive method of checking on results. Given any three of these five, a business or an agency can probably function with fair success. Four of them operating together will result in much better than average efficiency. However, it requires all five to create the best management obtainable.

In the Army Service Forces, we have had an opportunity to test the effectiveness of modern methods of management, in tests which in size, complexity, geographical spread, and importance of results have seldom been equaled. With two million people, military and civilian, on the payroll, we face personnel problems of great size and complexity. Geographically, we are scattered across the continent, and the scope of our business reaches around the world. We feed, clothe, arm, house, and transport the troops. We build all military installations, from airfields to chapels. We maintain law and order; we operate the courts. We entertain the troops with motion pictures and radio. We operate a world-wide news service and sponsor thousands of camp and unit newspapers. We operate the Army exchanges, with a seventy million dollar re-

tail business each month. We look after the Army's health, run the hospitals, are responsible for hundreds of special schools. We are priests and preachers. We pay the Army's bills. We pay the troops, and pay their allotments. We keep the Army's financial books.

Our seven technical services buy or make everything (except aircraft) that the Army needs and fill many of the needs of our allies. We transport supplies and equipment to the places all over the world where they are needed. We are responsible for holding and employing prisoners of war.

This is complexity raised to the nth degree. Without an efficient management, we surely would fail. That we have not failed is proved by the success of our arms in every battle zone. We have attempted to apply the principles of management outlined above: the job, men, organization, system, checkup.

The efficient performance of any task depends upon a precise understanding of exactly what that task is. This is an obvious principle of good management, but one whose full implications are often overlooked. It is essential to define the job to be done in quantitative terms and to have all key personnel familiar with these objectives.

It is not too difficult to determine broad objectives, but plans must be specific if they are to be useful. It is customary to think of logistics as meaning the right supplies in the right quantities in the right places at the right time. "Enough and on time" has become a popular slogan. But in themselves these terms do not help an organization like the ASF very much. We

must set forth in detail the actual quantities of many different types of items that make up the "right" quantity; we must set forth the dates on which these quantities will be needed. It is not sufficient to say that it is the job of the ASF to furnish service troops to our overseas commanders. How many service troops, of what type, and where—this is the way that we must define our job. The development of these details is laborious, but the effort must be expended if the "mission," the customary term in the Army, is to be realized.

Every administrator is aware of the importance of qualified and capable supervisors; realizes the necessity of placing the right man in the right spot; realizes that, whether in business, civil administration, or war, this is a world of people and not of things. But not every executive realizes that large, complex undertakings can fail, in spite of good men in key positions, through lack of an adequate organizational structure, through lack of systematic methods.

There are many ways to divide a job organizationally: functional division, division by clientele, division by geographic areas, division by professions. Some organizations combine two or even more types. There are so-called "vertical" organizations, "staff-line" organizations. The theoretical relative merits of various types of organizations are not the important consideration. What is important is that the organization adopted for performing a mission be the one most suitable for that specific mission. It should be as direct and simple as possible. It should contain the fewest possible levels of supervision—echelons of command, in Army language. It should be easily understood. It should not lead to questions of duplication, overlapping in duties, jurisdiction of authority, division of responsibility. Every man should know exactly where he fits into the organizational structure, what his responsibilities are, what his authority is. These considerations become doubly important

when it is necessary, as in the case of the ASF, to build a large organization in a very short period of time.

Of equal importance to successful management are proper systems for carrying on the business in hand. Red tape and paper work are abhorred by all. Nevertheless, large-scale activities cannot be successful on a hand-to-mouth basis. If every action is a daily crisis, failures soon begin to appear. Systematic methods must be adopted for handling the day-by-day flow of work. In the ASF, the handling of a million different items of supply with assurance of their arrival from manufacturer to storage depots, to ports of embarkation, on convoys, to ports of debarkation, to the troops overseas requires uniform, coordinated procedures. These procedures must cover the determination of the quantities required, the placing and scheduling of orders, the keeping track of what is in storage and where it is, the ordering of shipment. It is essential to reduce as much work as possible to a standard routine, and it is equally important to keep the procedures used in the process as simple and direct as possible.

Finally, a positive method of continually following-up on results is an essential factor for successful management. Delays and failures must be discovered and corrected promptly. The progress being made in attaining the detailed objectives of the organization must be constantly measured in quantitative terms. Otherwise, there can be no assurance that they are or will be met. It is not enough to issue instructions; there must be a check to see that the instructions are carried out and are effective. Such observations on management are axiomatic, but too often they are overlooked or applied spasmodically.

We do not pretend that our management is perfect. We know that there is still waste motion, that there are still some round pegs in square holes, that in places the organization still is cumbersome. We have been in existence only a little over two years. In that

time, starting from scratch, with a big job to do, we have come a long way.

The results to date have been good. In France and Italy, in North Africa and the Middle East, in India, Burma, China, and

the islands of the Pacific, these results should be apparent to any man. We are not yet satisfied. If the day ever comes when we are satisfied, we shall know that we have started to fail.

Management Control in the Army Service Forces

By MAJOR GENERAL C. F. ROBINSON

Director, Control Division, Army Service Forces

THE creation of the Army Service Forces in March, 1942, imposed a management problem of tremendous proportions. The ASF was made responsible for servicing and supplying the largest Army in the history of the country. Its responsibilities included the procurement, storage, distribution, and maintenance of all types of supplies and equipment (except aircraft), construction, the purchase and lease of real estate, maintenance of real property, transportation, communications, procurement of personnel, and medical, legal, financial, postal, and recreational service for the Army. Its work covered practically every type of human activity. What organizational structure should be used for performing these varied tasks? What were the tasks to be performed in quantitative terms by time periods? How could coordination of the many programs be obtained? How could progress in the major activities be measured to insure that the requirements of the combat troops would be met? What systems and procedures should be employed to carry on such a varied and tremendous undertaking? What controls should be established? What techniques could be used to uncover delays and deficiencies? What techniques could be used for improving the efficiency of operations? These were some of the phases of the management problem facing the ASF.

To assist in solving this management problem, Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, commanding general of the ASF, upon the formation of the ASF, created a unit in his office, reporting directly to him,

which he titled the "control division." This division was given no routine or operating duties. Its purpose was to advise and assist the commanding general in his over-all management job. Its field was the entire field of ASF activities. Its duties were of four main categories:

1. To review continuously the organizational structure of the ASF with a view to discovering duplications, overlappings, conflicts, inappropriate divisions of responsibility and authority, and inadequate coverages of activities, and to recommend corrective measures.
2. To measure quantitatively the progress being made in performing the numerous activities of the ASF by means of statistical reports and analyses of statistical data, and to discover deficiencies and delays and the reasons therefor.
3. To review continuously the procedures being used in the conduct of the various activities of the ASF with a view to their improvement, through simplification and standardization, for the purpose of eliminating nonessential work and speeding up the flow of work.
4. To investigate continuously the effects of policies and regulations on the achievement of end results, to review operations, and to promote the utilization of the best management techniques of business and government.

The control division at all times has endeavored to be an extension of the policies and personality of the commanding general, ASF. It has never tried to displace regular staff officers or subordinate commanders. Rather, it has existed to make special inquiries into subjects of concern to more than one staff director and to keep the commanding general independently informed about matters of general interest. Without any particular operating function or activity to promote, the control division

has been an impartial adviser. It has not operated as a fault-finding inspectorate but rather has attempted to do its work through cooperation with the other elements of the organization. Its investigations and studies usually have been made jointly with representatives of those responsible in a staff or operating capacity for the activities under investigation or study.

Naturally, it has been impossible for one control unit at headquarters to cover adequately the widespread activities of the ASF, involving as they do over 2,000,000 military and civilian personnel and some 3,700 offices and stations located in every corner of the United States. Control units have been established in subordinate elements of the organization to carry on the same duties at the local level for the local commander. Such units are under the jurisdiction ("command," in military language) of the local commander and not of the control unit at headquarters. At the present writing (June, 1944), there are some 390 such units, all attempting to improve operations by means of proper organization, statistical reporting analysis, simplified procedures, and good management techniques.

Three subsequent articles of this series consider in some detail the organizational, statistical reporting, and procedural aspects of the control job in the ASF. The remainder of this article will cover the efforts of the ASF to improve management through the review of policies, systems, and regulations and the use of recognized and new management techniques.

Types of Studies

IN CONDUCTING studies and investigations to improve operations, an effort has always been made in the control work of the ASF to be objective and impartial. Policies, regulations, and published instructions must be questioned for their effect in producing the desired end results. Personalities must be avoided. The basis of any corrective action must be facts, not impressions or opinions. Exactly how is the activity be-

ing conducted? is the question, and the answer is not how someone thinks it is being done or how it has been ordered to be done. What are the results required; what is the goal to be reached; what is a reasonable standard of performance? What results are actually being obtained—expressed quantitatively and not in generalities? Such an approach necessitates investigation in the field where the operations are actually conducted. It necessitates the assembly of detailed facts, the analysis of these facts to discover delays, deficiencies, and possible improvements, and the formulation of the corrective measures. This approach of the ASF to some of the problems of management can best be understood through typical examples.

One recent study involved the responsibilities of the ASF for training certain service troop units for use by overseas commanders. In comparison with its other activities or with the training program of the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces, this activity does not seem large. And yet, as many as 500,000 people at one time have been in the training schools and units of the ASF. The major problems have been the scheduling of training activities and the assignment of personnel so that the troop units are ready for overseas duty when needed and the number of men being processed and waiting assignment is kept at a minimum. The latter problem is important because of the stringent manpower situation. In the jargon of the Army, the flow of personnel in the "pipeline" should be geared to requirements and the number of men in the pipeline at any one time should be held to a minimum.

What could be done about this problem? The control division made a careful study of the entire system of personnel assignment for training units in cooperation with representatives of the staff officers responsible for personnel and training matters. Some 21 different installations were visited where over 50 personnel processing activities were being carried on. It was

found that there was a steady increase in troop units in training with personnel shortages. It took from four to six weeks to obtain the men required to bring a newly created unit up to its authorized strength—and these were units with a high priority. For other units, it took a longer period of time. There were approximately 4,500 units and locations between which men were being transferred. An office of the ASF in Washington was receiving reports on personnel strength, together with requisitions for additional personnel or notices of availability for transfer, from 1,900 sources. Men were being switched around in retail lots in what was essentially a wholesale business. The outstanding instructions in effect for personnel assignments and transfers were charted in detail.

A revised simplified system of military personnel assignment and transfer was evolved to accomplish the basic objective of proper flow and minimum pipeline. Complete instructions were prepared to place the revised system in operation. This system decentralized authority to make transfers to subordinate commands in the field. Training was concentrated in fewer stations, and these training centers, where a man received his basic training, were also made responsible for providing personnel to newly created units. Service commanders were made responsible for transferring personnel who were employed on operating jobs in the United States and who could be released from such duty. Reports on shortages and overages in personnel were greatly reduced. The number of field installations reporting personnel status to Washington was reduced from 1,900 to 36. The number of steps in the flow of personnel was reduced. The number of types of installations between which men might be transferred was reduced from 65 to 37. The revised system produced faster and better results and, at the same time, reduced the paper work and personnel required to operate the system. While sufficient time has not yet elapsed to determine the final re-

sults of the study and subsequent action, the men in the pipeline have already been reduced by some 40,000, and an over-all shortage no longer exists in troop units in training.

Another example of an ASF control project which led to highly beneficial results involved the development and installation of a personnel control system. Early in 1943 it became evident that manpower would be one of the critical shortages of the war. It was incumbent on the ASF to do its job in the United States with the minimum numbers of both military and civilian personnel. The former would be needed overseas; the latter in production of munitions on the home front. This necessitated a system for the close control of the numbers of personnel employed by the ASF. Following an examination of the procedures in effect and their operation in the field, a simple but effective system for the control of the numbers of personnel employed throughout all echelons of the organization was developed, and complete instructions were prepared for its installation and operation. The system was basically one of authorizing quarterly, by means of a standard form, the total number of military and of civilian personnel that could be employed by each major subordinate organizational element of the ASF. These elements, in turn, authorized personnel to their subordinate elements, and they, in turn, took the same course of action. Monthly, on the same standard form, reports were submitted up through the same channels on the numbers actually employed in comparison with the authorization. A series of instructional conferences was held to assist in the installation of the system. The result was a strict accounting and control of all personnel employed through a system which gives to each echelon of command the greatest possible flexibility. The efficacy of the system is amply demonstrated by the fact that during the eleven-month period from June, 1943, to May, 1944, the operating personnel of the ASF was reduced by 225,000, or

16 per cent, in the face of an increasing work load of approximately 25 per cent. This reduction, of course, was not solely the result of the personnel control system. Rather, it resulted from all the efforts, during the period, to improve management and increase efficiency. The personnel control system did make it possible, however, to realize the benefits of these efforts in a positive manner by actual reduction in employment.

A third example may be cited; that of a control project which utilized the technique of a suggestion system. It was suspected that there were numerous cases where field operations were being hampered (1) by lack of authority to act because the situation was not adequately covered in regulations or approvals were required at an unnecessarily high level, (2) by impractical or inapplicable policies and regulations, or (3) by the requirements imposed by higher authority to carry on certain activities or perform certain steps not essential to the objective to be attained. Such cases arose when policies and regulations adopted in peacetime and not applicable in war had not been rescinded or modified to meet war conditions, or when policies and regulations hastily drawn in the early stages of the war or in preparation for war had not been modified on the basis of experience with their practical application. A program was undertaken to uncover and correct such situations by canvassing the supervisory personnel in the lowest echelons who were actually attempting to carry out the policies and regulations prescribed. Instructions explaining the objectives of the program were prepared and forwarded to all echelons in the field. What unnecessary work was being done? What unnecessary records were being kept? What particular restrictions imposed by higher authority were bothersome? The instructions required the submission of cases from the lowest echelons through channels of command to the control division at headquarters in accordance with a designated time

schedule. Intervening commanders were permitted to comment on the suggestions thus submitted but were not permitted to hold up submission to headquarters.

The program was taken seriously by the entire organization. The number of recommendations received, 4,255, was surprisingly large. Few recommendations were trivial or unreasonable. They covered some phase of practically all the numerous activities of the ASF. With the assistance of the appropriate staff agencies at headquarters, the recommendations were analyzed. Over 60 per cent were found to have merit in simplifying and improving operations and were approved. The necessary revisions of policies and regulations were then prepared and published. Subsequently, a follow-up was made in the field to determine whether the approved recommendations had been placed in effect. The following random sample of actions taken illustrates the results obtained from the program.

Monthly physical inventories of post exchanges, involving a separate check by a disinterested officer, were replaced by a quarterly inventory and a spot check. A requirement of annual renewal of all real estate leases was replaced, after conference with the comptroller general, by automatic renewals for the duration of the war. For some time prior to the program, it had been a general practice in many parts of the Army to send out confirmation copies of radiograms, telegrams, and teletypes. This practice was found to be unnecessary and wasteful. It was therefore dropped, and hundreds of thousands of unnecessary confirmation copies were thus eliminated. It had been the practice for the office of the quartermaster general to approve centrally in Washington all contracts of a certain type in excess of \$85.00. This authority was decentralized to service commanders. It had also been the practice to clear the release of unclassified information from local offices through the bureau of public relations in Washington. For example, if a reporter on the Pacific Coast wanted a story

from the ninth service command about something that was not secret, he had to wait until clearance of the story was obtained from Washington. Authority to clear such items was delegated to service commanders. It was found that both an officer in the signal corps and one in the adjutant general's office were trying to handle the assignment of enlisted men trained in the signal corps. This activity was centralized in the adjutant general's office and handled by a representative of the signal corps placed in that office.

This particular program was the first time in the history of the Army that a concerted effort was made throughout as large a segment as the ASF to have commanding officers all the way down the line review critically the job they were doing and make recommendations to headquarters on what headquarters could do to make their jobs easier. The dragnet thus spread wide brought in many responses and had an enormous psychological as well as practical effect. It convinced the commanders in the field that headquarters was trying to help them. It also caused them to become extremely critical of their own operations.

The three examples outlined have a common pattern which is typical of the projects undertaken to improve operations. In each case an attempt was made to get the detailed facts by going to the lower echelons of the organization where the work is actually done. Other agencies having an interest in or responsibility for the activity or activities being studied joined in the project. The control division was primarily furnishing leadership and an impartial and objective consideration of the problems involved. The studies did not stop with the uncovering of unsatisfactory conditions but included the development of solutions in a form ready to be placed into effect. The decision as to whether the recommended solution would be adopted rested with the commanding general and was made by him. The projects continue through a follow-up stage to determine whether the solution

adopted is actually placed in effect and whether it works satisfactorily.

Work Simplification

THE "work simplification" program of the ASF illustrates the adaptation and utilization of recognized management techniques. This program got under way in January, 1943, when the control division, in cooperation with the office of the adjutant general, began a careful study of the work process in the record examining section of the enlisted branch of that office. This was the beginning of work simplification, adapting techniques which had been developed in private industry to the needs of the ASF. A standard process chart, to show the operations required in any large-scale routine clerical task, was developed and used in this test. It was found that induction papers examined by the record examining section went through 67 steps from the time the mail was delivered in sacks to mail control until the papers were separated for filing and for punch carding by the machine records unit. This survey resulted in 37 recommendations for improving work performance. The number of steps was reduced from 67 to 41 and the number of feet traveled by the papers from 605 to 375. These changes enabled the examining section to turn over 55 of their 135 personnel for reassignment to other duties.

The standard process chart developed in the ASF employed four symbols to designate operation, transportation, storage, and inspection. After recording the specific process used in handling papers, some simple yet exhaustive questions were asked about each step. *Why* is the work necessary? *What* previous operations or instructions require this step? *When* could or should this work be done? *Where* should the work be done? *Who* should do it? *How* should it be done? The use of this systematic procedure of analysis contributed to a large degree to the success of process chart application in the ASF.

Another technique employed in work simplification was the layout chart showing the physical layout of a room and the movement of papers from desk to desk to table to files. This type of chart permitted the analyst to examine the arrangement of desks and tables to determine whether work flow was as simple and expeditious as possible. It revealed ways to save space, eliminate confusion, and improve working conditions.

Operation study was introduced through a technique designed to improve desk or work-place layout and arrange supplies to eliminate unnecessary and tiring motions.

Later the technique of work simplification was extended to materials-handling operations. One of the largest jobs of the ASF is the handling of supplies and equipment for distribution to the Army in the United States and for shipment overseas. The many depots and ports of embarkation have a heavy labor requirement for storing, packing, loading, and unloading the thousands of items that must be shipped. A careful study was made of materials-handling practices at the New York port of embarkation. The process chart previously used in analyzing clerical operations was found to be equally useful in studying the procedure for unloading goods. An examination of the method employed for unloading a truck indicated 41 distinct operational steps and travel of 1,810 feet. Simplification of the activity resulted in reducing the number of steps to 31 and the transportation distance to 1,460 feet.

A new technique developed during the study at the New York port of embarkation was the construction of a process chart for gang activities. The work of each member of a gang was charted in sequence so that it was possible to analyze the work being done simultaneously by the various members of a gang of 3, 7, or even 35 men. The layout chart technique was applied to warehouses at the port. Methods used in wrapping and marking packages were also studied and simplified in various depots.

In large measure, the work done by the control division at headquarters of the ASF in the application of management techniques is experimental and charting. As techniques are developed, they are passed along to others to use. The work simplification program of the ASF has been conducted on this basis. The original study of the clerical operations in the enlisted branch of the adjutant general's office was more than just a single work simplification study. It was an experiment designed to demonstrate to others what could be accomplished by the use of the process chart technique. In February, 1943, the control division called a meeting in headquarters, ASF, which 175 officers and key civilians attended. The work simplification study was described in some detail at this meeting. Copies of a work simplification manual describing how to use the technique were distributed. Each technical service was encouraged to begin similar surveys in its Washington offices and field installations. Copies of the work simplification manual were also distributed to the nine service commands. The control division then sent personnel to the headquarters of each of the service commands to instruct persons there in work simplification techniques. Later, personnel came into the control division from field agencies to learn more details about the work simplification program. Altogether, 16,000 copies of the work simplification manual and 50,000 copies of an abbreviated pamphlet on the same subject have been distributed throughout the ASF.

When the new work simplification technique was developed for materials-handling the same kind of educational program was carried on. The results of the studies at the New York port of embarkation and at selected depots were presented by the control division at a meeting in December, 1943, attended by nearly 200 persons. A manual on work simplification in materials-handling was distributed to this group. At the same time it was announced that con-

trol division personnel would be available to give instruction in the new techniques at schools which the technical services might desire to organize. The first such school was held at the Jersey City quartermaster depot. Fifty-five officers and civilians attended. After one day given to an explanation of the technique, the group was broken down into small teams of four members accompanied by an instructor and assigned to observe and chart actual work being carried on in the depot. Each team then explained its chart to the whole group. Proposals for simplification were discussed. In this way each person was given an opportunity to participate in the use of the techniques being taught.

Following the experience with the Jersey City school, seventeen other schools were held at depots and ports all over the United States. Over 500 officers and key civilians received instruction. Personnel from other government agencies asked to be included in the classes. The persons taught at these schools were expected to teach the technique to others as well as to use it in the careful examination of existing materials-handling practices in their own agencies. For example, the quartermaster general had his officers who received instruction at these schools conduct additional courses which reached another thousand officers and civilians in the quartermaster corps.

Probably no program for the application of a management technique has ever before been undertaken on so extensive a scale at such a tempo as the work simplification program of the ASF. From the inception of the program in January, 1943, to June, 1944, some 5,000 persons were instructed in the standard methods of work simplification adopted for the ASF. During the same period, over 10,000 separate projects utilizing these standard methods were undertaken and completed. The activities reviewed involved the employment of approximately a quarter of a million persons. The savings in manpower resulting from these projects average 15 per cent of the

personnel surveyed. In addition, valuable time has been saved through the elimination of unnecessary steps, an important consideration in war. In March, 1944, the commanding general of the ASF issued instructions that all technical services and service commands continue work simplification studies as a practical means of combating manpower shortages. Specifically, it was directed that surveys would be conducted at depots, arsenals, ports, Army posts, induction stations, reception centers, general hospitals, finance offices, and repair shops. Each installation, after completing a study, was required to prepare a work simplification report. These reports are forwarded to the control division at headquarters at the end of each month, so that the progress of the program can be followed and reports of new developments can be circulated.

Work Measurement

RECENTLY, a work measurement technique was developed for determining and controlling the efficiency of operations. The technique was adapted from the various recognized methods used in private industry for analyzing the effectiveness of operations. It involves the use of standard work-units for various common activities, the recording of man hours expended per work-unit, and the comparison of such man hours with developed standards. Because of limitations in the War Department Appropriations Act, production records covering individual employees can not be maintained. Accordingly, entire operations or activities, such as the handling of freight in a depot or the preparation and mailing of allowance checks, are measured. The records are maintained at the lowest possible level in order to distribute the burden and to avoid large centralized clerical operations. At monthly intervals or more frequently, total work-units completed are multiplied by standards to obtain standard man hours. A standard is determined by first arranging in order of magnitude the

number of man hours per work-unit for a group of similar activities. The number of man hours per work-unit which is halfway between the best and the middle figure is used as the standard. Standard man hours divided by man hours expended indicates the effectiveness for an operation or activity. A comparison of the effectiveness of similar activities will indicate where improvements in management might be made and where personnel is probably not being properly utilized.

This technique has been formalized in a work measurement manual which prescribes standard methods and forms for its application. A program to apply the technique throughout the ASF, similar to the program used in work simplification, has been launched. This program replaces numerous uncoordinated local efforts to improve the management of specific operations. A standard approach will permit a wider application of methods to improve management and will permit comparisons of effectiveness to be made throughout the ASF. It is expected that the new program will supplement the work simplification program and will lead to more positive control over the efficiency of operations.

Work simplification and work measurement illustrate the efforts of the ASF to adapt and apply management techniques developed in business and government to

the work of the Army. Many other techniques, such as employee attitude surveys, form design, report and forms control, space control, suggestion systems, budgetary control, and inventory control, have also been applied, generally with marked success. The ASF has no preconceived or fixed ideas on methods to improve its operations. On the contrary, there is a willingness to experiment with any method, new or old, and to apply it generally if the experiment proves successful. The only requirement is that the method be one that can be applied on a wholesale scale at a rapid rate.

The control idea as it is applied in the ASF might be summarized as a determined effort at critical self-analysis. What delays, deficiencies, and unsatisfactory conditions exist? Where are manpower, material, equipment, and funds being utilized without full effectiveness? What corrective action can be taken? "Control" employs any applicable methods to improve management in the ASF. Probably no such wide-scale and rapid effort in the field of management has ever before been attempted. It has been successful, markedly so, in certain phases; but there have also been failures and omissions. The job is not finished; it will never be finished. But there exists a determination, which results in action, to improve and still further improve the management of the ASF.

The Organizational Structure of the Army Service Forces

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THE Army Service Forces has many different jobs to perform, from procuring supplies to providing recreational facilities, from dispatching messages to transporting troops, from running hospitals to keeping prisoners of war. There are all the tasks to do for military society that in the civilian world private enterprise and government combine to perform for the individual. The organization of so many diverse activities with their innumerable ramifications was a challenging undertaking.

In working out the organizational structure there were numerous possible bases of dividing up these responsibilities. The most ready choice was to let each specialty go its own way, developing its program without concern for other needs. There were pressures to permit such an arrangement. Yet no one who viewed the situation objectively could advocate administrative chaos in the face of limited resources, limited time, and unlimited needs for men and supplies to be used against the enemy. But could common threads be found to hold together diverse activities? Could multiple responsibilities be fitted into a homogeneous organization?

A variety of tasks was not the only organizational complication for the ASF. Hastily put together on March 9, 1942, this new agency of the War Department inherited many different elements, each with

its own peculiar background. The following branches or bureaus which had previously reported directly to the chief of staff became a part of the ASF:¹ the quartermaster corps, the corps of engineers, the medical department, the ordnance department, the signal corps, and the chemical warfare service; the nine corps areas; all ports of embarkation; the judge advocate general; the adjutant general; the provost marshal general; the chief of chaplains; the chief of the national guard bureau; the executive for reserve and ROTC affairs; the chief of finance; and the chief of special service.

It was the philosophy of the War Department reorganization that the administrative and coordinating responsibilities of the general staff were to be sizably reduced. The large supervisory staff of the under secretary of war for procurement operations was to be joined with the general staff units fixing supply requirements and controlling subsequent distribution. As a result, substantial elements of G-1 and G-4 of the War Department general staff were transferred to the commanding general, ASF, as well as almost the entire staff of the office of the under secretary of war, which at the beginning of 1942 numbered 1,200 officers and civilians.

At the outset there was little choice but to fashion a makeshift organization to accommodate activities and personalities in as expedient a way as possible. In time, adjustments could be made and a more satisfactory structure realized. The control division gave continuing attention to the problem of making a cohesive whole out of the

¹ When originally created by Executive Order No. 9082 (February 28, 1942), and by War Department Circular No. 59 (March 2, 1942), the ASF was known as the Services of Supply. The name was changed to Army Service Forces by War Department General Orders No. 14 (March 12, 1943).

parts which were labeled the "Army Service Forces."

Organization can never be static, if for no other reason than this: with time come new developments, new jobs, new emphases. On March 9, 1942, the ASF was not immediately worried about renegotiating contracts or terminating them. These matters were to emerge later as outstanding concerns and to demand special organizational arrangements. A stock control system showing the location as well as the amount of supplies was also to become a major objective, and, later, means had to be found for relating stock position to procurement schedules. Organization was adjusted to take into account these developments and to contribute to their handling.

Organizational structure must at best represent compromises—compromises between the rival claims of specialization on the one hand and of unified objectives on the other. The enthusiasm of the technician, the particularism of "know-how" must be combined with the vision of a goal and with the control and effective utilization of limited resources. The solutions for these problems are not universal. Often they must be arrived at through experimentation.

Yet behind the day-to-day alterations in the organization of the ASF lay a plan. This plan was outlined by the commanding general and developed by the studies of the control division. The existence of an administrative objective made the periodic organizational changes something other than mere patchwork. Today the goals of early organizational thinking have been largely realized.

There are three major elements in the ASF administrative structure—the technical services, the service commands, and the headquarters staff. The first two are the operating agencies—the technical services representing mainly a commodity breakdown with certain professional and functional aspects, and the service commands representing a purely geographical division of duties.

The Technical Services

THE ASF recognized as one of its major operating responsibilities the procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies. The agencies of the War Department that had performed this work had a long history. Three of them traced their origins to the Continental Army under General Washington. Another had been established early in the history of the federal government. The newcomers were the signal corps, first set up in 1860, and the chemical warfare service, established in 1917. The chiefs of these services were more than procurement officers. They were the chiefs of well-recognized branches of service, with personnel spread throughout the Army. It was not always easy to define the line of demarcation between the chief's direct administrative authority and his role as guardian of the best interests of his service wherever its members might be assigned. The budget practice of the government in appropriating funds by service activities, no matter how they might be organized, was another factor which had helped to develop a strong branch feeling.

It was eminently desirable to continue the traditions of these services. Moreover, organizationally it seemed a sound practice to divide procurement operations along commodity lines. Accordingly, the division of work which established commodity specialization in purchase, in storage, and in distribution was never questioned.

The ASF did create one new service—the transportation corps, which was set up by War Department General Orders No. 38 (July 31, 1942). The new corps was an amalgamation of the transportation division of the quartermaster corps with the transportation branch of former G-4 division of the War Department general staff. From the very beginning, on March 9, the ASF had regarded transportation as a distinct problem and had set up a transportation division as an operating unit.

At first called "supply services" and later "technical services," the quartermaster corps, the corps of engineers, the medical department, the ordnance department, the signal corps, the chemical warfare service, and the transportation corps served as the agencies of the ASF performing procurement and supply operations. Each of these services had its headquarters staff in Washington and its field installations scattered throughout the United States. These field installations were of several types. There were proving grounds and laboratories for the development and testing of materiel, procurement district offices and government-owned plants, and depots. Through these field installations the various phases of procurement were performed from research to issue.

The technical services of the ASF had other responsibilities besides procurement. Training was one. Divisions, corps, armies, and overseas theaters must have their supply and service troops performing appropriate phases of the work for their particular organizations and areas. Thus, an armored division must have an ordnance maintenance battalion to repair tanks and trucks when major overhauling is required. An army must have ammunition supply companies distributing ammunition to forward points where combat units can pick up their supplies. Quartermaster units are needed to operate depots in a theater and to keep the flow of food and other supplies moving to the hands of the combat soldier. Transportation units must be trained to operate overseas ports of debarkation. There is a signal company in a division providing communication for the division commander with subordinate units and with his superiors. Signal construction battalions string wire communication from army headquarters and corps headquarters to divisions and from army headquarters to field commanders. There must be radio and telephone operators. Medical units are needed to run overseas hospitals and to

provide immediate first aid for the men wounded in the front lines. Engineering units are needed for a multitude of different jobs in combat zones. Chemical warfare troops may be employed to operate smoke-generating equipment. In other words, supply and service is a job that must be performed at many different levels in the military hierarchy. The technical services were expected to provide the personnel to perform some of these jobs.

Besides its training work, the medical department supervised medical and hospital service in the United States. The signal corps ran the communications system connecting points in the United States and overseas. The corps of engineers was responsible for all construction for the Army in the United States. The transportation corps, with only a small procurement program, had as its major responsibility the movement of men and supplies by rail within the United States and by water transport to overseas destinations. The transportation corps stood astride the whole system of supply distribution, too, since the overseas theaters requisitioned supplies through the ports of embarkation. These ports were responsible for seeing that the necessary supplies were forwarded on time to appropriate overseas points.

The work of the technical services had many ramifications. Each was a large organization. Yet there were many common threads running through all of them. More will be said about this later. What is essential to note is that these technical services were each recognized as vital operating units of the ASF. Their chiefs were seven major commanders each carrying out a part of the responsibility of the commanding general, ASF.

The Service Commands

AS ALREADY mentioned, War Department Circular No. 59, issued March 2, 1942, provided that the corps areas of the War Department should become a part of the

new ASF. Nothing was said in the circular about the responsibilities of these corps areas, or how they were expected to fit into the functions assigned to the ASF.

The National Defense Act, as amended June 4, 1920, had provided that "for purposes of administration, training, and tactical control the continental area of the United States shall be divided on a basis of military population into corps areas." By General Order No. 50 in 1920 the War Department had divided the United States into nine corps areas to which were assigned responsibility for tactical training and administrative control of the component units of the Army. Each corps area was expected to contain one division of the regular Army, a division of the National Guard, and a division of organized reserves. The corps area commanders were expected to perform the various administrative and tactical responsibilities of the War Department in the United States.

Actually from time to time by various orders the War Department exempted numerous field installations from the jurisdiction of corps area commanders. These included district procurement planning offices, depots, ports of embarkation, finance offices, the division and district offices of the corps of engineers, named general hospitals, and certain other installations.

During the 1920's and 1930's the tactical importance of the corps areas also tended to decline as fixed geographical boundaries proved a disadvantage in planning the tactical training and employment of the Army. On July 26, 1940, a general headquarters of field forces was created charged with the training of all harbor defense and mobile troops within the continental United States, including a general headquarters, aviation, and the armored force. On October 3, 1940, the field forces still remaining under the jurisdiction of commanding generals of corps areas were transferred to the control of general headquarters. At the same time, the field forces were relieved from any re-

sponsibility for administration and supply. This latter function remained as a responsibility of the corps areas.

In effect, the corps areas thus became responsible for the management of military posts throughout the United States. The fixed installations of a military reservation were operated as a separate military activity. The post commanding officers saw to the maintenance of all structures, operated the post warehouses, ran the post exchange and the post motion picture theater, managed the post utilities, directed the work of the post hospital, provided certain post recreational facilities for the off-duty use of troops, ran a disbursing office, operated post laundries and maintenance shops, and otherwise took charge of post property. These functions were discharged through station complements under the direction of the post commander at each permanent camp, post, and station. Over all the post commanders within the appropriate geographical boundaries was the commanding general of a corps area.

Thus, when they became a part of the ASF the corps areas had little other than administrative and supply responsibilities. Even in this field, however, the full authority of the corps area, and more particularly of the corps area commander, was not clearly defined. Many administrative activities, such as disbursing and accounting for funds, tended to be operated directly by the chief of finance in Washington. The post commander had little to say about the work of the finance officer at his station. And in each corps area there were United States finance officers paying procurement bills over which the corps area commander had no jurisdiction. Repair and utility operations at posts and camps tended to be controlled directly by the field organization of the chief of engineers rather than through the corps area headquarters. The quartermaster officer at a post and even at a corps area headquarters looked upon himself more as belonging to a part of the organ-

ization of the quartermaster general than as a part of the corps area or post organization.

Shortly after March 9, 1942, the commanding general of the ASF directed his control division to make a survey of the organization and activities of corps areas. Two corps areas—the third, with its headquarters in Baltimore, and the sixth, with its headquarters in Chicago—were selected for careful field study in May and June, 1942. These surveys revealed two basic defects in the position and structure of corps areas. In the first place, there was no clear, complete statement to be found in Army regulations or elsewhere defining the responsibilities entrusted to commanding generals of corps areas. Many posts and installations had only a vague relationship to corps area headquarters. Within the boundaries of the sixth corps area alone, geographically a relatively small area of three states, there were found to be forty-nine exempted army installations. Many of these stations were now under the jurisdiction of the commanding general, ASF. There was confusion in the relationship of the corps areas to the four defense commands created by the War Department. The responsibilities of the corps areas had been whittled away and no effort had been made to provide the incumbent commanding generals with a well-defined and comprehensive statement of their position and mission.

In the second place, the organization of corps area headquarters tended to continue to follow tactical lines in spite of the fact that tactical responsibilities had been removed. One result of this tendency was a multiplicity of staff officers reporting to the commanding general. In the third corps area there were thirty-two divisions reporting to the commanding general. Some of these staff divisions had both planning and operating functions. The relations between general staff officers and special staff officers were not at all clear. In the sixth corps area it was found that six special staff officers

had their own civilian personnel sections. There was no uniformity in the recruitment, training, promotion, and separation of civilian personnel. In the third corps area there were nine different offices maintaining fiscal sections, each receiving separate allotments from Washington and in turn making allotments to field offices within the area. Five or six different officers were handling phases of the internal security program.

At army posts the same kinds of defects in definition of responsibility and in internal organization were found.

These findings were carefully reviewed in ASF headquarters. It was decided to make the corps areas the principal field agencies of the ASF in the United States for handling all but procurement, new construction, and certain phases of storage and transportation operations. The number of exempt stations was to be reduced and the responsibility of the commanding general of a corps area for managing the functions entrusted to him was to be made clear and definite.

The first step in setting up the corps areas as operating field units of the ASF was taken on July 22, 1942. At that time the name "corps area" was changed to "service command." This change in title acknowledged the fact that the corps areas had already lost all tactical importance in the zone of the interior. Further, it emphasized that as a service command the new unit exercised full control over administrative and service activities within the area.

Army regulations were then revised to set forth clearly the responsibilities of service commands. The mission of the service command was defined as the performance in the field of all the basic functions of the ASF except procurement, manufacturing, new construction, depot operation, and the operation of ports of embarkation. At the same time that Army regulations were revised, ASF headquarters issued a service command organization manual providing a common administrative structure for serv-

ice command headquarters and for posts, together with further details about the manner in which they would perform their duties.

In order to clarify the relationship of service commands to War Department installations in the field, all installations were classified into four categories. The revised Army regulations defining service command responsibilities provided that there should be Class I, Class II, Class III, and Class IV installations. Class I installations were under the complete control of the commanding general of a service command. Class II installations were army posts housing ground force troops. The post as a continuing War Department facility was to be managed by a commanding officer responsible to the service commander. At the same time, the mission of the commanding officer of a Class II installation was to provide necessary administrative and supply services to assist the ground force commanders located on the post. Class III installations were air fields under the direct control of the Army Air Forces. Class IV installations were those under the control of the chiefs of technical services of the ASF.

Class I installations included induction stations, recruiting stations, reception centers, motor repair shops, recreation camps and areas, internal security districts, general dispensaries, national cemeteries, and activities involving state guards and the Reserve Officer Training Program. These were all activities which had previously been operated by corps area commanders. In addition, all general hospitals, except Walter Reed General Hospital in Washington, now came under the command control of the service commander. Prisoner-of-war camps were transferred from direct operation by the provost marshal general in Washington to the commander of the service command. U.S. Army finance offices, except the Army finance office in Washington, were transferred from the chief of finance to the service commands. Certain training responsibilities of chiefs of tech-

nical and other services were likewise transferred to service commands.

At Class II installations, as already mentioned, the service commander had complete responsibility for the management of the post as a facility, but he could not forget his obligation to provide the kinds of service desired by the ground force commanders stationed there. The Army Ground Forces desired the ASF to operate these posts for a very simple reason: ground force commanders would thus be enabled to give their undivided attention to the problem of training tactical troop units. The repair of roads; the operation of the light and power plant, the water system, and the sewage disposal system; the management of laundries, bakeries, fixed repair shops, post stockades, magazine areas, the hospital, the post theaters and field houses, the post exchange, and the finance office; the storage of supplies in warehouses and the maintenance of property records—all these activities were performed by the ASF on the post, and the Army Ground Force commanders need worry only about the soldiers and troop units they were training. True, troop units had their supply sergeants and pay clerks, but the responsibilities which in the field would be performed by service units of a corps, an army, or the theater were in the United States performed by the ASF.

At Class III installations—air fields and posts—the service commands had only limited responsibilities. They supervised the audit of post accounts, the operation of laundries, the recreational and morale activities, repairs and utilities, disbursement activities, and the operation of fixed signal communications. In the performance of these particular activities the commanding officer of an air post was under the jurisdiction of the service commander. Otherwise he reported through his own direct channels to the commanding general of the Army Air Forces.

The position of commanding officers of Class IV installations was similar to that of

commanding officers at Class III installations. Class IV installations included procurement district offices, depots, ports of embarkation, proving grounds and training centers, and certain miscellaneous offices.

The division of all field installations into four categories proved a definite step forward in clarifying the responsibilities of service commanders in the field. Although difficulties developed from time to time in the relationships between service commanders and the commanding officers at Class III and Class IV installations which had to be solved through negotiation by the men on the spot, the mere fact that these installations had been classified helped to identify the nature of the difficulties which arose.

The organization of the headquarters of service commands was patterned after that of headquarters, ASF. In particular, such activities as internal security, training, personnel, and finance were centralized in single functional units. The number of officers reporting directly to the commanding general of a service command was reduced from an average of thirty to eleven; later, however, this average rose to seventeen. Army posts, in turn, were expected to be organized along lines similar to those of the headquarters of a service command.

Inter-Staff Relationships

SPECIAL efforts were made to insure that the staff officers of the commanding general of a service command appreciated that their first responsibility was to the service command. Careful instructions were issued that staff officers or chiefs of technical services in Washington would communicate directly with their subordinate members in service commands only on matters of technical detail. All instructions setting forth matters of policy were to be issued in the name of the commanding general directly to the commanding general of the service command.

A change was made in the system of allotting funds to field activities which also

tended to emphasize the authority of the service commander. It had been the practice for the chief of ordnance to make allotments directly to the ordnance officer in corps area headquarters, who in turn made such allotments as were necessary for local purchases to the ordnance officer of a post. After July 22, 1942, all funds for all activities which were the responsibility of the service commander were allotted directly to him rather than to any subordinate division of his office.

A number of other devices were used to strengthen the position of the service commander. The chief of engineers revised his divisional boundaries in order to make them coterminous with those of service commands. The division engineer henceforth had a twofold position. As division engineer under the chief of engineers he directed the district engineer offices responsible for new construction activities. As service command engineer he served as the staff officer of the service commander on repair and utility activities throughout the service command. A similar arrangement was made for transportation zones. The zone transportation officer was both a service command officer and a field officer of the chief of transportation. As service command transportation officer he supervised the work of post transportation officers who handled all local arrangements for large troop movements in and out of posts. The functioning of division engineers and zone transportation officers in dual capacities proved satisfactory in practice.

The emphasis upon the importance of the service commander as general administrator for field activities made it necessary for various officers in Washington to revise their concepts of their responsibilities. This change in point of view was perhaps best exemplified by revisions in Army regulations defining the position of the chief of engineers. The Army regulations on repair and utilities activities before the service command organization read that "funds . . . for the accomplishment of repairs and

utilities will be made available to post engineers. . . ." This was changed in September, 1942, to read "funds for the accomplishment of repairs and utilities will be made available to the commanding generals of service commands in accordance with approved policies and instructions of the Commanding General, Services of Supply." More significant of the changed philosophy of organization was the revised statement issued in April, 1943, defining repairs and utilities responsibilities in the United States. This statement read:

Repairs and utilities work within the geographic limits of service commands, Army Service Forces, is the responsibility of the commanding generals of service commands with such exceptions as fall under paragraph 1, Commanding generals of service commands will carry out this responsibility under the supervision of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and will be responsible for the conduct of this work so as to meet the requirements of Army Air Forces commanders and the chiefs of technical services to the extent that available funds, the policies of the Army Service Forces, and good engineering practice will permit. The Chief of Engineers will function as the staff agency of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, in connection with such work.

Similarly, the surgeon general became the staff adviser to the commanding general, ASF, on matters affecting general hospitals. The chief signal officer became the staff officer on all matters involving fixed signal communication within the boundaries of service commands. The chief of ordnance became the staff adviser on the operation of ordnance maintenance shops within the service commands. The provost marshal general became the staff adviser on matters concerning internal security and prisoners of war. The judge advocate general became the staff adviser on matters involving legal activities within the service command and on questions of military justice. The chief of finance became staff adviser on disbursing and accounting activities in the field.

After the reorganization of the service commands, continuing care had to be exercised to prevent offices in Washington from

establishing field agencies under their own direct jurisdiction exempt from the authority of the service commander. For example, the industrial personnel division of headquarters, ASF, in the autumn of 1942 set up branch labor offices throughout the United States to advise headquarters on labor supply conditions in their areas and to handle special labor supply problems affecting the ASF. In January, 1943, these labor officers were placed upon the staffs of commanding generals of service commands. When the Army Specialized Training Program was established early in 1943, its pattern of administration was set from the beginning along geographical lines. The director of army specialized training in ASF headquarters became the staff adviser to the commanding general for this activity. Administration in the field, including the negotiation of contracts with educational institutions and the selection and assignment of trainees, was made a part of the responsibility of the service commander.

There was an important reason for making the service command a major operating unit of the ASF and for conferring upon the service commander complete administrative authority over the various activities performed within the area. The service commander was expected to provide the necessary coordinating authority for the many diverse activities of the ASF within his area. It was recognized that various programs would have to be adjusted at the area level to meet the circumstances of different sections of the country. This was true, for instance, of internal security activities, the employment of prisoners of war, and the handling of relations with state selective service agencies. The commanding general of the service command within the policy limitations prescribed from ASF headquarters was empowered to make these decisions without referring them all the way to Washington.

The fact that most ASF activities were performed on army posts for the benefit of

soldiers as individuals or for the benefit of units as a whole made general coordination vital. The post commander was in a position to effect the necessary coordination between the activities of recreation officers, post exchanges, motion picture theaters, field houses, and service clubs. He was in a position to move day labor for unloading cars from the post ordnance officer to the post quartermaster when large shipments of supplies arrived. He was able to see that road repairs and utilities operations were performed to the satisfaction of all elements on the post. If the post surgeon felt that quartermaster supplies were not being provided him properly or that he was not getting the right service in repairing buildings and fixtures, the post commander was there with full authority to settle the difficulties.

The geographical hierarchy of the ASF was not intended to belittle or to hamstring technical proficiency in various specialties. The post surgeon or the commanding officer of a general hospital was expected to be a technician in the medical field whom only the surgeon general's office could evaluate. The post engineer and the service command engineer were expected to be technicians, too, whose standards of professional performance would be judged by the chief of engineers on behalf of the commanding general, ASF. It was in the realm of the common problems of fiscal service, personnel service, and supply service that the commanding officer of a post was expected to exercise his authority in a way to insure the most efficient utilization of manpower and facilities.

Staff Agencies

THE third organizational feature of the ASF was its staff structure in Washington. As already mentioned, with the establishment of the service commands as the principal field agencies of the ASF, many Washington offices no longer exercised direct control over their own field units. These offices had been given the

general label of "administrative services" when the ASF was created in March, 1942. They included the office of the chief of finance, the office of the judge advocate general, the office of the provost marshal general, the Army exchange service, the adjutant general's office, and two or three other offices. In order to lessen the burden upon the commanding general and his chief of staff, a chief of administrative services had been designated from the beginning who was expected to handle the major policy questions arising from these offices.

The original staff structure of the ASF was set up along functional lines. It was created by amalgamating various branches and sections which had previously functioned as a part of the office of the under secretary of war. For example, there were a personnel division, a fiscal division, a training division, an operations division, and three divisions organized under a deputy chief of staff for requirements and resources.

In the course of time, two developments occurred in the ASF staff structure. The first of these was the amalgamation of the work of the administrative services with the work of the staff divisions. With the service commands as the major field units, the administrative services became in effect staff agencies of the commanding general, ASF. Much of their work was closely allied to work being performed by the functional staff as originally created. For example, the fiscal division was established from a budget unit in G-4 and some fiscal services, such as control of advance payments, insurance, and other matters, that had been performed by the office of the under secretary of war. Necessarily, this fiscal division was closely concerned with the work performed by the office of the chief of finance. In the course of time the solution to the organizational problem presented here was found in amalgamating the two offices. Such administrative services as the office of the chief of chaplains, the executive for reserve and ROTC affairs, the Army exchange service,

and the special services were closely related to the over-all personnel activities of the ASF. It was therefore logical to bring all of these agencies together as a part of the personnel staff.

As the functions of the ASF were expanded to include the administrative services, the number of staff divisions was more than doubled. In order to prevent a large number of individuals, nearly thirty in total, from reporting directly to the commanding general, the positions of staff directors were created. Thus, there was established a director of personnel with eight staff divisions under him. The director of military training had two staff divisions. A director of supply had three staff divisions. Six staff divisions were set up under a director of materiel and six under the fiscal director, with his deputy, the chief of finance. Finally, a director of plans and operations by 1944 had three staff divisions under his control. In addition, the judge advocate general, the adjutant general, and the provost marshal general were all staff officers reporting to the commanding general. In this way some six staff directors had about twenty-eight staff divisions over whose work they exercised control in the name of the commanding general. Through these arrangements the immediate staff of the commanding general was reduced to manageable proportions.

The headquarters staff of the ASF was acknowledgedly large. In June, 1944, it numbered some 2,500 officers and about 13,000 civilians. These figures did not include the offices of the chiefs of technical services, which were also located in Washington. The reason for the large functional staff was readily evident. There were many common threads running throughout the work of the technical services, organized along commodity and professional lines. For example, the legal provisions governing purchasing procedure had to be uniform for the War Department as a whole. The pricing practices also required standardization. The procurement programs of

each technical service had to be geared to the purchase or manufacture of equipment to outfit the same number of combat troops. A uniform supply program, in turn, demanded certain quantities of raw materials needed for the manufacture of all types of items. These raw materials requirements had to be estimated on a uniform basis and reviewed and presented to the War Production Board for allocation. Adjustments had to be made in raw materials available to each technical service in order to meet schedules for supplying end items. Staff agencies were needed, in other words, to insure that all the supplies needed by ninety combat divisions and their support troops were provided on schedule.

Disbursing activities, personnel services, training, internal security, and prisoner-of-war programs could not vary in fundamentals from one service command to another. Staff agencies were needed to realize the desired uniformity for a geographical organization. The ASF was a large organization; it had a large staff. The desire to recognize many different specialties meant creating many different staff divisions.

The Organization Manual

IN AN effort to keep all elements of the ASF informed about administrative structure and to encourage administrative thinking, the control division shortly after its creation began the preparation of an organization manual. This manual was set up on a standard basis. Each staff division and each technical service was instructed how to prepare its own statement. Divisions and services were asked to set forth briefly and concisely, first, their mission; second, their major functions; and, third, their organization structure, showing branches and sections with the responsibilities assigned to each. It has been a problem to obtain exactness in the description of functions and responsibilities. There seems to be a tendency to resort to vague phrases such as "supervise," "maintain liaison," and "coordinate." A lot of effort has been expended

in trying to define more exactly, for instance, what "maintain liaison" means. It has been possible to get some individuals accustomed to substituting for the vague phrase the more exact information that an office "directs the preparation of estimates of raw materials by technical services; consolidates requirements and presents them to the War Production Board." That means a good deal more than "maintains liaison." The organization manual of the ASF today contains some 300 pages. It is revised periodically as important changes occur.

The control division has served as more than architect of the basic structure of the ASF. Much of its administrative management work has gone into the analysis of specific duplications or other problems. Sometimes staff directors request assistance in organizing their own activities. For example, the director of the international aid division of the ASF at one time was dissatisfied with the way his work was being conducted. He was not entirely certain about the causes of the difficulty, and he felt he wanted assistance. He requested the control division to make a survey of the work methods and the organization in his

division. This was done, and an entirely different basis for dividing up the work was proposed. On another occasion the director of plans and operations requested a study of his work. The result was a major shift in the staff structure under this particular officer. This type of adjustment continued long after basic structure was set.

In brief, then, these are the major organizational elements of the ASF: technical services having procurement and storage responsibilities together with certain additional activities, such as the supervision of medical care, the construction of all necessary plants, the transportation of men and supplies, and the supervision of the communication system; service commands responsible for a wide variety of services within fixed geographical areas; and staff divisions responsible for formulating common policies and supervising common activities throughout the entire organization. That this is a complicated structure is admitted. On the whole it has proved a satisfactory structure. At least, the procurement and service goals of the ASF have been achieved with no more difficulties than attend any large-scale enterprise.

Statistics as a Tool of Management

By COLONEL JOHN D. WITTEN

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FISCAL controls and personnel controls have long been recognized as indispensable administrative tools. They have been widely used in directing activities and in checking performance. These tools when used alone have inherent inadequacies, however, for they suggest that the end result of administrative effort is the orderly expenditure of funds or the employment of a limited number of persons in various grade classifications. Essential though both may be, neither suggests the basic reason why an administrative activity is performed or the results achieved in its performance.

Statistical controls have the advantage of measuring work done. Or perhaps it would be better to say that the purpose of statistical controls is to measure progress or performance in the conduct of operations.

Statistical reporting as a tool of management in public agencies has had a checkered history. On the whole, the potentialities of this device have not been well appreciated. Many statistics have been collected for general reporting purposes, to give an agency's clientele or the general public some idea of work accomplishments. Such statistics have also been "trotted out" at budget hearings and on other occasions when it has been necessary to justify an agency's program. None of these uses could be strictly labeled "tools of management." Some of the emergency agencies created in 1933 and the year following did employ statistics to good effect in directing their activities.

Many of the large corporations have made extensive use of statistics in market operations and production. The main pur-

poses have been to guide sales policy, production planning, and efforts to reduce production costs. These uses have been well appreciated by progressive plant managers and have been studied widely in American universities.

Perhaps a major factor in the uneven use of statistics in public administration has been some confusion about how to employ them as a tool of management. The experience of the ASF in the War Department in building up its system of statistical reporting illustrates certain general conditions necessary for the satisfactory use of the statistical tool.

When the ASF was created, there was in existence a statistics branch in the office of the under secretary of war. This branch was organized in 1939 to provide a central statistical service on procurement activities of the War Department. Since procurement matters were the primary concern of the under secretary, and since the Army's problems at that time were largely those of procurement, it was in this area that the statistics branch concentrated its efforts. At the time of the reorganization which established the ASF, the statistics branch was transferred to the ASF and designated statistical service. The scope of its interest was broadened to include all the activities of the ASF. Within a few months statistical service was absorbed into the control division in the office of the commanding general, ASF, and its structure was reorganized under the chief statistician as the statistics and progress branch. This transfer of the statistical function to the control division at the top echelon of the ASF was recognition of the importance of statistical con-

trols in the management of this organization.

The statistics and progress branch was assigned responsibility for coordinating and directing the reporting work of all activities of the ASF. It was to determine the reporting needs of headquarters, ASF, of higher authority, and of agencies outside the War Department, such as the War Production Board. It was to design standard recurring reports and to clear all reports except those set up solely within a single office. It was to prepare statistical summaries, analyses, and special reports. Finally, it was to be the official channel of communication between the ASF and outside statistical agencies.

From the beginning this new office has been faced with the problem of producing results at the same time as it was building the machinery to do the job. The objective has been to set up an orderly reporting system based on sound records and efficient procedures.

Statistical controls are exercised through statistical officers strategically located throughout the command to process and evaluate mass data. Each staff division, technical service, and service command has its control officer. Many of the larger depots and command facilities offices also have their own control officers.

The Monthly Progress Report

To serve the commanding general and to give staff officers necessary statistical data, a monthly progress report has been developed covering all major activities of the command. This report series must be comprehensive enough to give assurance to the commanding general that no important deficiencies will develop without his knowledge—at least none which are susceptible of statistical measure.

The principal mission of the progress report is to measure performance against established requirements or goals or against trends in areas where firm objectives cannot be developed. The report provides the

basis on which the commanding general and his staff initiate inquiries or direct corrective action.

The pattern of the progress reporting system follows closely the organizational outline of the command. Immediately under the office of the commanding general is an echelon of staff divisions—materiel, supply, personnel, fiscal, training, etc. At the next lower level are the technical services—ordnance, signal corps, engineers, chemical warfare, medical department, quartermaster, and transportation. These are the supply operating agencies. They also train service troops in their particular specialty. For the transportation corps, however, supply and training are relatively minor functions compared with its main job of managing land and water transportation for the Army. The technological division of functions among these services is matched by a geographical division among the ten service commands which perform housekeeping for the Army in the continental United States.

Urgency is the driving force in the supply program and the high speed reporting of the progress report is geared to it. Deadlines on reports, which at the time they were established seemed to experienced statisticians to preclude any hope of maintaining standards of accuracy, have been met with reliable data.

The flow of data on deliveries into the procurement section of the progress report for a typical technical service provides an example of the timing in this high-speed reporting system. This process begins at the end of the production line and threads its way through the many layers of organization up to the commanding general's office in the following steps:

1. Field inspectors submit reports on deliveries throughout the month.
2. By the 2nd of the ensuing month, the inspectors' final reports for the month have been submitted.
3. District offices assemble totals for their areas and submit them in time to reach

the central office by the 3rd or 4th of the month.

4. By the 4th the central statistical unit of the service has received all required data from the operating offices.

5. By the 7th the service statistical unit has edited, assembled, summarized, and typed final detail sheets and sent them to the staff division in ASF headquarters responsible for production.

6. Before the morning of the 8th the statistical unit of the staff division has checked the detail sheets for consistency and sent them on for offset reproduction.

7. By noon of the 8th summaries have been edited and consolidated and the remaining values plotted on the trend charts which have previously been completed to this point.

8. By noon of the 10th the 200 copies of the 300-page procurement book have been bound and distributed.

This book has 86,000 entries. The speed with which it is produced is made possible by careful, detailed preparation all along the line, well in advance of the reporting operation. The content of the report is explicitly defined in a circular published by the staff division. Tabulation forms for final printers' copy are issued, as well as forms for reporting summary data. All tabulations and computations are processed as far as feasible before the current data become available. The current data are then dropped into the hopper and have a clear path. Although every conceivable type of difficulty has developed to upset the most carefully laid plans, time and experience have brought the process to the point where it is generally ahead of deadlines rather than behind them.

The procurement report sets the pace for the other twenty-three sections of the monthly progress report. All other sections are scheduled for distribution by the 22nd of the month.

The following synopsis of several of the sections of the progress report indicates the scope and intensity of this reporting system.

Procurement. For a group of approximately 1,500 major items of equipment, the procurement section provides monthly and cumulative data for the current calendar year and for various periods of the next calendar year on the number of units delivered to date or forecast to be delivered during future periods toward attaining the Army Supply Program required production. The items are grouped by the several technical services responsible for their procurement. Summaries give monthly dollar totals by technical service for the previous, current, and next calendar years and by principal item groups for the previous, current, and next months. A series of charts for each principal group shows monthly progress and forecasts.

Contract Price Changes. This section gives summary contract price changes, monthly from January, 1942, based on representative items valued at approximately half of total War Department procurement. The computations are presented as indexes by items, by major groups of items, by ASF technical services and for the ASF, the Army Air Forces, and the War Department. The measurement for an item involves determining for each contractor with whom new contracts or modifications are negotiated during the current month the percentage his new contract price is of his October, 1942, contract price. The item index is an appropriate average of these individual percentages which takes into account the relative importance of each contractor in the procurement of that item.

Storage and Issue. The storage and issue section is designed to show the quantity of each major item (from a distribution standpoint) made available for distribution by each technical service, the quantities shipped from depots to each of the major recipients (Army, international aid, Navy, and other agencies), and the quantities on hand as storage in the depots at the close of the report period, classified by physical condition and by obligation status. Returns to stock received from the major recipients are also shown. Data for two report periods are shown: cumulative from January 1, 1944, and the current month. As supplementary information, any obligations authorized in excess of storage are reported, as are estimates of the quantities to become available for distribution during each of the six months following the month covered by the report. The section consists of a summary section and seven parts (one for each technical service) presenting detailed tabular data by individual items and charts and tables in terms of dollar values, using estimated unit costs as statistical weighting factors.

Ammunition Supply. This section shows the supply status of approximately 100 items of ord-

nance and chemical warfare ground force ammunition. It compares stocks in the United States with the authorized levels at each of the overseas bases and the supply on hand or en route to those bases. Losses and expenditures of ammunition are also reported.

Storage Operations. This section includes information on storage operations at all depots and holding and reconsignment points operated by the technical services. It includes data on gross and net space, the degree of occupancy, the quantities of materials handled, the kind of equipment used, and the personnel engaged in storage and allied functions at depots. The various aspects of storage operations are presented in three subsections of the report. The first subsection presents, in both graphic and tabular form, summary material on storage space and occupancy, materials handled, personnel, materials handling equipment, and work load. The second subsection contains summary information in graphic form on the utilization of gross and net usable storage space for each depot, by location and by type of space, and detailed tabular data on storage space and occupancy for each depot and each service. The third subsection contains detailed tabular data on materials handled, equipment, and personnel for each depot and each service.

Transportation. The transportation section contains comparative monthly statistics of transportation activities, principally those of the Army, grouped into four subsections: shipping situation, ocean traffic, port conditions, and inland traffic. The subsection on the shipping situation shows the tonnage of Allied and neutral merchant ships constructed and lost, the resulting net change in the size of the merchant fleet, and the inventory of Allied merchant ships and of ships controlled by the Army, classified by type. The ocean traffic subsection covers troop embarkations and debarkations at United States ports, Army cargo shipments from United States ports to overseas bases, and the number and types of airplanes dispatched by sea and by air to overseas bases. The subsection on port conditions presents statistics measuring the relative congestion of export freight at United States ports, including such factors as the number of loaded cars on hand by length of time held and activities at troop-staging areas. The inland traffic figures show Army freight and troop movements by rail, motor vehicle, and water within the United States and the utilization and availability of domestic railway equipment.

Construction. War construction, real estate fee acquisition, leasing and disposal, and repair and utility activities of the corps of engineers are included in this section. It shows the estimated total cost, value of work in place, value of new work authorized, value of completed jobs, and employ-

ment data for the construction program and lists individual jobs, costs, location, and status. For the real estate programs it presents the dollar value, number of directives, tracts, leases, and acres (or other unit of measure) by status and fiscal data. For disposal activities a listing is shown of properties declared and placed in standby, excess, or surplus status. This listing shows the last use, present use, and available facilities of properties declared, and presents brief remarks on terms of temporary and final disposal actions. Analyses of unit costs, by arm and service and by service command, are presented on the repair and utility program.

Personnel. This section contains data on total strength of the Army detailed by various significant categories, ASF strength by significant categories and in relation to authorized strength, procurement of officers and men, WAC strength and recruiting, chaplains' activities, and miscellaneous activities related to ASF civilian personnel. It also gives information on activities under the staff supervision of the special services division, including Army exchanges, the U. S. Army motion picture service, and other recreational and athletic activities.

Health. Information designed to indicate the state of the health of the Army both in the United States and overseas and the adequacy of the facilities available to take care of Army patients is presented in this section. Data on the incidence of disease and injury among troops are shown by geographic area and by types of disease. The data are most often related to the strength of troops so that the effect of disease upon combat strength may readily be seen. Among the other topics regularly reported on are: dental infection, utilization of hospitals in the United States and in overseas theaters, and the evacuation of Army patients from overseas. Allied subjects treated from time to time include discharges for disability by cause, mortality by cause, the length of hospitalization for disease and injury, the nutritional adequacy of field rations, rejections of inductees by cause, and new methods for treating disease and injury. Problems arising from seriously high incidence of particular diseases are described extensively, together with the steps taken to overcome them and prevent recurrences.

Fiscal. The financial aspects of the War Department's procurement and other activities are dealt with in this section. In accounting for War Department funds from the appropriation through the obligation to the expenditure levels, it presents a picture of the entire War Department program that is not available in any other report. The obligation of (contracting for) funds is shown by project within each technical service and the air forces. In addition, Section 8 reports on the

efficiency and progress of various accounting and disbursing operations of the Army, as well as various other functions such as the issuance of war bonds to military and civilian personnel, family allowance and dependency payments, the guarantee of loans and the making of payments in advance to War Department contractors, suspensions on contracts, and the renegotiation of contracts.

Morale Services. Activities related to information, orientation, and education under the staff supervision of the morale services division are reported in this section. The presentation of the results of surveys of soldier attitudes and opinions usually constitutes a considerable part of the report.

Administration. Activities under the supervision of the independent staff divisions are reported in this section. Included are: the activities of the Army postal service and other functions of the adjutant general; data on prisoners of war, personnel and materiel security, and other functions of the provost marshal general; and information on general courts-martial, the settlement of claims, rehabilitation centers, and state guard activities.

Maintenance. This section is designed to show maintenance activity for all fourth echelon, fifth echelon, and combined shops under the control of the technical services and the service commands. The report contains a summary and two sections: (1) repair of unserviceable equipment at fifth echelon shops, (2) repair of unserviceable equipment and shop activities at fourth echelon and combined shops. For all items repaired at fifth echelon shops, statistics are given to indicate the quantities of unserviceable materiel on hand for repair at the beginning and the end of the month and quantities processed during the month. The section on fourth echelon repair contains the same information and also includes employment data for each shop covered by the report.

Contract Terminations. This section presents data on the number of contract terminations in process and the dollar value of the cancelled portion of such terminated contracts and summarizes progress being made in effecting final settlement of terminated contracts. Data on settlement progress indicate the status of prime and subcontractors' claims and the time required to effect settlements. Settled claims are analyzed to show the relation of property disposition values to total settlement costs and the relation of gross amount of settlement to amount claimed by the contractor. Data are reported for the Army Air Forces and for each technical service, and separately for fixed-price and cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.

Property Disposition. This section indicates the volume of serviceable property and salvage available for redistribution or disposal and progress

being made in effecting disposition. The estimated costs of excess serviceable property redistributed within the War Department and of surplus serviceable property disposed of through sales and through transfers to, or on order of, other federal agencies are shown. Amounts realized from sales or reimbursable transfers are shown. Comparisons are made between the volume of property declared to disposal agencies as surplus and the volume of such property disposed of by each agency. Serviceable property is classified according to three types—military, property resulting from contract terminations, and other nonmilitary property; data on salvage are classified according to detailed types of material. Data are shown separately for each technical service, each service command, and for the Army Air Forces.

The last scheduled section of the monthly progress report is "Analysis," which in terse narrative and carefully chosen graphics sweeps across the activities of the ASF, drawing heavily upon the other sections of the report. This review is prepared by the statisticians in the control division who are assigned to cover the reported subjects.

The climax of the month's reporting comes in the use of the analysis as the agenda for the commanding general's staff conference. The commanding general personally studies the report in detail and uses it as a springboard for discussion with his staff generals. From this meeting comes direction for revising and reshaping the reporting system in the course of the next monthly go-around.

Decentralization of Statistics

CONTROVERSIES over centralization versus decentralization of control statistics, so fierce in some administrative organizations, have been resolved in ASF by a scheme which may be peculiarly adaptable to command organizations. This scheme amounts to central management of decentralized records. Sheer volume, of course, precludes any extensive centralization or duplication of operating records. In ASF the problem has been more one of the level at which the assembly of the data should be directed than of the level at which the assembly should be effected.

Central management of decentralized preparation of reports has been effected through: (1) publication of directives that specifically outline and define the required data; (2) standardization of presentation practices; (3) close personal consultation with the preparing offices; (4) analysis and interpretation of data prepared for publication; and (5) review and post-publication criticism of the content of reports.

Whatever may have been lost in decentralizing the preparation of the progress report to lower echelons has been repaid in the responsibility which the lower levels must accept for the data. The mechanics of the operation are such that data on ordnance performance are reproduced as prepared by ordnance. Evaluations made by higher echelons are not discounted because of errors made in computations at lower levels. The prospect that errors or deficiencies in data may come home to haunt is no small influence in maintaining high standards of accuracy.

The chain of command is such that the staff divisions may prescribe precisely what is wanted in reports, and the operating services are, within reason, required to produce these data. The necessity for all reports, however, is reviewed by the control division through a registration system of control approval symbols. This system has been effective in weeding out great numbers of unnecessary reports and keeping the volume of reporting to minimum essentials. During less than two years of review the control division has brought about the elimination of some 4,000 recurring reports. In this operation the control division's statistical responsibility is very much akin to that of the Bureau of the Budget in relation to governmental agencies as a whole.

Administrative changes had to be made in order to effect the present reporting system. As already mentioned, the nucleus from which the ASF built its central reporting system was the statistics branch of the office of the under secretary of war.

This branch had been set up on a professional basis, and the organizational theory behind it was that the collection, presentation, and analysis of statistics in themselves constituted a major function. The other branches of the office of the under secretary of war were expected to obtain the statistical information they needed only through the statistics branch.

In addition, the statistics branch had performed a number of central services for the procurement agencies. It maintained a large machine tabulating unit which prepared statistical data for its own use and for the technical services. The largest single tabulating job was the computation of requirements for basic industrial materials needed by the procurement agencies in order to meet their production schedules.

As a necessary expedient during a developmental period, the central professional status of the statistics branch was retained under the ASF while the reorganization of the reporting system was in process. Once established as a going concern, the sections of the monthly progress report were assigned for preparation according to functional staff responsibilities within the ASF. Thus, the staff agency charged with supervising procurement work was made responsible for preparing the section of the monthly progress report on procurement. The staff agency responsible for supervising the distribution of supplies was made responsible for preparing the section of the monthly progress report on distribution. The control division of the office of the commanding general, ASF, retained responsibility for overall supervision of the reporting system. It determined what sections should be added to the monthly progress report and what sections should be eliminated. It set the schedule for the publication of each section of the report. It controlled the distribution list for all sections. Finally, it prepared the analysis section.

Behind this organizational arrangement

was the theory that statistics is an administrative tool to be made an integral part of the supervisory process. A staff agency responsible for supervising procurement, for example, is dependent upon statistical data for guidance. The agency responsible for supervising personnel activities is similarly in need of personnel statistics. Accordingly, statisticians are no longer gathered in a single statistical agency but are scattered among the staff divisions of ASF. In this way the statistician is brought into more direct relationship with administrative officers. Administrative needs are the first criteria of the reporting system. Any possibility that the procurement figures do not adequately meet the supervisory needs of the procurement staff is thus eliminated. Nor can the agency responsible for supervising storage activities complain that storage statistics do not fulfill its needs.

Within the procurement agency itself responsibilities are similarly broken down so that in practice those responsible for the purchasing operations of a technical service have to worry only about procurement statistics and deal solely with the staff agencies supervising all procurement work. That part of a technical service handling distribution work for the service deals only with the central staff agency supervising all distribution, and consequently reports its distribution statistics to a single source. In this way what might appear on the surface as multiple lines of contact with a technical service in reality tend to merge under operating conditions.

The experience of the ASF seems to indicate that the integration of the statistician with the administrative staff along functional lines is a satisfactory organizational device. It goes a long way toward making statistics a useful administrative tool.

Essentials of Reporting

THESE are two essential conditions that must be fulfilled in order for a reporting system to function effectively. The first

is that the activities of an agency must be susceptible of statistical measurement. The second is that the statistics developed are used in the direction of activities.

The monthly progress report measures upward of forty activities of the ASF in quantitative terms. These activities may be divided into two general categories: those which are measured against some objective standard and those which can only be shown over a period of time.

In the first category might be placed the comparison of deliveries of materiel with forecasts. Monthly deliveries and forecasts are shown as percentages of the Army Supply Program which is the production goal. In distribution, the total storage space available provides an objective standard against which to measure space utilization. Lend-lease requirements are the measuring rod for materials assigned under the program. Current demand for items of equipment is shown against the available supply of such equipment. Automatic supply requirements for overseas bases are contrasted with the material on hand at those bases, afloat, and earmarked at ports of embarkation for shipment.

The ratio of utilization of cargo space to theoretical capacity of vessels provides an efficiency measure in this highly important area. In the field of health, a similar ratio of actual to capacity utilization of hospital beds points the way to expansion or contraction of particular facilities, as the case may be. A comparison of total War Department funds available for obligation with funds actually obligated affords some indication of the progress of the procurement program. The percentage of ASF troops qualifying in rifle marksmanship shows the extent to which service troops are being taught to use the weapons which they will have to employ in the field.

The second category, which overlaps extensively with the first, comprises data showing time series for various activities. On transportation, there are series of tonnages lost, new ships constructed, capacity

of the ships in Army service, loaded freight cars on hand at posts, days spent in unloading cars at ports, accidents at ports of embarkation, and the volume of inland freight and troop movements. For construction, the progress of the program is measured by the cost of work in place, employment on construction work, and land acquisition.

The health of the Army is covered by trends in noneffective rates and rates of incidence of all major diseases. Fiscal activities measured are renegotiations recoveries, payment of bills, and war bond issuance. The course of officer, officer candidate, and specialist school enrollments gauge the extent of progress in military training. Such special service activities as attendance at camp motion picture showings and enrollment in the Armed Forces Institute are also susceptible of measurement. In the administrative field, there are time series for personnel served and profits earned by Army exchanges; days of confinement of persons awaiting military trial; and prisoners of war held in the United States.

The second major condition for an effective reporting system is the use of statistics by administrative officers. Within the ASF, as mentioned above, it is the practice of the commanding general to make the

sections of the monthly progress report the basis of discussion at a staff conference of his staff supervisors and line administrators. Similarly, staff supervisors use the statistical information as a basis for inquiries of their own into what seem to be either unsatisfactory or unusual conditions. The statistical information of the ASF is in almost constant use. The importance placed by the commanding general upon statistical reporting is known throughout the organization. Careful attention is given to the preparation of statistical data and to following up the situations revealed by such data.

Major emphasis in the use of statistical data is placed upon measuring progress, and the accomplishments of the organization are thus kept under constant surveillance. Everyone knows this and puts forth particular efforts to make a good showing in his part of the program.

It is not intended to suggest that the statistical tool alone can meet all administrative needs. Certainly the ASF has found it necessary to use other administrative devices. But factual information based upon the careful computation of statistical data is the cornerstone for the determination of major ASF policies and for the supervision of their execution.

Standardization of Procedures

By COLONEL OLIVER A. GOTTSCHALK

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ALL large-scale enterprises are faced with procedures difficulties. A sizable volume of paper work is generally regarded as normal in the performance of administrative operations. Over a period of time, transactions of all types are likely to accumulate an ever-growing number of uncoordinated forms, copies, and routing instructions. Sometimes it seems that paper work has a life cycle of its own, constantly reproducing and expanding. If undisturbed, this life goes on year after year, providing numerous supervisors and clerks with a justification for existence which takes on the appearance of great importance. Only determined action can halt the rapid growth of paper work, or "procedures," as it is sometimes called. The reasons for pruning are obvious, but the desire is not always present—especially in government. Government activities, however, like those of business enterprise, are carried on in order to accomplish definite objectives, such as the construction of a cantonment, the collection of funds, or the settlement of a claim. In these activities the preparation and flow of documents often become so complicated and time consuming as to impede progress in producing end results. Paper work is a means, not an end; it must be controlled or it may grow to require as much effort as is expended on the primary objective.

From an administrative point of view a good procedure is one that is simple, direct, and flexible enough for application at all installations where similar functions are performed. To achieve such a procedure, documents should be designed to serve each agency involved in a transaction. In other

words, the piece of paper that authorizes an action often can, and whenever feasible should, be designed to include space for information to be inserted by each agency handling it and to permit enough copies to be prepared, initially, to serve all purposes along the line. A simple example is the preparation of a cash sales slip at a small store—a copy for the customer and one for the clerk are all that are required. A more complex example is the preparation of a combination purchase order and voucher form. The form is made up in a set consisting of the original and six copies. Different copies serve as a purchase order, an obligation document, a receiving report, an invoice, a voucher, and a file copy; each is completed by adding the information required to record the operation performed, thus saving the preparation of a new form to cover each action.

Another important element of a good procedure is the development of definitions of terms which are in common use at installations performing similar operations. If everyone concerned with a problem speaks "the same language," a solution is usually reached more quickly because long explanations and varying interpretations are avoided.

During the war there have been unusual incentives to simplify and standardize procedures for performing operations in purchasing, personnel, fiscal, supply, and distribution functions of the Army. Time has been a vital factor in the flow of supplies, and manpower has been so limited that every available man hour has had to be assigned to essential work. A rapid expansion of activities has emphasized the need

for standardization of operational methods. In addition, standardization is essential to producing results that can be analyzed on a comparable basis, to making improvements, and to developing personnel training programs on a broad base.

The Technique of Standardized Procedures

WHEN the Army Service Forces was established many operating units were performing similar functions, each in its own way; accordingly, it became clear that the standardization of procedures would require the development of a special technique, if progress was to be achieved. The problem was first attacked in an organized way in March, 1943. Complaints from many field installations indicated that the requisitioning, shipping, receiving, storing, issuing, and reshipping of supplies and equipment and the accounting in connecting therewith were the greatest sources of burdensome paper work.

The job of simplifying and standardizing the procedures involved in performing those operations was assigned to the control division, ASF. During the preliminary survey of transactions involved in moving and storing materiel it became evident that shipments consigned to overseas commanders were the most important and, accordingly, they were given first priority. It was found that thousands of shipments were being received daily at ports of embarkation from hundreds of industrial concerns and dozens of Army depots, each of which had its own shipping procedures. Consequently, the description of shipments was uncontrolled. Some shipments were received at ports properly documented. Most shipments had to be identified from labels or other markings. The result was that dock checkers described contents of shipments as best they could for purposes of manifesting. These descriptions, however, were so vague they were utterly useless for planning disposition of the cargo at the overseas base prior to arrival of convoys. This poor docu-

mentation caused delays in shipments, prevented accurate reporting on the status of shipments, and resulted in an excessive number of employees required to handle the work at depots, ports of embarkation, and overseas.

The remedy appeared to be to design a document that could be prepared concurrently with the preparation of the shipment at a depot, copies of which could accompany the shipment to the port and on to the overseas base. If such a procedure could be developed, a major problem then would be how to install it, since nine ports of embarkation and one hundred and fifty-two depots would have to conform to it. Also, all vendors making shipments direct to ports should be required to conform. It was decided to try out the procedure at Army installations before tackling manufacturers.

The solution to the problem of installing a new War Department shipping document established a pattern for standardizing procedures that is now applied successfully to all procedures examined by the control division of ASF.

When a project is undertaken it is important that its objectives be clearly defined. The analyst assigned to the project obtains as much background material as possible. This usually includes information about the mission and functions of the organizational units involved and their relationships with other organization elements. Pertinent information available on the volume of work and the character of problems is also obtained. Army regulations and other directives which have been published in the specific field are reviewed before the field work is undertaken. This background material establishes a common denominator upon which the analyst conducting the study and the operating personnel can base their discussions.

In conducting these studies channels of command are always respected. Introductions to subordinate personnel always come through the commanding officer. This procedure insures that the subordinates are

authorized and directed to discuss their activities. Another established practice of the control division is to invite the appropriate ASF staff division to participate in the study. When extensive studies are being conducted at army camps, service command personnel are also invited to participate. If a study is to be conducted in an installation under the direct supervision of the chief of a technical service, such as an Army supply depot, the chief of the service is likewise invited to assign a representative to participate. This participation is important, since it results in a study conducted jointly by all interested echelons. Through this approach a common conclusion is reached and lengthy reports, recommendations, counter-recommendations, and delays are obviated. The first step is to discuss the project with the staff division having primary responsibility for the procedure and then with the technical service or service command concerned. At these initial discussions the analyst defines the objectives of his study and indicates the plan he intends to follow in analyzing the existing procedures and in following the project through to completion.

The analyst obtains the confidence of the operating personnel by advising them that he has been assigned to help simplify their operations and that headquarters is ready to assist the field operating units by revising Army regulations which have resulted in burdensome procedures and by giving operating personnel sufficient authority to carry out their mission. Usually the analyst points out what has been accomplished in simplification and standardization of other procedures. Operating personnel in the field installations under study are also urged to participate in developing a solution to their problems and in applying corrective action. This approach enlists the practical cooperation of the operating personnel by giving them an opportunity to make a contribution.

In view of the scope of the procedures handled by control division personnel,

usually more than one type of installation in a particular field is studied. This affords an opportunity to obtain all necessary facts before reaching a conclusion, and it has the advantage of establishing a sound base upon which to make improvement. After the purpose and scope of the study have been presented to the head of the organization, the analyst becomes familiar with the organization of the installation and its controlling policies. Sometimes he may have such knowledge before the field work is undertaken.

In analyzing existing procedures, each step is studied in its proper sequence. Copies of all forms used in the process, completely filled in, are obtained. In collecting these data, suggestions for the improvement of the present procedures are obtained from the unit heads and other operating personnel. Usually the analyst and the operating personnel reach conclusions jointly as the survey progresses. The various steps in the process, the forms and records, the number of copies, and their distribution are discussed with a view to eliminating nonessentials. The time required to complete the various steps, the frequency of operations, cost, equipment, facilities, and office layout are all considered.

One of the most helpful mechanisms in evaluating a procedure is the application of process or flow charts to procedure studies. Charts take the place of long narrative descriptions and permit a quick analysis of a problem. Properly prepared, flow charts enable an analyst not only to visualize an entire activity but also to visualize each step in detail in its relationship to each of the other steps and to the problem as a whole. After all the necessary information relating to each step in the process has been obtained, a flow chart or a series of charts is prepared to reflect the existing procedures. These charts show each document, each step in the process, the distribution of each copy of each document, and the action taken at each point in the process.

Each analyst follows the same style in the preparation and presentation of procedures in chart form. This is important, as the same procedure is sometimes studied by several analysts at different field installations at the same time. For comparative analysis, uniformity of presentation is essential. The flow charts are set up with vertical columns to reflect the various organization units through which documents flow. The names of the forms or documents used are always shown in the column on the extreme left. Chart boxes illustrate the various copies of each form. Horizontal lines and arrows describe the movement of the documents between units. A draftsman develops this type of chart in final form with very little work, since the chart boxes and directional lines and arrows are reproduced in sheets in advance and are merely cut out and pasted on the charts in the appropriate position.

As these charts are being developed the analyst is considering improvements, such as reducing the number of steps, the number of documents, the number of copies, or the time involved in completing the process. Frequently, decentralization of authority or a change in organization structure will help correct a deficient procedure.

After all existing procedures have been charted, a detailed analysis of the forms is made to determine those which may be improved, discontinued, or consolidated with other forms. The next step is to develop a procedural chart covering the contemplated changes. The "before" and "after" charts provide a means of comparison for determining the degree of improvement possible. They also form a basis for further discussions with operating personnel and stimulate constructive suggestions. The revised forms are prepared, keyed into the "after" flow charts, and discussed with the operating personnel. Such discussions may lead to additional changes and to a further refinement in the operating procedures.

As has been mentioned, the charting

technique for the development of standard procedures, introduced in the ASF by the control division, avoids the necessity for preparing long reports. Changes may be summarized in a brief memorandum supported by the charts. Exhibits of new forms and a comparison table to show the reduction in time, forms, copies, signatures, steps in the process, and personnel are keyed to the "after" charts.

Following the completion of the field research work, a tentative procedure is developed for war gaming (field test). This test is usually conducted at one of the field installations where the study was originally made. The staff division having primary interest and a representative of the appropriate technical service or service command, depending on which organization has jurisdiction over the installation, are invited to participate in the war gaming process. This affords an opportunity for the interested staff division and operating agency to review, examine, and criticize the procedure and to make any necessary refinements during the test. In addition, representatives from other service commands or technical services are invited to visit the pilot installation, examine the new procedure, and make appropriate recommendations. As a result of these recommendations, further improvements may be made during the test period.

A test usually is conducted for a period of thirty days and, before completion, a tentative manual is prepared at the pilot installation. The tested procedure is then installed in one installation in each of the other service commands, or in an installation under each of the other technical services, depending upon which has jurisdiction. These pilot installations are considered proving grounds for the new procedure. After another thirty to sixty days of testing, the procedure is finalized and installation is extended to all applicable stations. At the conclusion of a test period the final procedure is published and schedules are requested of operating agencies showing

the dates the procedure will be installed at each applicable depot, office, or port of embarkation. These schedules are followed up closely by the control division to see that satisfactory progress is being made in getting the new procedure into effect.

Up to this point, an attempt has been made to outline the problems involved and to describe the technique employed in analyzing, developing, testing, publishing, and installing standardized procedures. To date, the results of applying this method to procedural problems of the ASF have been most impressive. An idea of the immense savings in man hours and paper realized through the installation of standardized procedures may be given to the reader by relating several case histories.

Shipping Document Procedure

THE urgent need for standardization of shipping procedures of Army depots was mentioned earlier in this article as an example of the problems which faced the control division. To meet this need a document, now known all over the world as the War Department shipping document, was evolved from the miscellaneous forms previously in use to move supplies from depot stocks through transportation channels to domestic installations and ports of embarkation for trans-shipment to overseas destinations. This supply movement involves the following operations:

At the shipping depot: (1) warehouse order for stock picking, packing, and marking; (2) packing list to identify contents of mixed containers; (3) tally out for loading and as basis for bill of lading; (4) shipping ticket for the stock records and as advice to consignee; and (5) dray tickets in case of truck deliveries.

At the receiving domestic installation: (1) tally in of packages to accomplish bill of lading; and (2) tally in of items as basis for stock record and comparison with shipping ticket upon arrival.

At in-transit storage points: (1) tally in of packages; and (2) tally out of packages.

At ports of embarkation: (1) Tally in to check in arriving shipment and accomplish bill of lading; (2) tally out for removal to in-transit storage or to the pier; (3) dock tally to receive freight at ship's side and to plan stowage and loading; (4) hatch tally for loading freight aboard vessel and as basis for preparation of ship's manifest and stowage plan; (5) forwarding of shipping tickets to overseas base as advice of shipment against requisition; (6) simultaneously, maintaining status and follow-up for overseas requisitions.

The problem was, first, to design a form which would provide for all the constant information required throughout this cycle; second, to make provision for variable data in the successive phases of the supply movement; third, to arrange for the preparation of the form in time for it to accompany the shipment physically; and, fourth, to standardize procedures so that each type of agency could operate with a standard number of copies.

The forms in use at the depots, in-transit storage points, receiving stations, and ports of embarkation were analyzed and a fundamental plan for a combination form was developed whereby all the information common to these forms was placed in the body of the document. Different types of stubs were provided for the variable information required by the consignor and the consignee. By use of a master form, the constant information was prepared once and mechanically reproduced to provide all the copies required by all agencies involved. Accuracy of stock number and nomenclature was insured, since this information is entered on the shipping document by trained personnel at the source, by mechanical means, and never recopied.

After the tentative form was developed, the next hurdle was to determine whether the documents could be prepared in time to accompany the shipment. Despite the fact that many large manufacturers and Army officials reported that this was impossible, a test at the Richmond ASF depot

proved it could be done. Each step in the depot procedures, from the receipt of the requisition through stock control, storage, and transportation, was synchronized with the work of a reproduction unit established for preparation of the documents. Trials in the documenting of all types of shipments were successful and proved the fundamental soundness of the plan.

In view of the magnitude of the problem it was felt that the plan should be tried out under actual operating conditions for the complete supply movement. Accordingly, a filler depot handling the supplies of five of the seven technical services was selected. Its chief mission was to supply two ports. One of these ports was able to get along with thirteen copies of shipping documents to serve its internal and overseas needs, whereas the other port, because of its sprawling geographic characteristics and varied transportation facilities, required a total of forty-four documents. Initially, it was agreed to supply the stated number of copies for each installation with the understanding that the problem of standardization would subsequently be studied.

Within two months sufficient experience was gained, the form was modified, and the procedures satisfactorily worked out. The major difficulties in connection with mechanical reproduction and its synchronization with depot operations had been overcome. The new procedure was then installed at other depots. Personnel was brought in to study it at the original installation and, after observing the project first hand, undertook to introduce the plan at home stations. A tentative manual was prepared and, upon publication, the new shipping procedure was made mandatory for ASF depots.

During the balance of the year 1943, all of the depots, in-transit storage points, and ports were cut over to the new system. A violation-reporting method was put into effect so that the weak points in the preparation and use of the new document could be brought to the surface. At the same time,

studies were initiated covering the nine ports of embarkation to determine feasibility of standardizing the number of documents required by the ports for the processing of the all-important overseas shipments. Concurrently, depot procedures and procedures at in-transit points were reviewed. As a result, procedures were standardized whereby domestic receiving installations operated with one copy by mail and two with the shipment. Ports received four shipping documents by mail and fourteen with the shipment. Of the eighteen copies received by the port, four were made available to the overseas theater by air mail and with the vessel, tying in the overseas and domestic systems of supply. The final manual was then prepared and distributed to the field.

Consequent upon the adoption of a standardized and simplified procedure, the publication of a comprehensive manual, and the continuous policing of violations, the entire movement of ASF supplies from depots to domestic installations and to ports of embarkation was consolidated into a single integrated pattern. Violations have dropped to a negligible percentage, and very few shipments arrive at destination without supporting documents.

Accuracy of stock number and nomenclature is assured, since once entered at the source by specialized personnel, they are not tampered with at successive handlings. At ports of embarkation, checkers unfamiliar with intricate military supply nomenclature are no longer required to interpret markings, labels, and a miscellany of packing lists into the basic transportation and supply information for overseas use. The authentic data on the shipping document have become the basic information for the overseas theaters all over the globe.

There are over four million shipments, annually, from ASF depots to domestic installations and to ports of embarkation. When troops are in training in the United States, the majority of shipments are domestic, but as the number moving overseas in-

creases, the preponderance of shipments swings to the ports. The huge armies overseas must know what is en route to them so that they can plan the use of the supplies with accurate knowledge. The development of the War Department shipping document procedure has stabilized the flow of this essential information. In addition, in place of twenty-four to thirty-two million operations (four million shipments times an average of six to eight document operations), one basic form involving four million operations is prepared with the accruing information added thereon, without the necessity of any recopying or repetition. A variety of forms is eliminated and, because of simplification and standardization of procedures, some ninety-five million pieces of paper are done away with. Checking at depots, stations, and ports has been reduced 25 per cent.

Bill of Lading Procedure

DURING the study of shipping procedures, attention was drawn to the U.S. Government bill of lading. It was noted that the Army's uses of that document varied widely, and it was concluded that a special study should be made with a view to co-ordinating it with related documents and, at the same time, simplifying and standardizing the use of bills of lading within the ASF.

A detailed study of the procedures followed in the handling of U.S. Government bills of lading was conducted. Wide disparities were revealed in the distribution and use of copies. At three thousand War Department installations bills of lading were being issued in as few as five and as many as forty copies. Further, it was found that in many instances two or more copies intended for the same destination were mailed in separate envelopes. The analyst assigned to the study explored the reasons for these variations in many sample cases and found that few were justified. It was concluded that the twelve million bills of lading prepared annually could be issued

in a uniform number of copies and that proper use of those copies would meet all procedural and statistical requirements. Representatives of technical services participating in this study concurred in these conclusions.

A "Bill of Lading Procedure Manual" was issued in September, 1943, for the purpose of introducing simplification and standardization. Through the inclusion of exhibits of properly-prepared bills of lading, the manual not only served to expedite preparation but also provided a means for achieving a greater degree of accuracy. Those were the intangible gains which it was impossible to evaluate; however, tangible economies were evident—eighteen million copies of bills of lading and six million envelopes were saved annually, plus, of course, the carbon paper, manpower, and facilities involved in their preparation and distribution.

Depot Supply Procedure

SUPPLY depots of the ASF are the wholesale distributors of the Army's vast supply system. Materiel and supplies from manufacturers are received and stored in over a hundred supply depots of the ASF for subsequent distribution to the retail outlets such as posts, camps, and stations within the continental limits of the United States and to base supply depots of each theater of operations overseas. Some 220,000 people, expending a total of over forty-three million man-hours per month, are employed at these depots. Something over four million tons of supplies and materiel per month, or the equivalent of over two hundred thousand carloads, are received and shipped. Behind these figures are individual receiving and issuing transactions totaling over five hundred thousand per month.

Each of the seven technical services forming the supply services of the ASF developed its own operating procedures, control records, and files for handling the receipt, storage, and issue of supplies. Many depots

of the same technical service as well as depots of different technical services handled the same kinds of transactions in different ways. It became apparent that the ASF had basically seven noncorrelated systems for depot supply operations.

There was need to streamline the paper work of all depot operations in order to expedite supply. The benefits of well developed procedures at one depot were not being utilized by other depots. The primary mission of supply was being slowed down by the overbearing requirements of paper work. Supplies were not being stored rapidly and hence were not available for immediate issue upon demand. The filling of requisitions was being delayed by complicated paper flow and the number of safeguards which had been instituted throughout the operations. Control registers, cross-reference card files, and completed documents files were numerous and variable.

A study of the supply operations of these depots resulted in the development of a manual standardizing the procedures incident to the receipt and issue of supplies and materiel. Examples of savings in personnel and expediting of the supply activity are many; the benefits from only two specific changes amount to a saving in the preparation, processing, and disposition of copies of documents totaling over twenty-three million pieces, or approximately fifty-eight tons, of paper per year. At a minimum estimate, this saving amounts to over \$500,000 annually. Other benefits produced comparable savings. The number of control registers was reduced and the forms standardized, cross-reference card files and records were eliminated, and document files were consolidated, saving file cabinets and filing space as well as personnel. Old peacetime accountability requirements were modernized by elimination of nonessential processing steps.

The adoption of standardized procedures in all depots permits an evaluation of operating efficiency. This is a fundamental requirement necessary for sound control and

administration. The major accomplishment of the "Depot Supply Procedures Manual" was, however, the acceleration of the supply mission of the depots of getting enough supplies on time to the troops of the American Army throughout the world.

Station Supply Procedure

THE second major procedure analyzed by the control division was that used by station supply officers to obtain property and issue it to troop units. One of the largest posts in the United States was selected as the initial station to be studied. The study revealed that in large measure each of the seven technical services had its own forms and procedures for use by the station supply officers responsible for the issue of the materiel and supplies that it procured. In addition, forms developed by certain of the technical services to meet special conditions at individual stations had been made available to all stations. Procedures, files, and records varied widely. Typical of the existing procedures that had developed was the practice of requiring that a requisition on a depot be signed by the supply officer and also by the station commander. Investigation proved that the signature of the commanding officer was purely *pro forma* or was put on by the adjutant, who had no knowledge of the supply condition of the station. The height of useless "red tape" was discovered at one station where the commanding officer had appointed each supply officer as an assistant adjutant for the purpose of signing requisitions. Thus, requisitions leaving that station bore two signatures of the same individual—one in his capacity as supply officer and the other in his capacity as assistant adjutant signing for the commanding officer.

A review of this study revealed that there were approximately twelve basic procedures used to obtain, issue, and account for materiel and supplies at stations. Forty forms that had general distribution, together with many that were locally reproduced, were in use. One transaction involv-

ing each of the twelve procedures used at the station required a total of one hundred and twenty copies. After standardization of the forms and procedures, thirty-seven of the existing forms were eliminated, three were retained, and nine new ones, including three variations of the War Department shipping document, were prescribed. Now, only twelve forms are in use, and the number of required copies for basic transactions has been reduced from one hundred and twenty to fifty-seven. No locally reproduced forms are now authorized. The annual saving is estimated at 45,000,000 copies of forms plus the man-hours expended in preparing and processing them.

Two basic changes in procedure were also developed. It had been the practice, when shipments received from depots did not agree as to items and amounts with the shipping tickets forwarded from the depot, to prepare an "Over, Short, and Damaged Report" and return this report to the depot, supported by standardized affidavits usually prepared on mimeographed forms. The practice had developed that when such reports were received, the shipper accepted all overages and denied all shortages. The result was much correspondence without either a correction of the property records or a determination of the cause of the shortage. This procedure was changed to provide that the receiving officer be required to account only for the quantities which he actually tallied in as received and that no notice of discrepancy, either overage or shortage, be sent to the depot. Thus, much useless correspondence was saved.

As a result of this new procedure, it was possible to develop as a second procedure an inventory adjustment form which is used to adjust operating differences that arise from the speed with which wartime operations are conducted. This form, prepared by the accountable officer, if approved by the director of supply or officer immediately in command of the supply officer, becomes a validated voucher to the supply officer's account. It permits him to readjust his

stock record account and eliminates the necessity for a complicated report of survey.

Disability Discharge Procedure

IN THE first nine months of 1943, over one-half million soldiers were issued medical discharges. In the discharge of this large number of enlisted men from the Army into civilian life, many interested civilian and military organizations had important functions to fulfill. Each organization must receive individual notification of each separation. Selective Service must register the discharged soldier at local and state headquarters; the War Manpower Commission requires notification to aid him with his employment rights; the veterans reemployment committeeman requires data to aid the soldier to obtain new employment; and the Veterans Administration requires detailed clinical and personnel records to adjudicate pension claims, to administer benefits, and to continue national service life insurance.

In the Army, the adjutant general requires complete data on each separation at time of discharge to keep the enlisted man's permanent record and to maintain and compile data on basic Army strength and analysis. The Army war bond office, the government insurance allotment branch, and the office of dependency benefits require prompt discontinuance of allotments and allowances totaling millions of dollars. The quartermaster general furnishes instructions to soldiers on the retention, wearing, and disposition of uniforms and to supply officers on accounting for clothing and equipment charged to each enlisted man. The surgeon general, most interested of all, has the task of administering the best possible definitive medical treatment, recording the clinical findings, and then cooperating with the adjutant general in assembling and forwarding to the Veterans Administration the clinical records for present or future pension claim adjudication, and, in some cases, delivering the enlisted patient to a Veterans Adminis-

tration facility for further care.

While many other considerations are involved, the discharging organization prepares the soldier's final statement, pays him, furnishes a discharge certificate carrying a complete "enlisted record" of the soldier, forwards his service records to the adjutant general, and completes and forwards records as outlined above. The rights, privileges, and duties of a veteran are explained verbally. Written notices are presented to the soldier, after which he is discharged. This vast operation cuts across nearly every phase of the work of the Army.

The forms required were individual or unit records that had been hastily devised or were peacetime forms, many over twenty years old. They were unrelated in size, type, color, and design. A minimum of forty-six heterogeneous forms was to be prepared as prescribed by War Department instructions issued by the various interested staff divisions. In personnel sections of six hundred Army hospitals, two to three man-days were required to discharge three soldiers on a medical discharge—or almost one enlisted man required to discharge one soldier. In terms of volume, something over a half million disability discharges required preparation and disposition of twenty-three million forms, involving at least three hundred thousand man-days. More costly and of greater significance to the Army was the fact that this tremendous load of paper work acted as a bottleneck to men leaving the Army hospitals and created a large backlog of patients taking up valuable bed space and other hospital facilities, mounting into millions of hospital bed days, while awaiting discharge.

This problem was met by gathering all forms required in several hospitals, dividing the forms into three groups, and posting them on three large wall beaverboards. The groups and the number of forms posted were: fiscal, 17; personnel, 3; and information—duties, rights, and privileges of the soldier, 12; or a total of 32.

Staff officers or representatives of the or-

ganizations involved were then invited to join in the analysis of the multitude of forms and requested to cooperate in simplifying the paper work. The staff representatives responded whole-heartedly, and, as a result, new all-purpose forms were designed and placed on the beaverboards, as follows: fiscal, 2; personnel, 1; information—duties, rights, and privileges of the soldier, 2; or a total of 5.

A further comparison of the old and new forms reduced copies from ninety-six to thirty-five and signatures from seventy-seven to twenty-five. All forms were designed in accordance with the modern principles developed by the control division. The next step was development of a procedure for discharging men within three days after the disability discharge board met.

A tentative manual on discharge or release from active duty and the corresponding form layouts were completed, with great attention to detail and flow. The manual was published March 15, 1944, along with sufficient tentative forms to test the procedures in one station and one general hospital in each of the nine service commands. Favorable comments were received from each service command, along with specific recommendations for improvement. Many of these suggestions were accepted and installation has been extended to all of the many hundred hospitals of the ASF.

Estimates of annual savings, based on the present rate of medical discharges, are: up to 70,000 man-days in preparing forms; up to 8,000,000 forms; up to 10,250,000 copies of forms; up to 19,000,000 signatures; up to 3,650,000 hospital bed days, or the equivalent of 10 thousand-bed hospitals made available; and 125 clerks in Washington. Other results are: prompt forwarding of all records to the Veterans Administration for adjudication of pension claims; prompt and complete cancellation of allotments and allowances whether service records show them or not; and complete and timely information to soldiers on duties, rights, and benefits.

Impressive though the accomplishments of the ASF program for simplifying and standardizing operational procedures may be, it should be understood that a technique alone is not the key to success. Work of this type during a war period is far removed from the scene of battle. There is no glamor attached to it. It requires painstaking research, analysis, and coordination involving many different people. New ideas must be sold to personnel whose daily work habits are going to be changed. Nevertheless, the individual who successfully develops and installs a greatly improved and simplified procedure is rewarded by a soul-satisfying sense of accomplishment and a

knowledge that he has made a contribution to better public administration. Finally, the most important factor in achieving success in this field of work is the personal policy of the head of the organization on the essentiality of having details organized and under control. Fortunately for the War Department and public administration generally, General Somervell, by personal example, has inspired his subordinates to be constantly on the lookout for better ways of performing the functions for which they are responsible. With this type of leadership much can be accomplished in eliminating nonessential administrative operations and standardizing essential ones.

Control Activities in the Quartermaster Corps

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THE control division in the office of the quartermaster general¹ has a dual function. As a management consultant agency to the quartermaster general it has contacts with all the other divisions within the office of the quartermaster general and also serves as the liaison with the control division, headquarters, Army Service Forces. A second major function is to deal with the depots and other field installations of the quartermaster corps. A control division has been established in each of these installations and the Washington division exercises technical direction over these local divisions and provides them with a constant program of stimulation and assistance.

The consultant service which the control division renders to the OQMG encompasses almost every phase of quartermaster activity. Primarily the division serves as an advisory staff to the deputy of the quartermaster general for administration and management and also renders research and consulting assistance to the deputy of the quartermaster general for supply planning and operations. Treating on such a broad plane with office activities, the control division is in daily contact with all divisions of the OQMG. In some cases the contact is initiated by the control division in the carrying on of a specific program or project; in other cases, the divisions call upon the control division to render consulting as-

sistance in the solution of some problem or the analysis or development of a special plan.

The control division endeavors to render a truly professional service, presenting its own best analysis of each problem with a recommended solution or alternative solution, if this is possible. The decision as to what action is to be taken can then be made by the line executive with the assurance that he has before him all pertinent facts as well as intelligent, objective recommendations bearing thereon.

In its studies the control division makes every effort to gain the participation and cooperation of the line personnel. In this way the special skills of each group are most effectively utilized. The control division employs certain standard recognized techniques for the analysis and solution of problems of policy, organization, procedure, and administration. The line executives possess, on their part, intimate and detailed knowledge of the particular activity. Only through the merging of these skills, abilities, and knowledge can all elements of a problem be considered and effectively analyzed. Slogans can be useful or detrimental in the conduct of a staff activity, depending upon the meaning of the slogan to the group as a whole and to each individual in it. The slogan of the control division, accepted by the staff members as a guiding principle in all their efforts, has always been, "You can get a lot accomplished if you don't care who gets the credit." This attitude has probably been

¹ Unless otherwise specified, the term "control division" in this article will refer to the control division of the OQMG.

the chief factor responsible for the uniformly good cooperation received from the line executives in the execution of the functions of the control division. Once convinced that the control division is sincere in its desire to act as his staff assistant in the solution of his problems, the line executive is likely to become an earnest advocate of the control mechanism and the control idea. By securing this type of cooperation from line executives, the control division has been able to accelerate its programs greatly and to extend the benefits of its service. Administrative participation in all its principal studies is now so commonplace as to be considered a binding thread weaving together the fabric of all control division techniques.

Scope of the Control Program

THE work performed by the control division embraces the chief management and administrative areas, which naturally divide into certain specialized areas to which are applied specialized techniques. These specialized areas involve such important phases of administration as organization, work simplification, analysis and control of recurring reports and records, the development of standard procedures covering basic operations, the establishment and control of operating statistics, the inspection of operating effectiveness, and the direction and coordination of long-range planning (such as demobilization planning).

There are two other primary activities of the control division which at various times embrace some or all of the activities mentioned above. One of these is the consulting service which the division renders to the entire organization, much in the same manner as a professional management consultant offers his services to his clients. The other is the technical direction, stimulation, and coordination which is given on a continuous basis to the activities of the control divisions which have been estab-

lished in all depots and other major field installations of the quartermaster corps.

Organization Studies

THE changes in the military phase of the war which are continually being made require corresponding changes in the supply organizations which back up combat operations. In a dynamic organization the maintenance of sound management principles on such matters as span of control, overlapping functions, and the like is a constant job. The organization group within the control division devotes itself to the steady refinement and improvement of this structure so as to provide an organization that will at all times correspond to the realities of the supply situation. Inertia and resistance to change probably occur more in this phase of control work than in almost any other. They must be combatted constantly through intensive study of organization structure and a determined approach to the problem of effecting changes that will enable various divisions to discharge completely their current objectives.

The work of a control staff on organization problems includes the following principal activities: (1) organization of new or reorganization of existing units to meet changing needs; (2) reorganization to simplify structure and span of control; (3) clarification and improvement of operating relationships; and (4) the reassignment of functions in accordance with existing responsibilities.

As an illustration of a reorganization to meet changing needs, the changes made in the headquarters purchasing division may be cited. Prior to the reorganization, the division consisted of a director, a deputy director, commodity purchasing branches, a branch concerned with priorities, facilities, expediting, and inspection, and a branch handling renegotiation. As the situation and program changed, it was realized that certain functions needed greater emphasis and that this change involved

additional staff with certain technical qualifications.

A number of steps were taken to gear the organization structure to the changed situation. Four deputy directors were created in place of the single deputy director, to head up the four principal activities which were included in the work of the division. The deputy director for purchases was placed in charge of the commodity purchase branches and the production services branch. The latter included, in addition to previous functions of priorities, expediting, and facilities, the coordination of production scheduling and the acquisition of excess property reported by other agencies. The importance of the inspection function, which had been carried on by a small section, was recognized by assigning it to a branch with five sections, headed by a deputy director. It had been found that 70 per cent of the work of the legal division was being performed for the purchasing division. In the interest of reducing the number of divisions, it was deemed feasible to assign this activity to a branch of the purchasing division under a deputy director. The branch continued, however, to serve all divisions in the office. The deputy director for contract adjustment was placed in charge of (1) the renegotiation branch, to which were transferred cost accounting functions in connection with renegotiation formerly carried on in the fiscal division; (2) a new contract termination branch; and (3) a new cost and price analysis branch to carry on better forward pricing of contracts to eliminate the need for renegotiation and to carry on cost accounting in connection with contract termination.

A program was also undertaken to develop and install a standard organization and standard procedures, records, forms, and statistics for purchasing offices at all field installations. (This program is discussed in the section of this article devoted to standardization of procedures.)

The second type of activity is illustrated by the reorganization of a branch which

consisted of fourteen sections with forty-four subsections. The branch, after reorganization, consisted of seven sections, five to perform the principal functions of the branch and two to provide services. The seven sections were, in turn, divided into fifteen subsections. This reorganization resulted in a simplification of the organization structure; a reduction in the span of control, with only seven persons reporting to the chief; and a reduction in supervisory personnel.

The clarification and improvement of operating relationships are illustrated by the reassignment of responsibility for specifications and clarification of the relationships of the divisions concerned therewith. Responsibilities for the preparation of specifications were scattered, and methods of revision were not clearly defined. As a result of conferences held with interested divisions, an order was drawn in which all concerned concurred, which provided that (1) responsibilities for preparation of, and coordination of concurrences in, new or revised specifications were assigned to the development division; (2) units which, because of their responsibility for methods used, had a primary interest in certain portions of specifications, such as packing and crating, could initiate preparation of these portions, to be included in the completed specification after approval by the development division; and (3) no changes in specifications for items under contract would be made without the concurrence of the purchasing and supply divisions.

The following data serve to indicate the scope of the activity of a control staff on organization problems. During a period of a year three divisions were created, two from subdivisions of other divisions and one with almost entirely new functions; two divisions were made subdivisions of existing divisions; two divisions were completely reorganized to meet changing needs; eight new branches were created, in addition to smaller subdivisions, to provide for new functions or to enlarge the scope of existing

functions; the organization of 85 per cent of the units was reviewed and improvements in structure were made as needed, with the concurrence of the units concerned; over twenty cases that needed clarification and improvement of operating relationships were satisfactorily resolved; and twelve cases of assignments of new functions, resulting from directives of higher authority, were made.

Work Simplification

THE team work between the control division, headquarters, ASF, and the control divisions of the technical services can perhaps best be illustrated in the program of work simplification. This program, as conceived and promulgated by the control division, headquarters, ASF, embraced the entire range of working activities, both clerical and manual, within all technical services. The clerical work was concentrated largely in the offices attached to supply establishments, whereas the manual work to be examined was performed in the various warehousing, transportation, and manufacturing facilities within the technical services. Since these two phases of the program were carried forward independently, they will be discussed separately.

During 1942 the OQMG instituted a program for the better utilization of clerical personnel. The object of its studies was to take an inventory or X ray of work situation and personnel in order to arrange the work so that it could be accomplished at a high level of quality with a minimum number of clerks. Three simple charts were used in these studies: a work distribution chart, which told in synopsis form what was done in each unit being surveyed; a process chart, which told how each routine was performed; and a work load chart, which told how much of each unit of work was produced during any given period.

The quartermaster program had been under way approximately four months when the control division, headquarters, ASF, announced its service-wide control

program. This was a far-reaching program that required the establishment of control divisions in all the technical services and the coordination of major management programs throughout all the services through the control division at headquarters, ASF. Liaison officers were appointed from the control division, headquarters, ASF, to serve with each of the control divisions within the technical services. These liaison officers not only served to interpret the directives and technical material put out by headquarters, ASF, but were also extremely helpful in the extension of the work simplification program to the field installations of the quartermaster corps.

Soon after the announcement of the work simplification program of headquarters, ASF, the quartermaster general directed the establishment of control divisions in all depots and other principal field installations of the quartermaster corps. The training material received from control division, headquarters, ASF, was disseminated throughout the field and these newly created control divisions set about developing their programs for clerical work simplification within their own installations. (The activation of depot control divisions is discussed in more detail in the section of this article dealing with field liaison.)

Some indication of the success of the clerical work simplification program can be gained from some figures taken from a report issued after it had been in operation for one year. Surveys had been completed of approximately thirty thousand clerical employees, or 89 per cent of all clerical personnel under the jurisdiction of the quartermaster general, and as a result 26.3 per cent of them had been saved for other assignment.

After the original objective of personnel reduction and manpower conservation had been attained, the work simplification program was carried forward on a voluntary basis in order to increase efficiency through a more intensive application of its study techniques.

The work simplification program for materials handling was introduced to the technical services by the control and storage divisions of headquarters, ASF, during the latter part of 1943. Both in ASF and the quartermaster corps this program typifies the outstanding results that can be attained when the operating and staff personnel are drawn into a complete working partnership. Most of the work analyzed in this program was performed in field installations of the quartermaster corps under the technical direction of the storage and distribution division, OQMG. When the tentative outline of the work simplification program for materials handling was presented to the executive personnel of the storage and distribution division, they gave enthusiastic support to the program.

As a result, the quartermaster corps was honored by having the first field school scheduled by headquarters, ASF, in one of its principal depots—the Jersey City quartermaster depot. This school was attended by representatives of the control and storage divisions of the OQMG and eleven of its eastern depots. The instructors were mainly personnel of the control and storage divisions, headquarters, ASF. In addition to classroom lectures and demonstrations, students, in cooperation with the personnel of the Jersey City quartermaster depot, made "on-the-job" test runs of techniques.

Impressed with the possibilities for improvement in physical operations inherent in such a program, the quartermaster general immediately scheduled a series of "schools" patterned after the initial course given by headquarters, ASF. At these quartermaster schools selected personnel who had attended the headquarters, ASF, school in turn became the trainers and instructors of mixed teams of storage and control division personnel from every principal quartermaster field installation.

Because it was recognized early in the control program of the OQMG that operator participation in control activities was

the only guarantee of permanent success, a school was established at one of the depots under the quartermaster general to instruct a large number of operating personnel in the fundamentals of materials-handling work simplification. In this way approximately twelve hundred officer and civilian personnel have been trained in the use of these work simplification techniques.

Although this program has not been in effect for as long a period as the companion program of clerical work simplification, remarkable results have already been achieved. On the basis of incomplete figures, of 36,965 employees surveyed, 10,198, or 28 per cent, have been saved.

The benefits which any organization can reasonably expect from an aggressive work simplification program can be briefly summarized under three main headings: (1) conservation and control of manpower through the elimination of all unnecessary work and the simplification of all necessary work; (2) conservation of space and equipment through more effective layout and the correct and full utilization of all equipment and machinery; and (3) improvement in the approach to their work on the part of supervisors and employees at the working level through becoming acquainted with techniques for work analysis and the extension of management consciousness to all employees throughout the organization.

Recurring Reports and Records

THE recurring reports and records section of the control division is constantly engaged in the study of both internal and external reports and records in order to eliminate any that are unnecessary and, wherever possible, to consolidate and simplify those that are essential. Objective study by some central group such as the control division is needed to minimize duplications and overlappings. Every effort is made to simplify and standardize both the form and the content of needed reports in order to increase their effectiveness.

The control division frequently conducts

specific procedural studies for operating divisions which may be apart from these basic programs, except that they involve the use of reports or forms. Work on reports and forms also leads to many allied activities in connection with operating problems, since a high percentage of all quartermaster corps activities includes use of reports and forms.

Specific accomplishments of the recurring reports and forms program throughout the quartermaster corps include: (1) elimination of 763 reports and 4,008 forms, estimated to save the full time of approximately 3,400 personnel; (2) organization of the control approval system, by which the essentiality of 1,403 reports has been determined by thorough analysis and approval indicated by the assignment of individual control approval symbols; (3) inventory and assignment of form numbers to 11,314 forms and the subsequent survey of these forms for simplification of design and standardization; and (4) establishment of stock levels for forms and the return or salvage of stocks in excess of these levels.

Strict justification is required for all recurring reports, and a licensing system for the preparation of these reports is in operation which consists of the prior assignment of control approval symbols to those reports which are approved and determined to be essential. Similarly, a continuous program is conducted throughout the corps for the control and standardization of forms.

Consulting Services

AS IN any large organization there are always a number of operating problems that require special advice and assistance. The operating personnel call upon the control division to render staff assistance in the solution of these problems. The personnel of the control division endeavor to approach these problems professionally and to identify themselves with the interests and objectives of the operating chief concerned.

An example of the type of service rendered is the work done by the control di-

vision in cooperation with the operating divisions of the OQMG in improving the important operation of supply planning and stock control. The technical knowledge of the line personnel was combined with special control techniques to develop a substantial improvement in this activity. The need for this cooperative approach is indicated by the fact that the procedures involved covered: (1) coordination between supply divisions and staff divisions within the OQMG, (2) coordination between depots and supply divisions of the OQMG, and (3) coordination between depots themselves, independently of the OQMG.

Commodity specialists, stock accounting experts, and depot personnel from all interested divisions assisted in the development of tentative plans and the conduct of experimental runs.

As a result of this intensive combined effort, the following substantial improvements were realized: (1) a supply control system was originated with stock requirements and stock levels based mainly on a projection of actual requirements; (2) a master production schedule system was instituted in order to achieve a better balance between actual requirements and production capacities; (3) a stock control system was developed for installations down to post, camp, and station level; (4) a more effective system was developed for inter-depot distribution; and (5) a workable system was developed for the orderly disposition of obsolete items and stock excesses.

All these steps have helped to make the supply system for quartermaster items more amenable to control. Requirements are projected on a more realistic basis that takes into account depot and station stockage and the ability of industry to produce. While much remains to be accomplished in this field, substantial progress has been achieved.

Standardization of Procedures

AN EXAMPLE of the technique for developing a standard procedure is the standard procurement organization and proce-

dures developed and currently being installed at all of the principal procuring depots of the quartermaster corps. This project was undertaken as a result of a directive received from control division, headquarters, ASF, to install standard procurement organization and procedures throughout field installations of the quartermaster corps.

Subsequently, two members of the control division were appointed to work with two representatives of the procurement division, OQMG, in order to effect the standardization program which had been broadly outlined by headquarters, ASF. This four-man team subjected the tentative program outlined by headquarters, ASF, to an intensive review, at the conclusion of which it was decided that the standard patterns laid down for the organization and some of the procedures were not entirely applicable to QM installations. A conference was held with headquarters, ASF, at which permission was requested to develop patterns that would be suitable to QM procurement activities. This proposal was readily agreed to by headquarters, ASF, upon the understanding that unless local conditions would be seriously impaired by failure to deviate, no local deviations from the standard organization and procedures would be permitted. This was a reasonable request in view of the wide freedom of action left to the OQMG in the development of its own standard procurement organization and procedures.

When a tentative QM procurement manual had been developed covering purchasing, organization, and procedures, the four-man team took the project to a selected QM depot for testing under field conditions. The OQMG team took the depot operating personnel "behind the scenes," as it were, and explained in full the objectives of the project and the manner in which it was proposed to achieve them. The proving of the tentative organization and procedures was done by a ten-man team composed of all interested divisions within

the depot—including, of course, the depot control division. The work of this ten-man team was generally directed by the OQMG representatives, who gave every possible assistance and acted as coordinators during the entire installation.

Upon conclusion of the initial installation an operating manual covering procurement activities was prepared, based on the original OQMG outline, but modified in accordance with the results of this first trial run. The standard organization and procedures were then installed in a similar fashion in all of the major procuring depots of the quartermaster corps. In every case the assistance and cooperation of the depot operating personnel was sought and secured.

While the installations have been completed too recently to determine all the final and permanent benefits, some of those so far reported by the depots themselves have been: (1) an average reduction of 55 per cent in paper work and processing of documents; (2) elimination of unnecessary or cumbersome forms and records maintained by individual units and the substitution of standard forms which serve all elements of the organization; (3) a more definite establishment and a clearer understanding of the relationships of the various units of the organization; (4) the education of key operating personnel in the broad scope of procurement activities; and (5) the extension of executive control throughout the entire activity through the installation of standard organization, procedures, statistics, reports, forms, and records.

When this standardization is completed, the quartermaster corps will have developed uniform procedures covering one of its major activities. This has certain obvious advantages. Manufacturers dealing with the quartermaster corps will use the same forms and follow the same procedures regardless of which quartermaster purchasing organization they may happen to be supplying at the time. This improves coordination between the quartermaster purchasing organization and industry. Within the quar-

termaster corps executive control is extended over all the far-flung activities of a huge purchasing program. By developing the "best" procedures and testing their effectiveness, there is greater assurance that the fullest benefit is received from each salary dollar expended. Comparisons of efficiency and evaluations of the effectiveness of performance are made possible. Standard practices will also permit a more orderly contraction of purchasing organizations, procedures, and personnel in the demobilization period.

Field Liaison

AFTER the control program had been shaken down by trial and error within the OQMG, it was decided to take the entire program to the field, where the great bulk of employees were located. The first move was the establishment of control divisions in every depot. The depots were instructed as to the organization, functions, and personnel to be set up for these divisions. After the divisions had been established, each depot sent in the chief and his principal assistants to attend a two-week training conference at the office of the quartermaster general. These men received intensive training in every phase of management analysis on an around-the-clock basis from the personnel of the OQMG control division. Then, to round out their instruction, they were given on-the-job training in surveys currently being conducted in the OQMG, under the guidance of OQMG control division personnel. When these men returned to their depots, they had not only a fair amount of technical training but also a good deal of enthusiasm engendered by the conference, as well as a firm conviction that the OQMG was *not fooling*—that the quartermaster general himself was vitally concerned with the accomplishment of this program!

But this did not end the scheduled program with respect to the depots. Every possible incentive was used to increase the interest and effectiveness of the depot con-

trol divisions. The next step was sending visiting "teams" from the OQMG. These teams consisted of OQMG control division representatives and high-ranking representatives of the various operating divisions. Operating personnel were sent in order to impress on the depot commanders the fact that the operating divisions intended to make use of all material and information developed in these surveys to gauge the over-all efficiency of the depot operating personnel within their respective areas. These teams thus had a dual objective: (1) to sell the commanding officer and his operating chiefs on the program, and (2) to inspire, instruct, and assist the depot control staffs in the establishment and furtherance of the work simplification program. Two teams have been kept constantly in the field handling this work as a stimulation to the depot control divisions.

It was soon felt that the control divisions were ready for the institution of training conferences. These conferences lasted a week and were attended by representatives of from ten to twelve depots. New techniques were presented and round table discussions were held on all phases of the work simplification program.

A number of other devices to stimulate interest were also used. Studies that were considered outstanding were sent in to the OQMG, where they were reproduced and distributed to all depots as a means of passing on information, recognizing outstanding accomplishments, and encouraging other depots to attempt to gain similar distinction.

Another means of increasing interest and promoting rivalry was the frequent publication of the "standing of the teams." Extensive training material was furnished—for example, the "Quartermaster Control Officers' Handbook," "Techniques of Warehouse Work Simplification," "Work Load Measurement," and "Reports Control and Simplification." Assistance was also given to depots in the recruiting of competent military and civilian personnel for control work.

Management associations and private companies were contacted in an effort to fill the great demand for skilled technicians, or for men who could be trained to do this work. Monthly progress reports submitted by the depots gave an index both of current progress and of progress anticipated during the next month. All these reports were carefully checked, and written comments were given to each depot on each report.

This constant supervision and attention to the human factors contributed as much to the success of the quartermaster corps work simplification program as did the technical factors.

Work Measurement

THE control division early recognized work measurement as an area deserving special attention. Work measurement consists of determining for a given activity a standard amount of work which should be done in a certain amount of time and comparing work accomplished with the standard. Work measurement studies are the best device for determining the number of additional personnel required for growing functions and the number that can be released from activities where the volume of work has decreased.

In order to promote this program throughout the quartermaster corps, the control division in the OQMG prepared a statement of the objectives, methods, and techniques to be employed in installing and operating work measurement. These methods illustrated various applications of work measurement and various techniques for accomplishing it so that any group installing work measurement could select the methods and techniques which applied to their particular situation. The program was tested by applying it to headquarters. Following improvement, it was transmitted to all the depots.

The work measurement program in many of the depots has been carried to a point where not only is local or decentralized use made of these data by the various operating executives in the depot, but the

information is also brought into a central point in the depot for the purposes of centralized control. This central point is frequently in the control staff, and the information is used as a basis for transferring personnel among the various divisions and for separating personnel when the depot volume decreases.

The information from reports on work measurement from the depots is consolidated in the OQMG and is used in making comparisons of the same activities in the various depots. It serves as the basis for making personnel allotments and following up on those depots that do not appear to be operating at maximum efficiency.

The control division in this particular instance recognized the need for this program and developed methods and techniques which were disseminated to depots. Having served this function, the control division turned over the administration of this activity to the personnel division as the organizational group most concerned with carrying forward this work. A position authorization branch was thereupon established to devote its full attention to the prosecution of work measurement and the determination of staffing controls.

Statistics

THE importance of statistics in maintaining central control and measuring progress and efficiency in the vast supply operations of the quartermaster corps was recognized by the quartermaster general early in the present war. Effective statistical reports were being prepared and an orderly reporting system was well established in the OQMG by the latter part of 1940. Since that time the role of statistics as a management and operating tool in the OQMG has become increasingly important.

Statistical reports in the OQMG are of two general types—operating and staff. Operating reports provide personnel at the operating level with detailed statistical data periodically for use in directing operations and taking corrective action. Staff reports are prepared for the quartermaster general

and his key assistants. They are of a summary nature and consist principally of graphic presentation plus concise textual analyses. Staff reports indicate "hot spots" or trouble areas and provide a basis for action to remedy them. The staff statistical reports are prepared by the statistics branch of the organization planning and control division. This division occupies a staff position and reports directly to the quartermaster general; its organizational position frees it from any entangling alliances with operations which are being analyzed.

The reporting system developed throughout the depot system of the quartermaster corps is controlled through standardization and prescription of statistical reporting procedures and methods by the statistics branch in the OQMG. These reports and analyses cover all phases of supply operations. They measure the trend and magnitude of procurement, from the computation of requirements through the issuance of procurement directives implementing these requirements, the awarding of the contracts by the depots, and deliveries by the contractors. The distribution and storage phases of supply operations are covered in reports that show the status of stocks of QM items and the rate and magnitude of issuance. The most important phase of the statistical operations of the statistics branch involves supply control through supply analyses.

Several other types of reports are issued. Administrative activities of the quartermaster corps are summarized in periodic reports. During a recent six-month period studies of the following fields have been made: personnel utilization, stock control operations, procurement, research and development, training, distribution, and maintenance. Supply operations are summarized in efficiency and activity indices.

Operations Inspection

A FIELD progress branch of the control division devotes itself to examining operating trends and conducting special investigations of operating activities. Its

examinations are usually of a general nature and are conducted with the objective of disclosing any unfavorable conditions that can be subjected to more detailed study by one of the other units of the control division. It is the function of the branch to inform the quartermaster general and his deputies currently of the status and operating efficiency of quartermaster activities, to examine trends in operations and activities of the quartermaster corps in order to forestall conditions that will require corrective action, and to recommend the specific corrective action necessary when an investigation reveals an activity not operating at maximum efficiency.

An illustration of the nature of the work undertaken by the field progress branch is the recently completed "Comprehensive Study of Army Food Distribution." Data were collected from every available source—from the operating divisions of the OQMG in Washington through all levels of command to the individual company mess hall. In addition, all the information on food which had been collected previously by other investigational units was carefully screened and all pertinent data extracted. After processing and analyzing this mass of information, a report was prepared detailing the present system of food distribution, its strength and weaknesses, and specific recommendations of action to be taken. Previous studies of a similar nature have resulted in food savings to the Army totaling \$117,000,000 annually.

The branch also conducts special investigations and inspections at the request of the quartermaster general and his deputies. Such investigations may cover any phase of quartermaster activity. They result in immediate corrective action so that "trouble spots" will not develop into acute general problems.

The field progress branch coordinates and supplements the investigational work being done by the various other units. The first step in the execution of a project is the examination of the data already collected by these other agencies. It is only after the

processing of this information, which may be obtained from any government agency, War Department or civilian, that the branch inaugurates its own investigation for the purpose of obtaining confirmatory evidence and filling in gaps.

Demobilization Planning

DEMOBILIZATION planning in the quartermaster corps is divided into three echelons: (1) demobilization planning units in all quartermaster and ASF depots, (2) units in OQMG procurement, storage and distribution, subsistence, fuels and lubricants, international, military planning, and service installations divisions, and (3) the demobilization planning branch, organization planning and control division.

The primary objective of demobilization planning is the preparation of plans which can be put into operation on V-Day. Activities to achieve this objective include the development of actual demobilization plans and the preparation of projects and reports as required by higher echelons.

In order to accomplish these objectives, the three echelons function approximately as follows: (1) the demobilization planning branch, OPC division, controls and supervises all quartermaster corps demobilization planning, assigning to other organizational units particular projects pertaining to them, (2) the units within the divisions, OQMG, coordinate all planning as it pertains to their respective divisions and furnish such information and reports as are required of them, and (3) the units at the depots similarly coordinate all planning within their respective depots.

Concluding Statement

THE experience of the quartermaster corps with control work indicates that it is especially useful in connection with problems of organization, procedures, statistics and reports, and utilization of personnel. The work of a control division does not offer a substitute for sound and effec-

tive administration. Rather, it provides an aid to management through increasing the efficiency of management and of all the work activities of the installation to which these control techniques are applied.

It must not be assumed that the results achieved by the control divisions of the quartermaster corps are due in any special measure to the particular abilities of the personnel recruited to man these activities. True, every effort has been made to secure experienced and capable personnel, but the fact remains that much of the work performed was done by personnel who received their instruction in management analysis in the control divisions of the quartermaster corps.

The techniques developed by both headquarters, ASF, and the control division of the OQMG, the earnest and continued support rendered to the program by the top management of the quartermaster corps, the dramatization and energy put into the various sustaining projects, and the constant stimulation and training of the staff members—all these contributed their share to the success that was achieved.

But over and above all technical devices, there was held before both control division and operating division personnel as a motivating force their responsibilities as members of the greatest supply team in history. All personnel of the quartermaster corps is constantly reminded of the motto of the quartermaster corps, "Enough and On Time," and that each activity fits, either as a small cog or a large wheel, into a supply machine that must and does serve with the highest degree of efficiency in all parts of the world. It is probable that our control divisions still would have done a creditable job without this constant motivation, but with it, with their identification of themselves as part of the fighting quartermaster organization, they have done a job that holds much promise for their future achievements as staff assistants to the commanders and executives of all quartermaster installations.

Reconversion of the Federal Administrative Machinery from War to Peace

By LOUIS BROWNLOW

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IN THE matter of superlatives, owing to the war, we are bankrupt. The stockpile of adjectives has disappeared. The adverbial assembly line cannot possibly keep up with the demand. When those most skillful and adept of wordsmiths, the war correspondents, valiantly tried to keep pace with growing Allied airpower, they wrought mightily but finally were forced to say that there were no words beyond the superlatives they had already used to describe the new and greater things that were being done. The war writers were forced back upon the meager resources of the dictionary and were compelled to use words that once were strong but now become but feeble instruments to transmit the mightiness of the things they had to tell.

So of public administration. As this is written the German armies still fight furiously in the valleys of the Rhine, the Vistula, and the Po; and Japanese still endure to the doom of death in their island outposts; but the United Nations are sure of victory. They know not the hour nor the day, but they are sure.

They are sure because they have succeeded in accomplishing the most stupendous task of the coordinated use of manpower and materials in all the history of mankind. That coordination was, of course, a task in public administration, military and civil; it was more, much more, than the coordination of men and materials—it was also the coordination of elements heretofore deemed to be intrinsically independent, as of armies and navies; and of

elements heretofore believed essentially separate, as of nation and nation.

In our own country the administrative success has been the greatest of all. Perhaps because here we were spared the direct impact of enemy force; perhaps because of our greater resources in skills and management; perhaps (who can say "nay"?) because of our form of government; in any event, our success was the greatest in all time. We could not have reached this peak without Britain or without Russia; but, on the other hand, without America both of them long ago would have perished. There were the indignant protests of those who believed that if this were not changed, or if that were not done, or if t'other were not stopped, the war was lost. Military men saw too much civilian interference, civilians too much military control. Industrialists feared the coddling of labor; labor feared the coddling of industry; farmers feared they were being neglected; and everybody else had his fears, too. Experts in every specialty wrung their hands as they saw their particular prescriptions seemingly tampered with by amateurs. Nobody was satisfied.¹ Yet, despite all this (maybe because of all this), the success was achieved—a success so great that we can now talk about reconversion of the governmental machinery from war to peace even before the war is at an end.

If we were not so sure it would have been impossible for the President to write, as he did write, on September 18, 1944, to the Director of the Budget:

¹ Cf. John Godfrey Saxe, "The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Hindoo Fable."

Total war has required a great expansion of Government activities, agencies, and personnel. Our success on the battle fronts all over the world bear witness to the effectiveness of our efforts.

Upon the termination of hostilities, we must proceed with equal vigor to liquidate war agencies and reconvert the Government to peace. Some steps along these lines may be taken when the fighting ends in Europe. The transition from war to peace should be carried forward rapidly, but with a minimum of disorder and disruption. Only careful planning can achieve this goal.

Wasting no other word upon the measure of success achieved, the letter went on to say:

In order that I may most effectively fulfill my responsibilities as Chief Executive in the demobilization period and may present appropriate recommendations to the Congress on the reconversion of the Government agencies, I am asking you to re-examine the programs, organization, and staffing of Government agencies and submit to me at the earliest possible date recommendations for adjusting the Executive Branch of the Government from the needs of war to the needs of peace.

Such recommendations should include plans for (1) the liquidation of war agencies and the reassignment of such permanent or continuing functions as they possess, (2) the reduction of Government personnel to a peace footing, and (3) the simplification and adaptation of the administrative structure to peacetime requirements.

In general, recommendations should include the methods for effecting the proposed changes and the appropriate timing of these changes. Immediate attention should be focussed on the adjustments needed upon the termination of the war in Europe.

Thus the President, agreeable to the provision of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, directed the Bureau of the Budget, which since July 1, 1939, has been in the Executive Office of the President, to plan for the reconversion of the federal administrative machinery from the uses of war to the uses of peace. These plans, when made, supplemented and complemented, no doubt, by other plans in the large and in detail that will come from scores of other sources, both public and private, will be subjected to so much of public opinion as is concerned with administrative problems and then sometime, somewhere, directly or

indirectly, will receive the sanction of the Congress and constitute the framework of the postwar administrative organization.

What sort of a job is this? We can but say, somewhat primly, that it is of prime importance. No tax can be levied upon the lexicon of superlatives that will produce the adjectives or the adverbs to denote adequately its importance or its primacy. Again verbal bankruptcy compels understatement.

Not only is the job first in significance, and top of the list in timing, but unfortunately there is reason to believe that it will prove to be, if anything, even more difficult than was that other task of converting the machinery of this government from peace to war. The success of the conversion to war was not easily nor smoothly achieved. There were many false starts and wrong turnings, many underestimates of capacity when fear was the counselor, many overestimates of results when organization charts on paper were accepted as accomplishments in lieu of organizations furnished forth with brain and brawn. Nevertheless, it was a great success because, no doubt, throughout the struggle and despite the intensity of battles fought over differences with respect to method and to policy, there was the pervasive, beneficent influence of a common purpose—victory. The will to win the war begat the unity that alone was powerful enough to win it.

Now, as we turn to peace, can we find a common purpose? Can we agree upon the goals of peace? Certainly, in the very nature of things, these goals will be numbered in the plural. There will be no such single, measurable, definitive, unique objective as victory. The organization of the administrative machinery must be devised to facilitate the achievement of at least five principal purposes on which there is apparent agreement:¹

1. The durability of the peace and the prevention of war, in which the United

¹ Cf. Democratic and Republican platforms, 1944; campaign speeches of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Thomas E. Dewey, 1944.

States must act in concert with the other United Nations.

2. Maintenance of prosperity in a system of free enterprise.

3. Maintenance of a high level of employment.

4. The extension of the social security system.

5. The extension and enrichment of the opportunities for the cultural advancement of the individuals composing the nation.

These goals require different approaches for the solution of the administrative problems they evoke, and the very fact of a plurality of objectives introduces a complexity in the pattern not present as when every effort is bent, as in war, to win.

II

IT MAY be useful to go back over the main administrative steps that were taken in the conversion to war.

As measured by time and denoted by name, there were two phases—that of defense, from September 1, 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, and that of war, from December 7, 1941, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. What was done in the defense phase, of course, was used and useful in the war phase, but there were profound differences in the psychological orientation of the two. Indeed, during the defense phase it was observed that persons with proposals that seemed to be too warlike were rather rudely put in their places, while, in the second phase, persons who were expected to produce proposals for total war sometimes seemed still to be dominated by defense mechanisms or else seemed to forget the necessity of maintaining an essential civilian economy.

The Reorganization Act of 1939, approved April 3, 1939, in effect made the President an agent of the legislature to prepare reorganization plans to be submitted to the Congress to be effective upon the expiration of sixty days thereafter if during that period the Congress had not adopted a concurrent resolution disapprov-

ing the plan. After Munich, after the occupation of the Sudetenland, after the march into Prague, the President, on April 25, 1939, sent to the Congress Reorganization Plan No. 1. The Congress did not pass a resolution of disapproval, and therefore in the normal course the plan would have been effective on June 25. This date was inconvenient with respect to the fiscal year—a defect that was remedied by the passage through both houses of a joint resolution which was approved by the President, making the plan effective July 1, 1939. Thus there was established the Executive Office of the President, which was destined to become a major factor in the process of the oncoming conversion, predominately through the defense phase and importantly even in the war phase. On September 8, a week after the invasion of Poland and the beginning of the war, the President issued Executive Order No. 8248 establishing the divisions of the Executive Office of the President. These were six in number: the White House Office, the Bureau of the Budget, the National Resources Planning Board, the Liaison Office for Personnel Management, the Office of Government Reports, and "in the event of a national emergency, or threat of a national emergency, such office for emergency management as the President shall determine."

During the period of the "phony war" from September, 1939, until May, 1940, much planning had been done, many inquiries had been instituted into the facilities of existing agencies of the government, and many surveys had been made of the statutes to discover how far the defense program could be advanced upon the basis of existing law. There was available the act of August 29, 1916, setting up a Council of National Defense consisting of six cabinet members and an advisory commission of seven members. In May, 1940, when the seizure of Norway and Denmark had been succeeded by the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands, the President revived the Council of National Defense and its ad-

visory commission, provided for its liaison with him through the Office for Emergency Management, and thus began the conversion. Of course, the government had not been entirely oblivious of the danger of war during the period of peace, and there also were available the studies made by the War and Navy departments with the cooperation of other agencies of the government. These had resulted in the Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1936, which was revised in 1939.

In the defense phase of the conversion, the President adopted the policy of utilizing the existing agencies of the government wherever possible. This was at variance with the Industrial Mobilization Plan, which had provided for new and independent agencies to take over the various civilian activities and controls required for the prosecution of war.¹

As the conversion proceeded, the National Defense Advisory Commission gave way to the Office of Production Management and other agencies set up in the Office for Emergency Management, some of them designed for direct operations and some for coordinating the operations of other agencies, both regular and emergency.

At this point a new thing in the administrative organization of the United States government came into being—the subpresidential, supradepartmental coordinator. Until this time all administrative work of the government had been carried on through departmental organizations or by *ad hoc* independent agencies, administrative coordination being left to the President. World War I had not seriously disturbed that normal pattern, and when there had been, from time to time, variations in which the President had permitted the task of coordination to be exercised by others, the delegation, when formal, as in the case of President Harding to the Director of the Budget, Mr. Dawes, had been avowedly re-

stricted to such aims as economy and efficiency; or, when informal, simply assumed, as by Senator Smoot in the time of Mr. Coolidge.

Nevertheless, for several decades interdepartmental issues of administrative policy had been increasing in importance in the national administration. World War I accentuated this trend; the crisis of 1929 and the succeeding depression aggravated the issue; and the great crisis of World War II brought the problem up to a level where something had to be done about it.

The very framework of the administrative machinery probably has accented the number of interdepartmental questions, many of which could not be settled by decisions in the formal administrative line of command. The burden of coordination and decision bore heavier and heavier upon the President himself. In this situation there arose the quarrels, the clashes, the dissension among the administrators and between the military and civilian staffs; among occupational groups, industrial, labor, and agricultural; and between the executive and the legislative branches which might well have convinced an outside observer that because of bad administration the whole effort must fail and the war end not in victory but defeat.

Perhaps the question never can be resolved. It must be admitted that some of these disputes could have been avoided. Yet, it still is arguable that if the administrative machinery had been so organized that profound questions of policy would not have come to the surface, the whole effort might not have been as speedily successful as it was. In fact, it could be argued that administrative organization should be moulded precisely to bring to the top unreconciled conflicts on policy and on jurisdiction. A far less spectacular threat to speedy decisions in the war than occasional public quarrels between "czars" was the polite suppression by the lower echelons of disagreements on basic matters—disagreements which never even came to the notice

¹ Joseph P. Harris, "The Emergency National Defense Organization," 1 *Public Administration Review* 1-24 (Autumn, 1940).

of the heads of the respective agencies, who, in the majority of cases, would have instantly resolved them; or, failing that, they could have been resolved by the President.

If, for instance, the struggles in the War Production Board with respect to allocations of materials between civilian and military needs had been settled finally at any one of a half-dozen subordinate points when they seemed to be so settled, we could not have supported the Army and Navy with war materiel as we did and at the same time maintained the civilian standards as we have. Also, it is entirely probable that if the administrative decisions with respect to stabilization had been rigidified by an oversimplified and superficially streamlined administrative mechanism, the genuine concerted power of group pressures against the line might have broken through more easily than when the structure was kept flexible by permitting the disputes behind the line from time to time to flare into open conflict to be settled only by the President. The fact remains that the almost impossible task of "holding the line" was achieved.

In appraising the great success of the conversion to war, it will not do to overlook the extremely valuable services rendered by the Congress, especially through its committees. In the American scheme of things the Congress is perhaps most useful when it acts in its capacity as an inquirer and as an investigator, either through its standing committees or through special committees. These inquiries, although some of them were bungling and futile and one or two seemed to be not quite in good faith, in nearly all instances helped to bring out into the open the essential problems of policy that were to be decided. Many of the false starts and wrong turnings would not have been retrieved and corrected had it not been for the hearings before the congressional committees.

No one can deny that this is a painful and laborious process. It is laborious for the hardworking members of the Congress,

who are all but driven to exhaustion by the physical labor entailed. It is painfully laborious to the administrators, who must spend their mornings before committees and keep their staffs at work far into the night preparing for the next morning's ordeal.

The individual charged with the administration of the rubber program no doubt thought that twenty-seven separate committees of Congress were too many. But notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, this fact, the rubber program met the pragmatic test of success. The work of the regular committees and such special committees as that headed by Senator Truman helped the executive branch the better to do its work; and the administrators, through their testimony before these committees, similarly helped the Congress the better to do its job.

III

As the defense phase of the conversion gradually (as far as administrative machinery was concerned) merged into the war phase, so now before the end of the war, and perhaps long before the end of the war, the whole business of conversion to war merges into the gigantic task of reconversion to peace. The President, as has been pointed out, has asked the Bureau of the Budget to prepare plans for orderly readjustment of the machinery of the executive branch.

In the Surplus War Property Act and in the Contract Settlement Act, the Congress has proceeded to set up machinery for dealing with reconversion and has capped the whole structure by the establishment of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. This office is to be the successor of the Office of War Mobilization, which was created by executive order in the Office for Emergency Management. This shift from executive order to statute as the basis for an over-all administrative agency perhaps may give the added authority of advance legislative sanction, but it

also may introduce rigidities that may make the whole machinery less effective than its more flexible predecessor.

But far more important is that in this act for the first time the Congress is attempting to set up by statute an over-all administrative agency transcending the scope of the executive departments or independent agencies and, indeed, subordinating such agencies to the administrative authority of a subpresidential, supradepartmental official.

Traditionally, it has been adequate for individual congressional committees to deal with each executive agency and make their wishes known and felt. As it becomes impossible to govern in such an atomized way, the center of governance tends to move to the point of over-all direction. That point is the President. He has of his own motion set up coordinating officials in the executive office. Now comes the statutory establishment of functional supervisors above the departmental level, which may be construed as an attempt to increase congressional control of administration through one or all of these subordinates of the President. Such an arrangement, however, would result in nothing but confusion. If the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion is in fact close enough to the President to be effective, he will tend to partake of the President's official independence; and if he is not that close to the President, Congress would not gain authority by getting control of his office. Therefore, the innovation may be taken as congressional approval of a presidential method of dealing with an increasingly complex problem.

The pattern is illustrated in Executive Order No. 9250 (October 3, 1942), "providing for the stabilizing of the national economy." This order established an "Office of Economic Stabilization" in the "Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President."¹ The

¹ In the Office for Emergency Management are also such principal war agencies as Foreign Economic Ad-

director of the office, "with the approval of the President," was instructed to

formulate and develop a comprehensive national economic policy relating to the control of civilian purchasing power, prices, rents, wages, salaries, profits, rationing, subsidies, and all related matters—all for the purpose of preventing avoidable increases in the cost of living, cooperating in minimizing the unnecessary migration of labor from one business, industry, or region to another, and facilitating the prosecution of the war. To give effect to this comprehensive national economic policy the Director shall have power to issue directives on policy to the Federal departments and agencies concerned.

The director was to advise and consult with an Economic Stabilization Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Price Administrator, the chairman of the National War Labor Board, and two representatives each of labor, management, and farmers, to be appointed by the President.

Although the order followed the precedents, some of the personnel and physical arrangements were new. The director was Mr. Justice Byrnes, who resigned from the Supreme Court to take the position, and he was located physically in the East Wing of the White House. The aura of prestige plus the geography of the situation gave the director considerably more authority in dealing with the departments. On the other hand, as the authority was actually exercised by the director, the nature of the economic problem, the vagueness of the assignment, and the complexity of the means for achieving it tended to counteract the potentialities of the post.

The task of coordination had been carried out through liaison with the Presi-

ministration, National War Labor Board, Office of Alien Property Custodian, Office of Civilian Defense, Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Office of Defense Transportation, Office of Scientific Research and Development, Office of War Information, War Manpower Commission, War Production Board, Smaller War Plants Corporation, War Shipping Administration.

dent by one of his administrative assistants since the beginning of OEM, first by Mr. McReynolds and then by Mr. Coy; but since the President himself was the head of OEM, the administrators of the war agencies in that office also had direct access to the President. What may be regarded as a shift from liaison and direct contact to the creation of an administrator for the OEM came with the establishment of the Office of War Mobilization, the directorship of which was filled by transferring Justice Byrnes from the Office of Economic Stabilization.

Under Executive Order 9347 (May 27, 1943), the Director of War Mobilization became virtually an "assistant president" with a very broad jurisdiction to formulate policies and to direct agencies in their execution. Thus, he was authorized:

(a) To develop unified programs and to establish policies for the maximum use of the nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the effective use of the national manpower not in the armed forces, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and conditions;

(b) To unify the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products and to resolve and determine controversies between such agencies or departments, except those to be resolved by the Director of Economic Stabilization under Section 3, Title IV of Executive Order No. 9250; and

(c) To issue such directives on policy or operations to the Federal agencies and departments as may be necessary to carry out the programs developed, the policies established, and the decisions made under this Order. It shall be the duty of all such agencies and departments to execute these directives, and to make to the Office of War Mobilization such progress reports as may be required.

Reconversion entered the lists when the Baruch-Hancock report accepted the general administrative theory and recommended the establishment of several additional functional supervisory units to formulate policy and to direct the agencies in

reconversion activities. The proposal was that each of these functional supervisory authorities would constitute a part of an Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, i.e., the Office of War Mobilization rechristened.

On February 21, 1944, by Executive Order No. 9425, the President established the Surplus War Property Administration within the Office of War Mobilization, to be headed by an administrator appointed by the Director of War Mobilization. The administrator, assisted by an interagency Surplus War Property Policy Board, was "to have general supervision and direction of the handling and disposition of surplus war property." He was authorized to "prescribe regulations and issue directions necessary to effectuate the purposes of this order." His principal task was to lay down policy and supervise the actions of disposal agencies whose broad jurisdictions were defined in the order and included the Treasury, the RFC, the WFA, the Maritime Commission, and the FEA. The geologic deposition of administrative strata thus involved the theory that the President would supervise the Director of War Mobilization, who would supervise the Surplus War Property Administrator, who would supervise Secretaries Jones and Morgenthau, Admiral Land, and Administrators Crowley and Marvin Jones in their property disposal activities.

In Executive Order No. 9427 (February 24, 1944), the same principle was followed in the establishment of the Retraining and Reemployment Administration. The administrator, with the assistance of a Retraining and Reemployment Policy Board, was:

To have general supervision and direction of the activities of all Government agencies relating to the retraining and reemployment of persons discharged or released from the armed services or other war work. . . .

. . . to develop programs for the orderly absorption into other employment of persons discharged or released from the armed service, or other war work, including adequate provisions for vocational

training, for the finding of jobs for persons so discharged or released. . . .

IV

PARTLY because of the insufficiency of basic law and partly because of the growing disposition of the Congress to set up administrative agencies by statute, the Office of Contract Settlement was established by the Congress¹ to supersede the Joint Contract Termination Board created by executive order which had been operating as a part of the Office of War Mobilization. The Office of Contract Settlement was not made a part of the Office of War Mobilization, but later the Congress included it as a part of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.² The director of the Office of Contract Settlement, appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate for a two-year term, is directed by the Congress to prescribe policies, principles, methods, procedures, and standards to govern the exercise of the authority and discretion and the performance of the duties and functions of all government agencies under this act; and to require or restrict the exercise of any such authority and discretion, or the performance of any such duty or function, to such extent as he deems necessary to carry out the provisions of this act. The director is advised by an interagency Contract Settlement Advisory Board.

In this act a new wrinkle was introduced in a section entitled "Surveillance by Congress." In this section it was provided that the appropriate committees would "study each report submitted to the Congress under this Act," and "otherwise maintain continuous surveillance of the operations of the Government agencies under the Act." Congressional surveillance is in practice no new thing, but it comes into this situation in a novel setting. Here an agency was established to make policy for other agencies, and the Congress seeks to exercise surveillance over an agency vested with the

responsibility of supervising other agencies.

In the Surplus Property Act of 1944 an administrative board of three was set up after a long dispute between the two houses of Congress. The Senate at first had proposed a board of twelve, to be appointed on the basis of occupational representation—three members for industry, three for labor, three for agriculture, and three representing the general public. The House insisted upon a single administrator. After some time a compromise was announced which provided for a board of four not representatively appointed which would select an administrator. But at the last moment the conference committee abandoned that idea and set up instead an administrative board of three members to be appointed by the President.

While these differences between the two houses were being ironed out, an even livelier fight was going on between the Senate and the House with respect to the bill setting up the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. When the statute setting up this office finally emerged from the conference committee, the provision which had been in the Senate bill for a joint committee to study and review each report submitted to the Congress by the director and otherwise maintain continuous surveillance of the operations of the director and other executive agencies under this act was omitted. Instead, the director of War Mobilization and Reconversion was required to submit quarterly reports to the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives.

This is the first instance in our history, so far as I can find, in which the Congress by statute has set up a subpresidential, supradepartmental administrator with authority (so far as transition and reconversion are concerned) over all departments, independent establishments, and agencies in the executive branch of the government, including corporations wholly owned by the United States. The statute³ says:

¹ Public Law 395 (78th Congress, 2nd Session).

² Public Law 458 (78th Congress, 2nd Session).

³ *Ibid.* Sec. 101.

(c) In addition to any powers which the President is authorized to and does delegate to the Director for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the mobilization of the Nation for war, the Director shall, subject to the direction of the President—

(1) formulate or have formulated such plans as are necessary to meet the problems arising out of the transition from war to peace;

(2) issue such orders and regulations to executive agencies¹ as may be necessary to provide for the exercise of their powers in a manner consistent with the plans formulated under this section or to coordinate the activities of executive agencies with respect to the problems arising out of the transition from war to peace. Each executive agency shall carry out the orders and regulations of the Director expeditiously and, to the extent necessary to carry out such orders and regulations, shall modify its operations and procedures and issue regulations with respect thereto. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as authorizing any activities to carry out any plans formulated under this section which are not within the scope of the powers possessed by the President or the executive agencies under the provisions of law other than this section;

(3) recommend to the Congress appropriate legislation providing authority to carry out plans developed under this section but not authorized under existing law;

(4) promote and assist in the development of demobilization and reconversion plans by executive agencies; develop procedures whereby each executive agency is kept informed of proposed demobilization and reconversion plans and proposals which relate to its work and which are being developed or carried out by other executive agencies; and settle controversies between executive agencies in the development and administration of such plans;

(5) cause studies and reports to be made for him by the various executive agencies which will enable him to determine the need for the simplification, consolidation, or elimination of such executive agencies as have been established for the purposes of the war emergency, for the termination, or establishment by statute, of executive agencies which exist under Executive order only, and for the relaxation or removal of emergency war controls;

(6) institute a specific study, for submission to the President and the Congress, of the present functions of the various executive agencies in the field

¹ Sec. 601. "When used in this Act—(a) The term 'executive agency' means any department, independent establishment, or agency in the executive branch of the Government, including any corporation wholly owned by the United States."

of manpower, and develop a program for reorganizing and consolidating such agencies to the fullest extent practicable;

(7) consult and cooperate with State and local governments, industry, labor, agriculture, and other groups, both national and local, concerning the problems arising out of the transition from war to peace; and

(8) submit reports to the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives on the 1st days of January, April, July, and October, on the activities undertaken or contemplated by him under this Act. Such reports shall summarize and appraise the activities of the various executive agencies in the field of demobilization and post-war adjustment, and may include such legislative proposals as he may deem necessary or desirable.

Thus there comes into being for the purposes of the further mobilization of the nation for war and to meet the problems arising out of the transition from war to peace a statutory officer who may be considered an assistant president. He is to be appointed by the President, of course subject to confirmation by the Senate, but for a term of only two years, and he is to make regular reports to the Senate and the House of Representatives as well as to the President.

Moreover, he is to have an advisory cabinet of his own. Again I quote the statute:

SEC. 102. (a) There is hereby created an advisory board, which shall consist of twelve members who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. All of the members of the Board shall represent the general public and the public interest, but in order that the Board may have the benefit of experience in the matters with which it will deal under this Act, three members of the Board shall have had experience in business management, three members shall have had experience in matters relating to labor, and three members shall have had experience in agriculture. The President shall designate one of the remaining three members as chairman of the Board.

(b) It shall be the general function of the Board to advise with the Director with respect to war mobilization and reconversion and make to him such recommendations relating to legislation, policies, and procedures as it may deem necessary.

(c) Members of the Board shall receive a per diem allowance of \$25 for each day spent in actual meetings of the Board or at conferences held upon

the call of the Director, plus necessary traveling and other expenses incurred while so engaged.

Here we have a novel device of an advisory board so organized that many persons will consider it, partially at least, representative of occupational groups assisting not the President but an over-all administrator, who has authority to issue orders to any agency in the executive branch.

It may be doubted, except under his general constitutional powers and his military powers as Commander-in-Chief, if even the President has such a grant of power as is now given by statute to the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion to issue orders and prescribe regulations for such an independent agency as, let us say, the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission.

V

THUS we see that both the President and the Congress clearly contemplate a reorganization of the administrative machinery of the government as a necessity in the transition period and as an antecedent to the reconversion to peace. Under provisions of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the President has asked the Bureau of the Budget to submit to him plans for the reorganization. Under the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944, the new "assistant president," the director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, is to do something of the same sort.

In my own opinion, the process of reorganization should be a continuous and a continuing one, since the needs to be met are ever changing and the emphasis of relative importance in operation is always shifting.

If the executive and the legislative branches are to work together the better to discharge their responsibilities to the people, both the President and the Congress should share in the work of reorganization, and this applies not only to the reconversion of the so-called emergency or

war agencies to be liquidated, but with even greater force to the regular operating agencies which must carry on in the peace.

Even at the risk of rehashing twice-told tales, it may be useful at this juncture to review our past experience with the reorganization problem. In the earlier days of the republic, the necessary adjustments in the organization of the executive branch were made (except perhaps in the administration of President Lincoln) by the formal legislative process. Perhaps there was a recommendation by the President in a message to Congress, the consideration of the matter by a committee of one or both houses, the enactment of the statute, its approval by the President, and that was that. This method never was used for a general reorganization and usually has been used only when the creation of some new agency or the assumption of a new function rendered a partial reshuffling necessary.

Probably the first important general study of all the agencies in the executive branch with a view to their more efficient reorganization was undertaken by a committee appointed in 1893 by President Cleveland and thereafter known as the Dockery Committee.

After that time, and during the last fifty years, the recommendations for interagency reorganization have been made: (1) by an *ad hoc* committee acting on the request of the President, or the Congress, or both; (2) by a suitable federal executive agency; (3) by a private agency acting on appropriate request; (4) by a commission established by law; (5) by a committee of either house of Congress; (6) by a mixed legislative-executive committee.

Reorganization measures so initiated have been put into effect: (1) by statute; (2) by action of the President under authority conferred on him either by law or by the Constitution; (3) by action of the President subject to rejection or approval thereof by Congress prior to a delayed effective date; either (a) executive orders

subject to legislative approval or (b) legislative plans submitted by the President subject to legislative disapproval—the so-called legislative veto process.

Exploration of the different reorganization methods reveals that:

1. Reorganization of any substantial scope cannot be accomplished by ordinary statute.

2. The most expeditious method is that wherein the President takes definitive action without any subsequent congressional action of any kind, as under the War Powers Act.

3. The most satisfactory method is that in which the President and Congress act in cooperation, as under the procedure of the Reorganization Act of 1939 and the similar procedure taken with respect to the uniform rules for federal courts¹ and the procedure in leading up to the act for the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives, approved June 18, 1939.²

The second, or most expeditious, method may be followed as long as the first War Powers Act is in effect so far as war activities are concerned. Authority under it expires six months after the termination of the war. It is interesting to note that the last World War legally came to an end in 1921, so that, even if there is a treaty of peace after this war, which may be doubted, the termination of the existing act is far, far in the future. Nevertheless, it may be amended by the Congress at any time by the ordinary legislative method, which, of course, requires the approval of the President; or the Congress may attempt to terminate it by concurrent resolution not requiring the signature of the President (a process never yet tested for its validity but frequently set up as a reserved right by the Congress in the body of a statute); or it may be nullified in fact to a certain degree by such enactments as the War Mobilization

and Reconversion Act of 1944.

In my opinion, the greatest prospect of cooperation between the President and the Congress for the necessary reorganization attendant upon the reconversion to peace could be reached by reviving the procedure of the Reorganization Act of 1939—putting the responsibility for the formulation of proposals upon the President and leaving in Congress the ultimate sanction through the legislative veto.

At the present time the Bureau of the Budget and the director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion are both given the task of preparing recommendations. If, under the direction of the President, they work in harmony, perhaps no evil results will flow from this duality of responsibility. If, on the other hand, some suitable scheme of cooperation is not found, the task of reconversion and reorganization may be seriously interfered with. This apparent problem may disappear if the Director of War Mobilization clears his legislative recommendations with the President through the Bureau of the Budget in the same manner that all other agencies in the executive branch have done for years.

The initial task of formulating the recommendations for reorganizations is of prime importance. As mentioned briefly above, in the past the methods utilized or proposed for accomplishing this task have been:

1. By a committee (or person) acting on the request of the President, or, theoretically, at the request of Congress or of either house. The President's Committee on Administrative Management (1936-37) is an example. The President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency (1910-13), consisting of five members and financed by various appropriations made available to the President in the aggregate amount of \$250,000, is another example; however, the attention of this commission was focused more on procedures than on the solution of organizational questions.

¹ H. Rep. No. 2743, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, June 19, 1938.

² John D. Millett and Lindsay Rogers, "The Legislative Veto and the Reorganization Act of 1939," ¹ *Public Administration Review* 176-89 (Winter, 1941).

2. By a suitable federal executive agency, such as the Bureau of the Budget (Section 209 of the Budget and Accounting Act places this responsibility upon the Bureau "when directed by the President"). The former Bureau of Efficiency also performed this function in 1923.

3. By a private agency acting on appropriate request, such as the Brookings Institution in the case of its report to the Byrd Committee.

4. By a commission established by law. Secretary of Commerce Hoover on December 29, 1920, testifying before a joint congressional committee, suggested that Congress create an independent commission which would recommend to the President certain defined principles relating to organizational adjustments, after which the President would carry out the details of transfers of individual bureaus and functions to meet such principles.

5. By a committee of either house of Congress, such as the House Select Committee To Investigate Executive Agencies, created April 29, 1936, pursuant to House Resolution 460, 74th Congress, 2nd Session, which committee expired with the termination of the 74th Congress on January 5, 1937; and such as the Senate Select Committee To Investigate the Executive Agencies of the Government, established pursuant to Senate Resolution 217, 74th Congress, 2nd Session, adopted February 24, 1936. The latter is the so-called Byrd Committee, which employed the Brookings Institution for the primary purpose of assembling voluminous factual information as contrasted with the making of recommendations.

6. By a committee partly legislative and partly executive in composition. By joint resolution of December 17, 1920, Congress set up the Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Administrative Branch of the Government, consisting of three senators and three representatives. A joint resolution of May 5, 1921, authorized the

President to name a representative of the executive branch to cooperate with the committee, and he became chairman. While the committee made some studies of its own, its action finally centered upon the President's plan transmitted to the chairman February 13, 1923, which was substantially shaved down by the committee and allowed to die by Congress.

After reorganization projects have been initiated in the past they have been accomplished by three general methods, namely, (1) by statute enacted by Congress and approved by the President in the usual manner, (2) by action of the President, and (3) by action of the President subject to rejection by the Congress or requiring the approval of Congress.

1. Examples of transactions accomplished by statute are (a) abolition of the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering, Navy Department, and consolidation of their functions into a Bureau of Ships in 1940 (5 U.S.C. 429); (b) consolidation of the Bureau of Entomology, the Bureau of Plant Quarantine, and the disease control and eradication work of the Bureau of Plant Industry, Department of Agriculture, into the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine in 1934 (48 Stat. L. 486); and (c) the bifurcation of the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1913.

Any expectation that reorganization would be effected in the largest volume and with most facility through the legislative route, i.e., by statutes carrying out specific reorganization steps, is not borne out by the facts. Indeed, it is possible that executive reorganization and joint executive-legislative reorganizations loom as large as they do because of the fact that definitive specific reorganization measures seldom emerge from Congress. This point is well illustrated by the experience during the administration of President Harding, when the President submitted comprehensive proposals to the Joint Committee on Reorganization; the Committee whittled the

proposals down severely before reporting them to Congress, and the Congress forgot the matter entirely.

2. Reorganization by the President is for the most part accomplished by executive order. It is commonly supposed to rest on authority conferred upon the President by act of Congress, as in the cases of the Overman Act of 1918; of 5 U.S.C. 602, authorizing the President to transfer to the Department of Commerce the whole or any part of any office, bureau, division, or other branch of the public service engaged in statistical or scientific work, from any one of seven stated departments; of Title IV of Part II of the Legislative Appropriation Act, fiscal year 1933, as amended March 3, 1933, and March 20, 1933 (5 U.S.C. 130); and of Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941.

The bill submitted by the President's Committee on Administrative Management to the Joint Committee on Government Organization February 16, 1937 (see its *Hearings*, p. 27), provided for definitive action by the President by executive order. That provision was not enacted into law.

It is quite possible that the President possesses similar powers in time of war even in the absence of legislation. Following is a paraphrase of the views expressed by Senator Knox, formerly Attorney-General and Secretary of State, on April 3, 1918, in connection with the consideration of the then pending Overman Act:

I would not hesitate one second to advise the President that he now has full Constitutional power to make such transfers of functions and consolidations of agencies; to utilize and coordinate agencies; to delegate from one cabinet officer to another any particular duties; and to require every department to do anything he directs to be done in order to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion.

In a number of instances the President has been authorized by Congress to take action of limited scope. Thus, under 38 U.S.C. 11 he was authorized to consolidate various agencies into a "Veterans' Admin-

istration"; and under 33 U.S.C. 855 and 14 U.S.C. 1, respectively, he is authorized to transfer certain facilities of the Coast and Geodetic Survey to the War or Navy Department when a national emergency exists, and to transfer the Coast Guard as a whole to the Navy Department. A slightly different situation arose under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, wherein the President was authorized to create and establish a Selective Service System.

It appears to be a view widely held that if Congress delegates what amounts to definitive legislative authority to the President for the purpose of effecting reorganization, then it must, for reasons of constitutionality, prescribe suitable standards. In other words, the matter appears to be viewed as any other delegation of legislative power. This is the tenor of a memorandum supporting the validity of the provisions of S. 3331, then pending in the Senate (83 *Congressional Record* Part 3, pp. 2746-48 [1938]). Actually, however, the issue may be quite different from that involved in ordinary delegation; at least, the impact of the constitutional "executive power" upon the point should be considered. While it would perhaps be unsound to state that no standards would be required in connection with the delegation of legislative authority to reorganize, *U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. Reports 304, suggests strongly that the ordinarily rigid requirements as to standards may not be applicable in connection with reorganization because of the fact that the President is vested with the executive power.

3. It appears probable that the approach to reorganization by action of the President subject to rejection or approval by Congress was the outgrowth of the Overman Act (1918), whereunder the President was authorized, during the war, to accomplish transfers of functions among and consolidations of executive agencies. It may also have been furthered by the experience of the Harding administration, tending to clinch

the conclusion that Congress cannot enact far-reaching specific reorganization measures.

This conclusion is borne out by the report of the House Select Committee on Government Organization, which in its report on H.R. 4425 on March 3, 1939, said: "It has long since been determined that the Congress itself will not initiate the necessary specific legislation to bring about a general reorganization of the executive branch."¹

Secretary of Commerce Hoover, in 1920 on the occasion of his testimony before the Joint Committee on Reorganization, suggested that "Congress should give authority to the President to make such changes within the limits of certain defined principles as may be recommended to him by an independent commission to be created by Congress." President Hoover, in his message of December 3, 1929, proposed that he be authorized to work out and effect reorganization measures, Congress to reserve to itself "power of revision." This is the earliest reference found to the device of presidential action subject to rejection by Congress or requiring the approval of Congress.

In the case of the Reorganization Act of 1939, the President submitted a "plan" instead of an order. This appears to have been done for the purpose of divesting the action of the President of an executive character for constitutional reasons; the theory was that the President submitted the plan as the agent of Congress.²

The plan idea first came to light in H.R. 4425, introduced by Representative Cochran of Missouri on February 23, 1939. In addressing the House on March 6, 1939 (84 *Congressional Record* Part 2, p. 2305), Representative Cochran said that he had returned to Washington following the fall election in 1938 to work on the bill; that

he had found Representative Warren of North Carolina at work on the same subject; that the two of them had had "the assistance of two outstanding members of the Legislative Reference Service [of the Library of Congress] and of the Parliamentarian of the House"; and that "up to the hour that the bill was introduced, no official nor employee of the executive branch of the Government had ever been consulted nor will you find in the bill one paragraph that was submitted or suggested by an official or employee of the executive branch of the Government."

A study of the record thus shows that the particular method embodied in the Reorganization Act of 1939 was originated in the Congress. We have this testimony of Mr. Cochran that nobody in the executive branch of the government knew anything about it. And indeed, on March 8, 1939, Mr. Dirksen of Illinois said that the bill "has never been profaned by coming before the eyes of Mr. Corcoran or Mr. Cohen" (84 *Congressional Record*, Part 3, p. 2493).

This was the bill that resulted after two years of consideration from the report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, of which I was chairman. I can testify that neither the text of the bill nor its substance was profaned by any suggestion made by me or either of my colleagues, Charles E. Merriam and Luther Gulick. We knew nothing about it in advance. Notwithstanding this innocence or ignorance on my part, I am convinced after mature consideration that the Reorganization Act of 1939 furnishes the most practicable means of securing executive and legislative cooperation for the accomplishment of the task of reorganization.

Dispositions made under that act, particularly by the creation of the Executive Office of the President and in it the Office for Emergency Management and by means of the continuous study of reorganization needs by the division of administrative management in the Bureau of the Budget, tremendously advantaged and facilitated

¹ H. Rep. No. 120, 76th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1.

² For expositions upon this point see (a) H. Rep. No. 120, 76th Congress, 1st Session, March 3, 1939, accompanying H.R. 4425, and (b) Millett and Rogers, *op. cit.*

the work of conversion to war organization.

Now, however, there is the need of reconversion to peace and there also is and always will be the need for continuous reorganization in order to keep the governmental machinery sufficiently flexible to meet the changing requirements of events.

All too often efforts at reorganization are met with the objection that a reorganization has been tried at some time in the past and that it didn't fill the bill. Without regard to the fact that few of the reorganizations in the past have in themselves been more than mere compromises with the demands of the times, the problem involved is not one of statics. On February 16, 1937, on the first day of the hearings of the Joint Committee on Government Organization on the report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, I said, "The executive branch of the Government and its work is dynamic. If the Archangel Michael could come down and arrange it perfectly by the 1st day of March 1937 by the first day of March 1938 you would need another Archangel to come down and adjust it."¹

At that time I and my colleagues on the President's Committee advocated delegation to the President of the power to make reorganizations by executive order not subject to legislative veto and without limitation of time. We believed, and I still believe, that a continuous machinery for reorganization is necessary if the President's managerial powers over the executive branch are to be made commensurate with his responsibilities. My belief then was that the necessary legislative control could be accomplished "by the power of the purse"—first, by the annual review of the appropriations submitted in the budget, and, second, by a better method of making the executive branch accountable to the Congress for expenditures. I thought that our committee had made recommendations

that would improve both methods, first, by permitting the President to assume direct charge of the Bureau of the Budget and, second, by making him more strictly accountable through an auditor-general reporting to a joint committee on accounts of the two houses.

While the Senate finally passed a bill which would have carried into effect the recommendations for more strict accountability of the President to Congress, that part of the recommendations of the President's Committee was negative in the House.² But now I believe that I was mistaken at that time so far as the method of reorganization is concerned. I am convinced that the best method is that originated in the Congress in the Act of 1939 which requires the President's acting as an agent of the legislature to submit plans for reorganization subject to the legislative veto and the Congress' acting under the method outlined in the act, which, incidentally, for the first and only time in our history, sets up a practical cloture in the Senate requiring prompt action. Some changes ought to be made in the act, perhaps, particularly the elimination of the limitations under which some twenty-one agencies are exempted from its operation; but these do not affect its essential features.

It should be noted that the Reorganization Act of 1939 is still on the statute books and is dormant only because of operation of Section 12; "No reorganization specified in a reorganization plan shall take effect unless the plan is transmitted to the Congress before January 21, 1941." The elimination of this time limit or its change to some other date in the future would immediately restore the act to operation. In this connection it is important to remember that the Congress still is in possession of an important implement for permitting its careful consideration of any plans for reorganization that the President might

¹ *Reorganization of the Executive Departments: Hearings before the Joint Committee on Government Organization . . . (1937)*, p. 8.

² Cf. Lucius Wilmerding, *The Spending Power* (Yale University Press, 1943) and Harvey C. Mansfield, *The Comptroller General* (Yale University Press, 1939).

submit under the Act of 1939. The Congress in 1937 by law set up a Joint Committee on Government Organization.¹ This joint committee was presided over first by Senator Robinson of Arkansas and later by Senator Byrnes of South Carolina. The law provides that the committee shall be composed of nine members of the Senate and nine members of the House; that it shall investigate the organization and activities of federal agencies with a view to determining whether, in the interest of simplification, efficiency, or economy, or in order to eliminate conflicting or overlapping activities, any of such organizations or units should be coordinated or consolidated with any other organizational unit, reorganized, or abolished, or the personnel thereof reduced; and that the committee shall report from time to time to the Senate and the House the results of its investigations, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. So far as I know, no appointments have been made to this joint committee in recent years, but, as I see it, there is no doubt that it is still in existence and could be revived at any time if the presiding officers of the two houses made the necessary appointments to memberships on it.

In view of the fact that grave danger of confusion lies in the assignment both to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion of substantially the same responsibility for initiating recommendations for reorganization, it would seem to be the part of wisdom not only for the President to require the coordination of the work of these two agencies in the executive office but also for the Congress to activate its own Joint Committee on Organization to consider the recommendations to be submitted.

Nothing can be clearer than that the executive and the legislative branches will be required to work in close cooperation and harmony if the administrative re-

organization required by the reconversion to peace is to be accomplished in time and in such a manner as to promise the greatest measure of success. Unfortunately, much of the popular discussion that has been and that will be going on with respect to these problems is based on news. It is a truism that a controversy makes more news than a quiet agreement. Divorces get in the news more often than do happy marriages. No useful purpose will be served if either the President or the Congress approaches the stupendous task of reconversion in a spirit of self-assertiveness or of a dispute about which has the greater power. Both are the elected representatives of the people, and in this great business the services of both are required by the people.

Much is being said nowadays of the need for further implementation of the Congress, and, indeed, much should be said. But with respect to reorganization, it is doubtful if any new machinery would be any better than that already available: the joint congressional committee and the Reorganization Act of 1939, which may be revived by a simple joint resolution.

Recent events in the Congress indicate that the difficulty in securing agreement with respect to administrative organization results not so much from differences between the Congress and the President as from differences between the Senate and the House of Representatives. And I think that few will contend that the conference committee is an ideal agency for working out administrative structure. Even within one house of the legislature disagreements exist which ensue, as legislative disagreements should ensue, in compromises. But compromises, however desirable with respect to the enunciation and determination of national policy, are not good when it comes to setting up administrative machinery for carrying that policy into execution. Recently we have seen Congress divided into three factions on the question of who should administer the GI bill of rights, with the conference committee

¹5 U.S.C. 135-138.

emerging at one stage with the startling scheme of entrusting it to the Veterans Administration, the Selective Service Administration, and the War Manpower Commission—one permanent and two temporary agencies. Now the whole business of the Retraining and Reemployment Administration is set up under the general supervision of the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion under an administrator to be appointed by the President, the Congress cannily providing that, if the President likes, he can name the Administrator of Veterans Affairs to the job and that if he names anybody else the Veterans Administration continues on its own. And be it remembered that this very Veterans Administration was created by the President under special authority of the Congress when the two houses couldn't agree on how to set it up back in 1930.

Then there was the case of the Surplus War Property Administration, which is now put in the new Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. The Senate started out to set it up under a board of twelve, then changed its mind in favor of a board of eight. The House was determined to have a single administrator. Then a compromise was reached calling for a policy board of four to be appointed by the President, with a separate administrator chosen by the board, and at last the conference committee emerged with an administrative board of three appointed by the President, the chairman to be named by him. Unquestionably, the more complex problems of the future will require the President to rely more on careful planning of administrative machinery and less on improvisation, but at the same time he should under no circumstances be deprived of the flexibility he has enjoyed since 1939, which in large part has enabled him to make from time to time the changes necessary to correct mistakes—corrections which have contributed so largely to the successful result of the war effort. It may have been the intention of the Congress to relieve the

President of a part of the burden that falls upon his own shoulders by giving statutory sanction to the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion to initiate the plans for reorganization. Since this also is clearly a function of the Bureau of the Budget, again the President personally will have to make the decisions.

Much talk is heard nowadays of putting the Army and Navy together in one great military department, a result of the lesson learned in this war when it was discovered that the unmixable could be mixed and that the oil, salt, and vinegar of the Army and the Navy and the Air Forces could be combined into a suitable dressing for our enemies. Just think how easy it would be for the military affairs committees of the two houses and the naval affairs committees of the two houses and conference committees made up of their members and resulting from their disputes to agree on how to set up the new department! Just remember how only the day before yesterday we were listening to the veritable screams of those who insisted that the Air Corps had to be a separate department! And in this connection it may be worth while to remember that the reorganization of the Army into its three great divisions of Ground, Air, and Service forces did not come out of a conference committee but was made effective in Executive Order 9082 (February 28, 1942), issued by the President under authority of the First War Powers Act.

As a fundamental principle of the reorganization I should say that it is imperative that the President be not deprived of any one of the three cardinal instruments of management: (1) fiscal and organizational, (2) personnel, and (3) planning. The Congress already has stricken from the Executive Office of the President the National Resources Planning Board, and already it becomes apparent that this function must be restored to the executive branch. Will the planning function devolve upon the advisory board of the new

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion? Will the Budget Bureau undertake it or bring in special consultants to perform the same purpose? Or will the President find another way to institutionalize his own function of long-term over-all national planning which is inseparable from and nondelegable by the presidency?

It is no part of my purpose here to enter into a discussion of what might be done to improve what have so often been described as the deteriorating relationships between the President and the Congress. Suffice it to say that if either the executive or the legislature insists upon acting so as to put the other in the hole, in the long run neither will be advantaged and only the people will suffer. A Congress that approves the recommendations of the President with respect to administrative reorganization is not necessarily a rubber stamp. A President who submits to the Congress in advance his plans for administrative reorganization does not necessarily abdicate his leadership.

We hear much these days of new schemes to improve the relations between the President and the Congress. So far as the reconversion of the administrative machinery from war to peace is concerned, I permit

myself to doubt that anything not already on the statute books is required. If these means ready to hand are revived and utilized they will suffice, as has been proved in the success of the war. No merely mechanistic device would be likely to generate a greater willingness for the executive and the legislative branches to work together.

Despite all the mistakes that delayed and hampered its accomplishment, the task of conversion to war was successful. Let us hope that this great democracy, which confounded its detractors by demonstrating that it was capable of action for the destruction of its enemies without, will not now let institutional jealousies place too many obstacles in its way to make as great a success of the peace as it has made of the war.

As this is written no human being knows what will be the result of the election on November 7, 1944. But this is sure—the Congress then elected and the President then chosen will the better serve the nation if they highly resolve to work together to adjust the administrative machinery of the government to the needs of the reconversion to peace.

Civil Service as Usual

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THE purpose of personnel management in any agency, governmental or private, is to secure, develop, and retain employees who are qualified to achieve standards of competence as high as available human resources will permit. Good personnel management involves, among other things, job classification and the establishment and maintenance of equitable wage and salary scales; positive policies and practices in the recruitment, selection, training, promotion, demotion, transfer, discipline, and retirement of personnel; provision for the hearing of grievances and appeals from administrative decisions; evaluation of employee efficiency in terms of future potentialities as well as in terms of past work; and the stimulation of employee morale.

Government at all levels, federal, state, and local, has been markedly affected by the war. The personnel and functions of some agencies have changed or have been curtailed, those of other agencies have greatly expanded, and many new agencies have been established to provide for new functions that have emerged. Few agencies of government at any level have escaped marked modification.

Efficiency in the federal government is more important and more of an issue today than ever before. Civilian agencies of the federal government have larger responsibilities in more areas than at any previous time. They control the production of war equipment and materials, the growing and distribution of food and fiber, and the use of manpower. They regulate prices, wages, and the use of consumer goods. They are instruments for winning a war and at the

same time for maintaining economic and social stability and converting to a peacetime economy.

No agency, public or private, can be more efficient than the quality of its personnel permits. In the critical period of demobilization and readjustment following the war, will agencies of the federal government have the right men, in the right jobs, at the right times? Will those responsible for the administration of federal agencies have authority that is commensurate with their responsibility in connection with the selection and training and organization of their staffs? It is impossible to predict the effectiveness of the discharge of government responsibilities during the period of demobilization and postwar readjustment without answering these questions.

No agency of the federal government is in a more strategic position to determine how well the public business of the United States will be conducted than the United States Civil Service Commission. Because of powers placed in the commission by law and by executive order, there is potentially no more important and influential agency of public administration in the United States. For this reason the decisions of the commission are subject to careful scrutiny by the public, and the principles and assumptions upon which it acts should be periodically examined and appraised. How valid are these principles and assumptions today, at the height of public employment? Have practices improved in recent years, and particularly since 1940, during the period of national defense and war activities? If so, will the commission go forward along improved and progressive lines or

will it revert to practices prevalent in the pre-war period? Some current trends and actions will be analyzed in an attempt to answer these basic questions. As a background for this analysis, the recommendations of two reports on the federal service will be briefly reviewed.

Two Reports on Civil Service Improvement

ON MARCH 20, 1936, President Roosevelt created the President's Committee on Administrative Management to study administrative management in the federal government. A monograph, *Personnel Administration in the Federal Service* (Government Printing Office, 1937), was prepared jointly by Paul T. David and the writer as one of a number of studies in administrative management by the committee's research staff. In this monograph are presented a brief history of the federal civil service, a description and evaluation of the effectiveness of its administration, statements of principles underlying sound personnel administration, and recommended changes to bring federal personnel administration into accord with the principles set forth.

Among the principal findings of this report were the following:

1. The President, because of his powers of appointment, removal from the service, and promulgation of civil service rules, is held largely responsible by the public for the administration and the effectiveness of the major personnel functions performed in the executive branch.

2. The Civil Service Commission is the most important and powerful central personnel agency, although a number of other agencies, including the Bureau of the Budget and the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, perform central personnel functions.

3. Among the more important functions of the Civil Service Commission are advising the Chief Executive on personnel policies, adopting rules and regulations under

authority subordinate to that of the President, operating central recruitment and examining services for positions within the classified competitive civil service, administering the retirement system, and conducting certain review and control activities relating to placement, transfer, promotion, and reinstatement of employees.

4. The commission is most effective in the administration of assembled examinations for large groups of standardized positions, in the administration of personnel classification, and in the administration of the retirement system; it is least effective in constructive and developmental activities of a positive and cooperative nature leading to improved recruitment, training, placement, and morale-building.

5. It is questionable whether the commission, because of the plural nature of its membership, is capable of a positive approach to personnel administration.

6. The federal service is so large as to make inadvisable a high degree of centralization of personnel administration.

To improve the situation set forth above, the authors made a number of specific recommendations on personnel administration, the most important of which may be summarized as follows:

1. A unified service of personnel administration should be established, with an adequate central personnel agency responsible to the Chief Executive and with adequate personnel offices in the departments and in large bureaus and services.

2. The Civil Service Commission should be abolished and a new central personnel agency, under the direction of a single well-qualified nonpolitical administrator, should be established "to assist the Chief Executive in developing his recommendations to the Congress respecting personnel legislation; to assist the Chief Executive in providing for the general regulation of the Executive Branch within his discretion in personnel matters; to assist the Chief Executive in maintaining a suitable amount of control over personnel administration

throughout the Executive Branch; to assist the heads of major establishments in the development of effective organizations for personnel administration in those establishments; to act as the central review agency for personnel classification and salary control; to provide the operating establishments with an adequate central recruiting, transfer, and retirement service."¹

3. A new Civil Service Board made up of part-time, nonsalaried members should be established to assist the President in the protection, improvement, and extension of the merit system, to represent the public interest in the merit system, and to assist in the protection and improvement of the merit system by approving the membership of special committees of examiners to hold open competitive and promotion examinations to fill important high civil service positions, by approving and certifying panels of persons qualified to serve on boards or committees of mediation and personnel relations for the federal service, by reviewing the quality and status of personnel administration throughout the federal service, and by advising the President, the Congress, and the civil service administrator on matters of personnel administration at their request.

4. Personnel offices at the departmental level should be increased in number, improved in quality, and given greater responsibility for final decision, subject only to agency approval, on many matters concerning which final decision is now made in the Civil Service Commission.

5. The Council of Personnel Administration should be reorganized to serve as an advisory committee to the civil service administrator and should devote its energies to the development of constructive personnel policies and standards.

Many of the recommendations presented in *Personnel Administration in the Federal Service* were accepted by the President's Committee and recommended to the Presi-

dent and by him to the Congress. Most of the recommendations that required congressional action, however, were not accepted by the Congress. Among the more important of the recommendations not accepted was the one to abolish the Civil Service Commission and establish a single civil service administrator and a citizen civil service board. After the Congress failed to act on this recommendation, the President, under authority of the Reorganization Act of 1939, established the Liaison Office for Personnel Management and designated one of his administrative assistants to head this office. Because the influence of this office upon the policies and actions of the Civil Service Commission is not entirely clear, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the commission should be praised for the constructive achievements that have been made in many areas since 1936, or the extent to which it should be blamed for the lack of constructive action in other areas. For this reason, reference in this article to the policies and operation of the commission should be understood to include reference to policies that may have been formulated in the Liaison Office for Personnel Management.

The President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement (the Reed Committee) was organized in 1939 especially to study the method of selection and status of lawyers in the federal service. With few exceptions lawyers had always been exempted employees. The committee was also required to consider the method of selection and conditions of service of the scientific and professional services. The committee made its report in 1941 (H. Doc. No. 118, 77th Congress, 1st Session).

With reference to federal attorneys, the committee divided. One group, including Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and the then Attorney-General Mr. Robert H. Jackson, recommended an open nationwide competitive examination resulting in an unranked register from which the departments would be free to select lawyers

¹ *Personnel Administration in the Federal Service*, p. 6.

who they thought fitted best into their organizations. Lawyers thus selected would acquire permanent tenure and would furnish the foundation for a career service in the legal offices. Other members of the committee, including Mr. William H. McReynolds, General Robert E. Wood, and Mr. Leonard D. White, a former member of the Civil Service Commission, joined the other members of the committee in supporting the idea of a nation-wide examination and a career system. They believed, however, that certification could be effective through the normal procedure of the rule of three, provided selective certification were recognized and provided, further, that appropriate options in the lawyer examinations were set up.

The President by Executive Order No. 8743 approved the recommendations supported by Mr. Justice Reed and his associates on the committee. A Board of Legal Examiners was established and a nationwide examination for lawyers was held. This examination, according to the best professional opinion, was very carefully prepared and achieved an outstanding success. The Board of Legal Examiners was subsequently placed within the Civil Service Commission. More recently, the Congress has forbidden the Civil Service Commission to spend any money to hold an examination for attorneys. This whole program, therefore, is now in a state of suspension.

The report of the Reed Committee also recommended improved procedures for the selection of persons to fill scientific and professional positions, especially in the higher brackets. Among these recommendations were (1) a program of positive recruitment, (2) close departmental cooperation at all stages in the selection procedure, (3) special examining committees for particular positions, (4) selective certification, and (5) experimentation with certifying more than three names to the employing agency. Except as emergency action, little has been done by the Civil Service Commission or by any other agency to apply any of these rec-

ommendations. This neglect is doubtless due in part to the crisis conditions of recent years, but these conditions once past, the recommendations of the Reed Committee with reference to scientific and professional positions should be carefully considered by the Civil Service Commission.

Some Principles of Personnel Administration

THE basic principles set forth in the monograph *Personnel Administration in the Federal Service* are as valid today as when originally presented. Many of them could be acted on within the framework of present laws. The extent to which they are adopted will indicate the probable effectiveness of the Civil Service Commission in developing sound methods of personnel practice after the war. The most important of these principles may be summarized as follows:

1. Authority for action on matters of personnel administration should be delegated to operating agencies to a degree commensurate with the responsibility vested in such agencies for the execution of their respective programs.

2. The major functions of a central personnel agency should be to develop over-all policies and standards and to assist the several establishments in applying such policies and standards, controlling only those actions and performing only those functions in which central review and the rigid maintenance of standards are more important than speed, economy, and agency efficiency in getting program results.

3. The personnel function of an operating establishment, stated broadly, should be to determine the means of making the over-all personnel policies and standards effective and to take final action in applying such policies and standards to specific cases.

These principles recognize that the federal government is too large and its operations are too diverse to justify uniformity except in matters of policies and general standards. Maximum efficiency can be at-

tained only if power to act in conformity with centrally determined general policies is delegated to the operating agencies which possess the information upon which action should be based, which can act with speed when quick action is important, and which bear the responsibility for the success or failure of the programs they administer.

Recent Changes in Federal Personnel Practices

SOME legislative action relating to civil service, highlighted by the efforts of Representative Ramspeck and Senators Mead and Hatch, has been taken since 1936. The Hatch Act of 1939 (P.L. 252, 75th Cong., 1st sess.) provided for the exclusion of federal civil servants from active participation in political activities. The Ramspeck Act of 1940 (P.L. 880, 76th Cong., 3d sess.), with its supplementary Executive Order No. 8743, extended the classified service to virtually all positions (those in the Tennessee Valley Authority with a personnel system based upon merit being a major exception), and broadened the coverage of the retirement system. The Ramspeck-Mead Act of 1941 (P.L. 200, 77th Cong., 1st sess.) made long-needed adjustments in the federal pay plan. Although none of this legislation relates directly to the principles stated above, it has, on the whole, been helpful in improving the quality of the civil service.

Departmental personnel offices were established under the terms of Executive Order No. 7916 (January, 1938) and have made increasingly significant contributions to sound personnel administration. The Civil Service Commission has expanded its functions of promulgating or amending overtime pay and leave regulations and of developing more accurate personnel records. It has promoted with considerable success a more effective utilization of manpower in the federal agencies.

The Council of Personnel Administration was reconstituted as a unit of the commission in 1938 under an executive order

of the President. The council has served as a clearinghouse where personnel directors exchange views among themselves and with personnel of the commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and other agencies. This exchange of views around the council table has resulted in the development of many improved personnel policies and practices in the operating establishments and in a number of excellent recommendations to the President and the commission on matters relating to personnel administration. An analysis of the work of the Council of Personnel Administration since 1938 leads to the conclusion that it has become an agency of major importance in connection with the development of constructive and positive personnel policies and practices.¹

The Civil Service Commission can take pride in many successful adjustments to needs during the crucial four-year period of manpower shortage beginning in 1940. It devised vigorous methods and relaxed long-standing procedures. As described by Commissioner Arthur S. Flemming at an early stage of this period, the actions of the commission include, among others: (a) administering a pool for war service appointments, (b) developing an aggressive recruitment program, especially for scientific, specialized, supervisory, and administrative personnel, (c) instituting open examination registers, (d) decentralizing a number of personnel transactions, (e) improving investigation of applicants, and (f) creating a liaison staff with defense agencies.²

Actions taken by the Civil Service Commission since Mr. Flemming made his statement indicate that much progress has been made in the directions he outlined. The commission and the departments cooperated in an extensive program of joint recruitment and immediate appointment of personnel. Many thousands of appointments of specific individuals who had been

¹ Frederick M. Davenport, "Let's Look at the Record." *6 Personnel Administration* 5-11 (January, 1944).

² "Emergency Aspects of Civil Service," *1 Public Administration Review* 25-31 (Autumn, 1940).

selected by the departments were approved by the commission, under decentralized procedures which permitted departmental recruitment with commission post-audit. In order to meet the need for an adequate supply of top administrative personnel the commission established a special section for their recruitment. The commission, by informal action, relaxed classification standards to permit pay adjustments. The commission on many occasions devoted its efforts to emergency problems and provided a twenty-four-hour service in order to solve them. In many ways and on many occasions the commission liberalized its internal procedures to permit rapid and effective action. These steps offered encouragement that a new philosophy was emerging.

Implications of Present Practices and Attitudes

IN AN historical analysis of major directions and ideas characteristic of the United States Civil Service Commission at various periods, an employee of the commission concludes that there is now an increased concern with leadership in improvement of federal personnel administration.¹ He believes this increased concern represents the viewpoint of the present commissioners. Quite realistically, he recognizes the difficulty of overcoming the traditions and philosophies ingrained in the thinking of older employees of the commission, but optimistically he expects the commissioners to make the new philosophy dominant.

Unfortunately, a number of recent actions of the commission now make it appear improbable that this expectation will be realized. The commission seems to be reverting to old habits and methods. While the developments that have been described in the preceding section are constructive, the sum total of the evidence in the record as to the administrative methods of the Civil Service Commission is more a cause

for concern than for satisfaction. In fact, it may be observed that most of the basic methods of the commission have not materially changed from those reviewed in 1936. The commission may still be criticized for excessive delay in the performance of many important functions, particularly for non-war agencies, for lack of sufficient initiative in devising ways to meet new problems, and for failure to comprehend and to give adequate assistance in meeting many of the important needs of the operating services in connection with personnel administration. Action on any definite plan of a permanent nature to remedy these defects has not yet been taken. The major interest of the commission appears to remain now as earlier in negative and restrictive activities related to the enforcement of civil service laws and rules. A positive and cooperative approach toward improved recruitment, placement, training, and morale-building activities still seems to be largely lacking. The conclusions of the President's Committee on Administrative Management and its staff that major changes were needed are by and large still applicable. It is still true that if the federal government is to advance in personnel management, the basic defects in the methods of the commission set forth by that committee must be recognized and corrected.

Lest there be any misunderstanding, let us be clear that the importance of a merit system and a career service are not being called into question. Nor is any question raised as to the need for a central personnel agency in the federal government. But what that agency does, how it functions, and the practices it follows are legitimately open to scrutiny.

Certification Procedures. A traditional and basic procedure of the U. S. Civil Service Commission is the closed register (a list of qualified applicants established at a definite date, to which no new names can be added), with the applicants' names ranked in the order of the numerical scores they

¹ Albion Taylor, Jr., "Changes in the Commission's Philosophy," 6 *Personnel Administration* 3-9 (March, 1944).

received on an examination. When an appointment to a particular position is to be made, the commission certifies to the appointing authority the names of the three persons at that time highest on the applicable register, and the appointment under ordinary circumstances must be made from this group. Most registers are based upon nation-wide competitive examinations for one or more categories of positions similar in duties, usually found in many agencies at many locations and for which there is recurring need. Such an examination must be general enough to meet the demands of all positions falling within the category in question, and the applicant must take the examination without regard to the specific position in the specific agency for which he may be especially qualified or in which he may have particular interest. The most that the applicant can hope for is the privilege of selecting in the examination one or more options or subdivisions of the broad field in which the examination is given.

This procedure is basically a negative process designed primarily to prevent favoritism and political influence in appointments to the federal service. As administered, it interferes with careful and positive recruitment of the person for the agency, location, and position for which he is best suited. The *Fifty-Sixth Annual Report of the United States Civil Service Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1939* (the last fiscal year prior to the President's declaration that a national emergency existed) stated (p. 3) that ". . . at the rate of current operations a total of 8,736 registers will be 3 years old or more during the fiscal year 1941. Over 3,000 will be 5 years old or more." Experience shows that reliance upon inflexible and out-of-date registers for the filling of positions that are generally similar, yet are actually very different in terms of specific functions, often fails to secure for the agencies the best qualified available personnel and frequently places persons in positions for which they are not actually fitted. Often this procedure results

in dissatisfaction both to the employee and to the agency for which he works.

Force of circumstances has caused the commission to meet emergencies by making marked modifications in its procedure. One of these was a process of "selective certification," initiated in 1938, by which a department can obtain from the registers established in the manner just described an employee particularly qualified to perform certain specific duties, even though he has a relatively low rank on the over-all register. The commission explains the reason for this modification of procedure as follows:

. . . each year there are hundreds of special vacancies, the requirements of which could not be anticipated by optional structure of the register. These vacancies can be filled by one of two methods: By the holding of many additional examinations each year and the establishment of registers which will duplicate parts of general registers already established, or the utilizing of present satisfactory registers through the employment of selective certification.¹

Furthermore, in 1939, and increasingly in the war years, the commission authorized thousands of temporary appointments pending the establishment of registers and increased the use of "open continuous" examinations which permit filing of applications at any time. The commission also stated that

. . . the War Service Regulations provide that appointment may be made through noncompetitive examination whenever in the opinion of the Commission it is not practicable to make appointment through competitive examination. This regulation was adopted primarily because of the many requests now received for persons with highly specialized and, in many instances, unusual qualifications, to be employed immediately. In such cases the Commission may now, instead of announcing open competitive examinations, utilize any source which will yield the best persons for particular positions without delay.²

¹ *Fifty-Sixth Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1939* (Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 32.

² *Fifty-Ninth Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1942* (Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 2. Such appointments are entirely "war service appointments," with tenure limited to "the duration of the war and six months thereafter."

It appeared that the commission was at last taking steps to renovate its cumbersome, expensive, and unsatisfactory certification system. Many, including this writer, hailed these and other innovations, undertaken to meet war needs, as steps toward a positive and scientific placement program which would recognize the proper participation of the agencies which bear the responsibility for getting their work done well and on time. But apparently such a placement program is not in the minds of the commissioners. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Civil Service in connection with the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, the Civil Service Commission, looked upon by Congress as the source of sound guidance in federal personnel administration, advised (with reference to the rule of three) through one of its commissioners as follows:

... However, taking the Federal civil service as a whole, although there is nothing sacred about one out of three, it has been the practice over a long period of time and it has been our feeling that it does give the appointing officer a reasonable amount of discretion and, at the same time, does result in the maintenance of proper standards.¹

This testimony was given in spite of evidence that this was a procedure which the commission itself had found inadequate, especially in the case of middle- and upper-bracket positions. The rule of three originated with the commission and has remained throughout the years, although its defects were demonstrated during the war emergency when it was found necessary to make many thousands of exceptions to it. Despite this experience, the rule has now for the first time been written into law in the Veterans' Preference Act. This action constitutes a long step backward in civil service practice. In fact, it may well be characterized as a major disaster.

The circular transmitting the commission's War Service Regulations, as revised

to effect the changes called for by the Veterans' Preference Act, contain this revealing statement: "The formalization of procedures required by the Act and the checks required to enforce the provisions will require more time for the filling of vacancies. It is therefore more necessary than ever that agencies submit requisitions for personnel as far in advance of actual need as possible."² The War Service Regulations run to more than 20 printed pages and the commission's notes on filling and vacating positions subject to these regulations cover an additional 173 pages.

Reductions in Force. In connection with the passage of the Veterans' Preference Act, the Civil Service Commission supported a provision which requires it to issue regulations for reductions in force in the federal government with due regard to tenure of employment, veteran preference, length of service, and efficiency ratings. It has used this authority to issue instructions that impose upon federal agencies a mechanical, numerical rank order procedure which makes next to impossible a careful appraisal of personnel in terms of specific remaining positions.³ This procedure requires that within the appropriate area and level of selection for force reduction a numerical value be attached to "government wide, lowest common denominator" efficiency ratings in *past positions*, to seniority, and to veterans' status and that persons severed from the service be those with the lowest arithmetic scores. This approach is almost entirely negative. It provides no opportunity for agencies to develop efficiency rating systems adapted to their own unique situations; it makes no provision for judgments or measurements of employees' qualifications for *future work*; and it imposes an exceedingly complicated maze of procedures that are both time-consuming and expensive. Under these instructions, judgments concerning any unique combination of qualifications of an employee for one of

¹ *Preference in Employment of Honorably Discharged Veterans Where Federal Funds are Disbursed: Hearings before the Committee on Civil Service, United States Senate, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, on S.1762 and H.R. 4115* (May 19 and 23, 1944), p. 26.

² *Departmental Circular No. 493* (July 3, 1944), p. 2.

³ *Departmental Circular No. 500* (August 5, 1944), 21 pp.

the remaining positions are not solicited and may not be taken into account. Yet just such judgments are the key to the proper placement of personnel and to success or failure in the operation and execution of public programs.

The mechanistic approach that the commission has adopted for reductions in force is not required by the Veterans' Preference Act or by any other law controlling such reductions. I can find nothing in the Veterans' Preference Act that prohibits the continued use of the open-continuous register or of selective certification, even though the rule of three is a part of the Act. The commission's approach may be and probably is the commission's conception, within the area of its discretion, of the best method of effectuating the intent of the Veterans' Preference Act. If so, I think the commission is wrong. Under the Civil Service Act, the Civil Service Commission may authorize the appointment on a permanent basis of persons who have been appointed on a temporary basis, subject to the passing of a noncompetitive examination. Clearly, this provision would apply to war service appointees who do not now have civil service status. The Civil Service Commission should take the opportunity to secure through noncompetitive examinations the services of outstanding key personnel now possessing war-service status only. Such action is particularly important in the case of persons filling vital positions in key agencies in postwar reconstruction.

The procedures established by the commission for reductions in force, which involve elaborate, time-consuming, and costly reports, are so drawn that the actions can be audited by personnel clerks with limited backgrounds. In fact, as one analyzes these procedures he may well question whether one purpose of their present form and content was to fit them to the abilities of personnel clerks in the Civil Service Commission.

The facts presented above lead me to conclude that in connection with the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 the commission did

not advise Congress wisely with respect to technical methods of personnel administration; that it failed to recognize agency responsibility, operating requirements, and program needs; and that in areas left to its discretion it has unnecessarily extended its own central control over personnel actions to the detriment of the programs of the operating establishments. It scarcely need be pointed out that the detailed procedural regulations it has adopted are not essential to conducting open competitive examinations or to securing for veterans the preference to which they are entitled. On the contrary, experience has shown that adherence to rigid procedures such as are set forth in these regulations often tends to negate the intent of public policy and law. It seems highly improbable that such prescriptions will develop efficient public personnel or protect the veterans' interests. Substance is sacrificed for form and responsibility dissipated into procedure.

Evading the Rules. One personnel director of a federal agency likened the system imposed by the Civil Service Commission to the situation under the Volstead Act. Because many of the rules seem unreasonable, personnel directors spend much time and use great ingenuity in discovering ways to evade them. More often than not, ways can be found. But the service suffers because of time lost and, often, because of the nature of the means used to evade the rules.

Sometimes a personnel director, finding no way either to obey a rule without sacrificing agency efficiency or to evade the rule, lays the problem in the lap of some member of the commission or its staff. The result may be a commission "memorandum" or "departmental circular," prepared with the specific case, or two or more similar cases, in mind. An examination of such memoranda, prepared to meet specific cases but made applicable to the entire civil service, indicates that the commission or its staff at times cooperates with the personnel directors in discovering ways to evade the spirit of the commission's rules without modifying their wording. Several examples that

deal with the classification of Clerical-Administrative-Fiscal (CAF) positions will be cited.

The Personnel Classification Division's Field Memorandum No. 19 of August 8, 1944, suggests ways whereby agencies may evade commission rules requiring employees to serve in a position at a certain grade level for a specified period of time before being promoted to a position at a higher grade. The employee may be "detailed" to a higher position and do the work of that position without prior approval of the commission because "the Commission is not staffed to exercise a strict control," but he may not be paid the salary for the grade in which his new position is allocated. "The pay of an employee on detail is determined by the allocation and salary range of the position *from* which he is detailed."

A number of examples are presented in this memorandum to illustrate the procedure that may be employed to evade the spirit of the time-limitation rule without violating its letter. One example is the detailing of a CAF-11 employee to a CAF-12 position when he "has not a legal status to be paid in CAF-12." To accomplish this, two CAF-11 positions are to be created, "even though the two CAF-11 positions could not logically both be performed at the same time." The reason for creating a position that will not be needed is to have someone to carry on the work of the necessary CAF-11 position "during the definite period of its incumbent's detail to the CAF-12 position." The action taken in this situation "contemplates an advance decision that the detailed employee will not return to his old CAF-11 position, but will be promoted to CAF-12 as soon as promotion requirements are met. When this is done, the temporary additional identical position should be abolished and its incumbent viced into the original CAF-11 position."

This memorandum also describes the procedure that may be followed when an employee in a CAF-10 position is effectively performing the duties of and is proposed for promotion to CAF-12 and, on the basis

of time requirements, is not eligible for such promotion but is eligible for CAF-11. The agency exercises its legal authority to allocate the position in CAF-11 rather than in CAF-12, the employee is detailed to perform the duties of CAF-12, but he is paid at the CAF-11 rate.

Field Memorandum No. 20 of the Personnel Classification Division (August 7, 1944) cites an example that suggests another type of action that may be taken when an agency "finds that a proposed incumbent whom it deems qualified for the position is determined by the Civil Service Commission to be not qualified for the position because of not meeting the time requirement of Departmental Circular No. 257 or for other reasons." Because his appointment would violate a commission rule relating to the time he has served, the agency may set up a position "which involves less than the full range of work required of an experienced employee, or one in which the work is to be performed under close review or supervision or otherwise entails less responsibility than would be the case with a fully qualified incumbent." The memorandum states further that "the creation of a position, that is, the gathering together of a set of duties and responsibilities to be performed or exercised by one employee, is clearly the responsibility of the agency concerned."

Does this statement of the commission and the example cited mean that an agency should "scale down" the work of an employee to a level lower than that needed by the agency, even though it considers the proposed incumbent qualified to do the work at the higher level, or does it mean that the "official" description of the position should be that of a position at a lower level, even though in terms of the duties performed and the responsibilities involved it belongs at the higher level? I can think of no interpretation other than these two, even though it would seem difficult to justify either type of action. Under a system that places responsibility upon an agency for getting a job done, and at the same time

permits an outside agency such as the Civil Service Commission to make detailed and often negative rules to govern the actions taken, one of the most important jobs of the personnel directors of federal agencies is to discover means whereby the spirit of a rule that is unreasonable may be violated without violating its letter. If a personnel director fails in his attempt to discover such means, his next step is to attempt to secure from the commission an interpretation of the rule that will make his proposed action possible. If both the personnel director and the commission fail to find means of evading the rule, the personnel director can then "pass the buck" to the commission for lack of authority to take desirable action. The effect of such a system is to weaken rather than strengthen the personnel offices of the operating agencies. Personnel officers do not grow in ability to carry responsibility unless responsibility is placed upon them.

The evidence presented above indicates that the Civil Service Commission has made a real effort to meet the needs of the war emergency through liberalizing its procedures. But it is likewise clear that the commission is more interested in salvaging its present system involving the application of detailed rules than it is in making constructive modifications in the rules to encourage positive actions upon the part of the agencies to improve the effectiveness of their personnel. Its salvaging of the letter of rules through devising subterfuges of interpretation illustrates an almost idolatrous worship upon the part of the commission of its detailed and antiquated rules.

The Responsibility of Operating Establishments

THE shortcomings in the approach of the United States Civil Service Commission to problems of personnel management result in hamstringing the programs of federal establishments. The public holds the operating establishments responsible for getting their jobs done, but they are deprived of much of the authority essential

to effective action. The approach of the commission precludes positive, constructive personnel administration as part of the total management job of federal agencies and converts this particular function into a mechanistic set of arithmetic tables. The judgment of the public as to the effectiveness of a particular federal agency will be made, however, not in terms of adherence to red tape developed by a central personnel agency, but in terms of program results.

The commission, it is true, has encouraged the development of personnel officers in the various departments in accordance with the executive order of 1938, has established liaison officers between the commission and the individual agencies, and has permitted departments to make final decisions on some personnel actions which formerly had to be approved by the staff of the commission. The potential value of measures such as these is great. There is a basic inconsistency, however, in such strengthening of departmental personnel offices and the continued emphasis of the commission upon adherence to uniform detailed rules and procedures.

The commission has recommended that a position of director of personnel in each department should be established by statute and that the law should provide, among other things, that

The Civil Service Commission may, in its discretion, delegate to any such Director of Personnel the authority within his department or agency to take action on behalf of the Commission in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission, and the Commission may from time to time withdraw or alter such authority.¹

This recommendation has certain obvious inherent defects which outweigh its good points. First, if the commission should delegate authority to the director of personnel in an operating agency, the director would receive some of his authority not from his superior but from an outside agency; second, the authority so delegated

¹ *Sixtieth Annual Report of the United States Civil Service Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1943* (Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 61.

would be exercised by a subordinate in the department on behalf of the outside agency and in accordance with its regulations rather than in behalf of the operating agency and its needs; and, third, the authority so delegated is subject to withdrawal by the outside agency. This recommendation violates a fundamental principle relating to the delegation of authority, i.e., when authority is delegated by one agency to another, the delegation should be to the head of the agency and not to a subordinate employee. The commission was on sound ground in recommending the delegation of authority to the operating agencies. The method it recommends to achieve the desired result, however, would have the effect of nullifying the delegation.

The commission apparently considers its recent liberalizing actions as emergency measures only. Recruitment and examination are still not thought of in terms of filling a particular vacancy with the best person or of meeting the special needs of an agency. If the testimony of the member of the commission in connection with the Veterans' Preference Act, cited earlier, is to be interpreted as the position of the commission, such services as selective certification and open registers are considered exceptions to the general pattern and apparently are to be abolished after the war emergency is over. The basic fallacy in the commission's approach to problems of recruitment seems to stem from the traditional fight against the spoils system and various forms of favoritism in making appointments. The commission has failed to develop a positive philosophy of securing the best qualified candidate for a vacant position or of placing a recruit in the position in which he can be most effective.

An Improved Administration of the Federal Civil Service

THE federal government faces crucial problems of personnel administration during the period of demobilization and readjustment from war to peace. These

arise from the anticipated mass reduction of force in many agencies when their war functions are completed; from the need for placing the many remaining federal employees in positions in which they can contribute to agency efficiency in handling postwar and peacetime problems; from the almost certain great expansion of the activities of many peacetime agencies; and from the equitable recognition of the re-employment rights of veterans.

The problems involved in the readjustment of federal activities and federal employees will not be easy of solution. They present a challenge to public administrators to get their houses in order quickly. As a result of the very large reductions in staff that must be made, as well as the need to expand many peacetime governmental activities at a time when large numbers of well-qualified persons may be seeking employment, there will be an unusual opportunity to increase the effectiveness of the federal civil service.

I have shown how the policies and procedures of the Civil Service Commission have placed and continue to place barriers in the paths of the agencies which are responsible, and which the public holds responsible, for facing operating problems realistically and solving them soundly. The reduction-in-force procedures do not provide effectively for the retention of employees who can serve their agencies most efficiently. Furthermore, they seem certain to lead to evasion, with all the evils inherent in evasion. The appointment procedures, likewise, are not only slow and unwieldy, but often fail to provide the best qualified candidate for the *specific* task to be performed. As designed, they shift responsibility for personnel administration from responsible officials of the operating agencies and dissipate it in the procedures of the Civil Service Commission.

It is within the legal authority of the Civil Service Commission to remedy at least some of the deficiencies of present procedures. I am of the opinion that the selective

certification procedure is possible of wide use under present law. A general use of selective certification, combined with a system of open registers and the participation of agencies in the development of standards of personnel qualifications and examinations, would result in the recruitment of better qualified personnel than is the case at present. This same concept of flexibility and division of work load could and should be applied to the reduction-in-force procedures. The several agencies should be permitted to retain the personnel best qualified for the remaining positions on the basis of their own evaluations.

This proposed approach to federal personnel administration would result in more effective sharing of responsibility by the commission and the operating establishments which are accountable to the public through the President and the Congress for agency efficiency and program results. It would, at the same time, permit fair treatment of employees with veterans' status and of other employees with records of long and efficient service. This result could be secured by requiring that agencies, in making appointments or in reducing force, select or retain the candidate with veteran's status or, after that, with a record of long service, unless another candidate is definitely better qualified for the position to be filled. This arrangement would place the burden of proof on any agency which did not select the candidate with veteran's status or seniority, but it should at the same time result in the selection or retention of the best qualified employees for the federal service. Such a plan should include a right of appeal by individuals to the Civil Service Commission.

The Civil Service Commission should cease devoting its major efforts to the development and administration of detailed procedures and should turn its attention to strengthening the career service in the federal government. A long step in this direction would be taken were the commission to encourage greater participation by the

operating establishments in the examination and the selection of candidates, as proposed above. A second step would be the appointment of special committees of examiners to administer open competitive examinations when such examinations are needed to fill vacancies in the highest civil service positions. A third step would be to arrange for an effective method for the transfer and exchange of personnel between the several departments and establishments in order to broaden the base of opportunity and experience. Such transfers and exchanges might well be effected on the basis of interagency agreements made with the active cooperation and assistance of the central personnel agency.

It has been suggested that a new liberalized approach on the part of the Civil Service Commission is needed in order to improve the effectiveness of personnel administration and, in so doing, the effectiveness of the entire federal service. But to secure such an approach will require a higher quality of commission personnel than now exists. During the stress of the war emergency and while under the necessity of expanding its services, the Civil Service Commission added to its staff a considerable number of able persons who brought to the commission a new attitude toward problems of personnel management. Within the last year many of the new staff members with imagination and constructive ideas on personnel problems have departed, many no doubt because they felt that emergency problems had been met, but others because they were unwilling to spend their time and energy in carrying on the routine type of activity that now engages the attention of the commission staff.

The securing of a higher quality of personnel in the Civil Service Commission will depend upon the establishment of a higher salary scale. But higher salaries will not necessarily require a larger budget. The commission should abandon many of its present activities, employ a smaller staff of higher quality, and use this staff primarily

to assist in the formulation of broad personnel policies, to secure adherence to such policies within the operating agencies, and to assist the agencies in devising means to carry out such policies.

I see little evidence that leads me to believe that the present triple-headed commission will change its ways. Furthermore, there are now on the statute books laws which would handicap a central personnel agency no matter what its form or its motivation might be.¹ I must therefore conclude that present laws, including the basic Act which set up the commission and established its functions, need modification. The actions needed are different in degree but not in nature from those described in 1937 by the President's Committee on Administrative Management and recom-

mended by the President to the Congress. The federal civil service is now several times as large as it was in 1937, and, although it will probably be reduced after the war, it seems unlikely that it will ever again be as small as it was even at its highest point during the 1930's. There is greater need now than there was in 1937 for the establishment of a new central personnel agency headed by a well-qualified, non-political administrator to perform, with the assistance of an advisory citizen board, the type of functions suitable to a central personnel agency in a large and complex organization such as the federal government. Unless and until such an agency is established, the present commission remains on trial. Legally it could now operate in a manner to bring about many of the constructive reforms that could be expected under the proposed setup. Looking at the matter realistically, I doubt that it will. But I hope that it does.

¹ In this connection, see Leonard D. White, "Congress and the Civil Service," 5 *Public Personnel Review* 65-69 (April, 1944).

Louisville Plans Its Future

By KENNETH P. VINSEL

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POSTWAR and reconversion problems were the subject of much concern to leading citizens of Louisville during the summer months of 1943. Problems concerning the cancellation of war contracts, demobilization, reconversion of industry, continuing or slackening government controls, and shifting populations left a large question mark over the future of the city. It was felt that local planning must provide the answers to many of these questions; that it was on a local level that we must begin to plan our way of life following the war. It was recognized that Louisville's postwar problems had been multiplied by the vast influx of war workers and military personnel, and serious thought was given to the future of the area. What would become of these workers when the war boom was over? Would there be jobs available for returning service men and women? How many of the war industries would remain in Louisville, and how could their reconversion be accomplished? How could Louisville take care of its postwar population? How could it become a more attractive and pleasant place in which to work and live?

In addition to the war-caused problems, there were many others which demanded an answer. Decisions on some questions had been delayed because of the war. Before any plans could be made, city officials had to know what kind of city the inhabitants wanted. Does Louisville need a sewage treatment plant and flood protection works? What can be done to improve traffic and transportation conditions? What is the best major street and highway plan which will help to relieve traffic congestion in the

downtown area? What are Louisville's needs in the health field? How can we put to better use the parks we now have, and what additional recreational facilities are needed? Would union terminals be feasible? How can we provide essential off-street parking? What can be done toward the redevelopment of blighted areas in the heart of the city? What is needed in the housing field?

Organizations dealing with specific problems in the social, economic, and cultural fields were legion. But what group could look at the over-all picture and plan ahead for the time when the wheels of war would grind to a stop, leaving the city with a new set of problems in addition to those of long standing? Who could act as coordinator for the various activities?

Inspired by Louisville's forward-looking mayor, Wilson W. Wyatt, a representative group of Louisville citizens met in the early fall and formed a civic nonprofit organization known as the Louisville Area Development Association. Financed jointly by business, local government, and labor, the interest and cooperation of all three groups is assured. Contributors include, besides the city and county, a local bank, a radio station, a newspaper, the water company, the gas and electric company, and the Louisville Central Labor Union. Officials of these organizations make up seven of the eleven-man board of directors. Representatives of the Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, the Louisville Industrial Foundation, and a legal adviser make up the remaining number.

With more than twelve hundred local

planning agencies in the nation there are, of course, a variety of approaches to the postwar problem. Some cities have approached it solely from the standpoint of city government, others from the standpoint of business only. The Louisville Area Development Association includes all the groups upon which rests the responsibility for postwar Louisville.

A dinner meeting was held soon after the incorporation to launch the association. Over three hundred representative citizens were present to hear Mayor Wyatt, elected president of the board of directors, explain the aims and functions of the new agency, organized to determine upon and plan the execution of the various local plans conducive to making the Louisville area, both within and without the corporate limits, a more prosperous and progressive community. The originators of the plan believe that in the concerted action of the citizens of the area is the answer to practical and useful planning for the future of Louisville. The meeting aroused widespread interest, and the cooperation of individuals and organizations has been most gratifying.

It was emphasized that the association would conflict in no way with established agencies. It acts as a clearing house to coordinate scattered activities in any field of community endeavor in which its services are needed. It encourages activities and programs of existing organizations and attempts to avoid duplication and overlapping. For example, the local committee for economic development, organized by the Louisville Board of Trade prior to the inception of the Louisville Area Development Association, serves as the association's committee on business and industry and has already completed a survey of 410 industries in Louisville, securing figures on present employment and on how many jobs can be expected in this field after the war. In this survey the committee for economic development was concerned only with industrial employment. To secure the overall picture by including employment in

commercial and service-type enterprises as well as industrial, the problem was turned over to the Louisville Area Development Association's population committee. The provision of sustained employment throughout the demobilization period in order to help absorb the shock of transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy is, of course, a major concern of this committee and of the association in general. Piece-meal planning is not sufficient, and the association hopes to provide the broad overall planning which can meet the immediate needs of the community, keeping the long-range picture in mind. To accomplish the aims of the association, the needs of Louisville not only today but ten and twenty years hence must be gauged as accurately as possible, and steps must be taken to provide for those needs.

In November, 1943, offices were set up with an executive director and a staff which at present consists of five persons. A fund of \$100,000 was provided to finance the administration of the program for the first two years. Work was immediately started on the selection of committees. A small group of interested citizens met with the executive director to make suggestions for the chairmen and subchairmen of various committees. These names were discussed and approved by the board of directors. The staff had set up, in the meantime, a file of some twelve hundred names collected from every conceivable source. After the chairmen had agreed to serve, the members of their committees were selected by the director and chairmen, again subject to the approval of the board of directors. It is felt that, while the process was a rather slow one, the care taken in choosing members was well worth the time, assuring the selection of the best man available for each job. Interest and willingness to work on the problems of the association are evidenced by the extraordinarily high attendance at meetings.

Committee members are chosen principally for their judgment and ability to "get

things done"; but some are selected because they are experts in a particular field. The basis for having citizen committees is that the community has the talent and ability to determine for itself what kind of an area it wants and what changes should be made.

To date, eleven committees have been organized with over three hundred citizens serving in the following fields: streets and highways, survey and research, finance and taxation, welfare, sewers and drainage, public buildings, parks and recreation, transportation, housing, and health. The committee for economic development is the eleventh. Committees soon to be formed will deal with education, smoke abatement, and arts and civic attractions.

These general committees are broken down into thirty-four subcommittees, each dealing with a specific aspect of the general problem. For example, under streets and highways, there are subcommittees dealing with a major street and highway plan, rebuilding and repairing, parking, roadside development, and bridges and viaducts. Under sewers and drainage are subcommittees on county drainage, on sewers proper, on a sewage disposal plant, and on the related problem of a flood wall. The work of one subcommittee often is of interest to another, and when occasion demands they hold joint meetings. Meetings of the overall committee are held in general only when subcommittees have reports to present; the subcommittee is the working group.

Invitations to serve on a specific committee were issued by the mayor as president of the board of directors. His letter included a brief summary of the purposes of the organization, listed the names of the chairmen and others invited to serve on the committee, and enclosed newspaper reprints on the occasion of the dinner meeting. It is significant of community interest that, out of a total of over three hundred asked to serve, fewer than five did not accept the appointment.

Meetings were held by the executive di-

rector with chairmen and subcommittee chairmen to determine the scope of the work of each committee and to define its purposes. At the first meeting of each general committee, the mayor, the executive director, and the chairman addressed the group briefly, with a question and answer period following. After this general meeting, subcommittee meetings were called and work began in earnest.

The staff of the association collects information for the committees, conducts surveys, sends out notices, and takes minutes of all meetings. Copies of minutes are mailed to all committee members. The executive director keeps each group apprised of plans in other fields which may have some bearing on their problem and provides the coordination between committees necessary to the over-all plan. Once projects are decided upon by the committees, it is the responsibility of the association to see that these plans are carried into effect.

When a committee has been set up, its members survey the needs in their field, determine correctives for the existing situation, decide on definite projects which will improve the area, and follow up to see that these projects are realized. Immediate projects which fit into the long-range program are under consideration, as well as those which will be needed in the future. The officers and staff of the association have no predetermined ideas or plans; they assist but do not direct the activities of the committee. The problem is presented to the committee, which acts as a study and discussion group, gathering information on a specific problem and deciding what action should be taken. The results are its own, decided upon after a study of the existing situation. Coordination by the director and the final review of all recommendations by the board of directors prevent conflicting action on the part of the various committees.

Coordination between committees and local government is provided for by appointing as ex-officio members the repre-

sentatives of the local governmental agencies which parallel the work of each committee. They attend all meetings and supply the committees with factual information. Thus the city and county engineers, the director of works, and the planning engineer are ex-officio members of the streets and highways and the sewer committees; the director of health of the health committee; and the director of welfare of the welfare committee. This system provides the committee with knowledge of the working arrangements and plans of the governmental agencies and furnishes government with an expression of opinion from a citizen group. In addition to the appropriate city and county officials, each committee has as a member an alderman who serves on a similar aldermanic committee. For example, the chairman of the aldermanic committee on finance is a member of the Louisville Area Development Association's finance and taxation committee. The county commissioners also are members of various committees.

The official planning agency for the area is the Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission. The Louisville area is fortunate in having this county-wide planning body, set up two years ago as one of the first city-county planning and zoning commissions in the country. Obviously, planning cannot stop at the city limits. The entire area is interdependent economically and socially, so that any group attempting to plan separately for the city or the county outside the city has its hands tied. The effectiveness of an arterial street and highway plan, of preventive health measures, of sewer construction, etc., depends on the ability to plan for the whole area.

Cooperation with the official planning agency is assured, since two of the commission's members serve on the organization's board of directors, and the chief planning engineer is an ex-officio member of the committees. The funds appropriated by the city and county for the Louisville Area De-

velopment Association go directly to the planning and zoning commission, thereby maintaining a separation of public and private monies and providing funds available to the commission for additional staff and work related to the broad planning program.

It may be asked why a private planning organization is valuable, in addition to the official public agency. A large part of the commission's time is necessarily taken up with matters pertaining to zoning, leaving little time for planning for the future. In addition, the Louisville Area Development Association's committees provide a source of valuable citizen opinion as to what is desired by the people of Louisville and what kind of city they want. The planning engineer and his staff furnish information to the committees and assist in surveys. Land-use maps to be used in connection with the street and highway program and assessment maps showing the comparative costs of alternate rights-of-way are made by the commission's staff. At the same time, it is valuable for the commission to be informed as to future developments as recommended by committees. Proper zoning in advance may save thousands of taxpayers' dollars in rights-of-way costs and damage suits when future improvements are undertaken. An example of this is the work in connection with Standiford Field, Louisville's second airport and the one scheduled for postwar expansion as a commercial field. By preventing the erection of costly improvements near the airport, it will be possible for the air board to carry out their plans with a minimum of difficulty and, at the same time, add to the safety of the field.

In connection with Standiford Field, several other problems have arisen which demonstrate the interrelation of the various fields of planning and the necessity for an over-all organization which can coordinate these plans. The question of an inner belt highway around the city was under consideration by the subcommittee on a

major street and highway plan. Upon inspection by the chairman of the air transportation committee it was found that the highway ran closer than was desirable to the airfield. The route was changed so that the highway, when constructed, will be easily accessible to the field but will not interfere with future expansion or cause operational difficulties.

Committees often refer certain aspects of their problems to other committees in this way. After meeting with officials of various airlines, the air transportation committee found that the most serious gap in plans for Louisville's future in the field of aviation was a quick route from the airport to the heart of the city. If the time saved by plane is lost in getting from the field to the downtown district, nothing will be gained. Accordingly, the committee referred the question to the streets and highways committee, and it is studying alternate routes for a limited-access highway from the field to the downtown district.

In the same way the sewers and drainage subcommittees have referred the question of how to finance needed sewer construction to the committee on finance and taxation. They have discussed a sewer rental plan as the best method to finance the program adequately and wish to see how it would fit in with the plan of municipal finance. The finance and taxation committee is studying various other problems, such as the question of special-benefit taxation in regard to small neighborhood parks and playgrounds.

In discussing a new welfare setup in which several city and county institutions would be combined, the subcommittee studying the home for the aged and infirm learned that a large percentage of the inmates were chronic invalids and belonged properly in a chronic or convalescent hospital rather than in an old people's home. Louisville, at present, has no chronic hospital, but the committee knew that the department of health was interested in such an arrangement. The subcommittee on hos-

pitals has been asked to consider this proposal and make some recommendation to the welfare committee.

Basic to the work of all groups are the data furnished by the committee on survey and research. So far it has two divisions: the population subcommittee mentioned earlier, and a subcommittee on a geological survey. The population committee has issued a report based on the committee for economic development's figures and data from the last census predicting the future population of Louisville. It is now engaged in elaborating on this report as to distribution of population, housing figures, etc. Before any long-range plans can be definitely decided upon, it is necessary to know how many people and what kind of people are being planned for, and where they live and work, find amusement, and the like.

The geological survey subcommittee is gathering together the available information on soil conditions, to be utilized as a guide to future land use. In the past, lack of such knowledge has caused unprofitable and serious misuse in some cases. Residential developments have grown up in low-lying areas which do not have proper drainage; industry has built on land which would be more suitable for some other use. Accordingly, the committee hopes to show which areas in the county will be best for future industrial development—which can best be put to use for residences and which for agriculture. Such information will be valuable to the planning and zoning commission as well as to individuals. The housing committee and the county drainage committee will be particularly interested in the results of this committee's work.

The \$100,000 fund which provides for the administration of the planning program has one other use. Consultants may be employed to assist in the work in special fields, and committee members may visit other cities to investigate programs in their field. A recent trip to Milwaukee by the executive director and the chairman of the parks and recreation committee provided a

working knowledge of the excellent recreation setup in that city and furnished many ideas to be considered by the Louisville Area Development Association group.

Nearing the end of the fact-finding period in certain fields, some of the subcommittees have already made recommendations and others will be ready soon. Study by the subcommittee on county drainage revealed the fact that little material was available on this subject and that any work which was undertaken to relieve local conditions might result in damage to some other part of the county. A comprehensive drainage survey would be necessary, and basic to that, in the long-range program, was a study of rainfall and run-off data. The subcommittee cleared its recommendation with the over-all sewers and drainage committee and the board of directors, and the recommendation was presented to the planning and zoning commission. The commission contracted with the United States Geological Survey for this basic information, agreeing to match the federal funds. This study is now under way.

Besides the population studies and surveys on off-street parking and recreational facilities which were made by the staff of the association, it was felt that expert help was needed in some fields. Upon recommendation by the association, the planning and zoning commission contracted with Roy Wenzlick and Company, real estate analysts, for a study of the downtown district. This report points up many of the problems which exist in the heart of the city and has provided committees with expert opinion on these problems. Again, the subcommittee on railway facilities and terminals of the transportation committee found that professional help was needed to determine the possibility of union terminals and improvements in track layout. Accordingly, the association secured the

services of an expert on railroad operations and track layout.

In addition, the association has sponsored a traffic and highway location study of Louisville and Jefferson County, the expense of which will be met jointly by the state highway department and local organizations. This survey will prove a valuable index not only to the major street and highway plan but to problems in such fields as public transportation and housing. This last survey is particularly important, since the highway program will probably be one of the first to get under way.

The association has issued few reports, feeling that limited manpower and funds could be better used at this time in fact-finding. When solutions can be presented for some of the various problems, proposals will be put before the public in as forceful a way as possible. In the meantime, community interest is widespread. Hardly a day goes by without an invitation from some civic group to the director to discuss the work of the association. The citizens of Louisville by their interest and cooperation have proved that they are alert to the present and impending problems of the community.

The association's program is not intended as a make-work program—its purpose first and foremost is to provide an instrument for democratic community planning, to maintain high production and employment during the reconversion period, to encourage business and industry which will make the Louisville area more prosperous, and to further projects and programs which will make the Louisville area a better place in which to work and live. When men and materials are available many plans and blueprints will be ready, and the citizens of the area will have determined their own comprehensive plan for the future in which all individuals, organizations, and groups can participate.

The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems

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I

ON THE issue of whether the parliamentary or the presidential system is more suited to the circumstances confronted by the United States at the present time, it is clearly a matter for Americans only to pronounce; and I have therefore no concern with the debate between Mr. Don K. Price and those with whom, like Mr. Henry Hazlitt, he differs. My purpose is the very different one of attempting to annotate some of his conclusions, both on the British system and on the American—for, as it seems to me, his account of the first is hardly aware of the changing social order of which it is the expression; and his account of the second, if a foreigner may judge, suffers somewhat seriously from those sins of omission in description which it is the natural temptation of a patriot to exhibit as virtues. And the whole argument, if I may say so, is built upon a series of unexplored and unstated assumptions which have an importance far beyond anything that Mr. Price is ready to recognize. I am, therefore, in no way seeking to eulogize the parliamentary system at the expense of the presidential, or vice versa; each seems to me to have its own special merits, and neither is likely to be capable of transference to another environment, where alien traditions are deep-rooted, without becoming something very different from what it was in the country of its origin.

I begin by noting that the "classic" parliamentary system, which Mr. Price is so emphatic this country "long ago" aban-

doned, has never existed outside the imagination of the publicists. In each epoch of its history since the time of Bagehot, the character of parliamentary government has changed with the problems it has had to solve. It was one thing in the days of Gladstone and Disraeli; it was another thing in the ten years when Mr. Balfour led the House of Commons; and it was different again in the years of the Liberal government from 1906 to 1914. The adaptation of Parliament to the demands of the first World War was of a profound character; and in the years from 1919 to 1939, no small part of its character changed in terms of a party situation which was, in its turn, a reflection of issues raised by political and economic matters outside the walls of Westminster. Nor must it be forgotten that a parliamentary system under the leadership of Mr. Baldwin or Mr. Neville Chamberlain can only be regarded by formalists as the same as when it is directed, as by Mr. Churchill, by a man whom only three men since Palmerston can rival in the complex art of mastering the House of Commons.

The function of a parliamentary system is not to legislate; it is naïve to expect that 615 men and women can hope to arrive at a coherent body of policy unless they are organized for this purpose. Its function is essentially threefold in our time. It must ventilate grievance and thereby scrutinize the executive's policy as a process of administration; it must so discuss the principles upon which the government of the day proposes to proceed that the virtues and defects are fully known to the electorate of the

time; and it must exercise that selective function which, in its ultimate form, may mean the withdrawal of its confidence from ministers and, as a result, a general election. And it must so perform each of these functions that it shows awareness and responsiveness to public opinion outside, that intricate amalgamation of parties and interests to which it owes its authority and by whose will it is able to maintain itself as a going concern.

I do not think that Mr. Price could seriously analyze the parliamentary history of Britain in the last generation and conclude that the system has failed in any of these regards. If there is a better vindication of the power to ventilate grievance than the Savidge case of 1928, with all its important consequences, I do not know it. Even the secrecy which necessarily enshrouds the operations of war has not prevented question-time in the House of Commons from remaining a vital check on the habits of the executive, and no one knows better than the prime minister that his colleague who cannot survive the ordeal of "supplements" with undimmed reputation is not likely to survive at all. So far as the making of policy is concerned, nothing is easier, and nothing is more false, than to believe that cabinet initiative is imposed upon an army of faithful slaves. Mr. Chamberlain (as Mr. Price has forgotten) had still a majority in the Narvik debate; but he did not survive the trenchant criticism of his policy. Mr. Churchill has an overwhelming majority as head of the Coalition government; but he has had to give way on such urgent matters as a ministry of production, the allowances to the dependents of serving men and women, our relations with Marshal Tito, and the thorny problem of an excess profits tax which, despite the shrill lamentations of businessmen, remains at one hundred per cent. I select examples only; there is a host of other instances to prove that, even in the angry crisis of war, no prime minister may strain too far the allegiance out of which he has become

prime minister. And, in my judgment, there is no aspect in which the House of Commons appears to better advantage than in its performance of the selective function. It will always listen with respect to some member who has something to say; its benches will always empty when a member, even if he be a minister of the crown, is talking, not of the real business in hand, but either to his constituents, or, as the member thinks, in a few cases of outstanding vanity, to History. It is not easy for a prime minister, however autocratic, to keep a colleague whom the House refuses to respect; and it is not easy for him to maintain his authority if he tempts the House to that temper where a minister is looked upon with dislike or with distrust.

Mr. Price writes as though the intensity of party allegiance turned most members of the House, differently from in the "classic" period, into little more than units in a division lobby. But that, I submit with respect, could only be held by someone who knows the House of Commons from books and not from direct observation. Perhaps the foreign critic is always tempted to be a *laudator temporis acti*. The present House of Commons is, I think, with but one exception, the poorest in the quality of its personnel since the parliament described in a famous sentence by Lord Keynes in his *Economic Consequences of the Peace*, a quarter of a century ago. Like every House there has ever been it contains dull men and stupid men and bad-tempered men; there are even some who seem to me malignant in habit and evil in purpose. But there is no party whip that could crack loudly enough to bring to heel some thirty members of the Labour party and perhaps as many on the Tory side. I do not think Earl Winterton compares in intellectual stature with Lord (Robert) Cecil; but I do not, either, think that the whip's office has yet been invented which could make him vote against his conscience. I do not share most of the political views of Sir George Schuster, but I am pretty confident

that he makes up his own mind in his own way. And I suspect that if Mr. William Whiteley, the chief Labour whip, were to compare his experiences with the secretary of the treasury in the time of Lord North, or with those of Sir William Sutherland when Mr. Lloyd George was prime minister, he would be unable to repress his sense of envy at the ease with which the earlier generation marshalled its battalions in the proper lobbies. There is a significant moral in the lessons taught by men like Mr. Shinwell and Mr. Aneurin Bevan. There is a moral perhaps even more significant in the fact that the standing orders of the Labour party not only permit abstention from the division lobby but affirm the right of the private member to speak against what the caucus of the party has decided to support.

Mr. Price is distressed by the fact that the House cannot make policy but is restricted to the choice of men to whom the making of policy is entrusted. Upon this view, there are certain observations to be made. In the first place, the Cabinet (emergency apart) does not produce a policy as a conjurer produces a rabbit from his hat. It produces the policy that, at least in its large outlines, is likely to satisfy the established expectations of the majority by which it is supported. A cabinet does not come into office without a pretty clear notion in the public mind of the line it is likely to follow. Mr. Price admits that the system produces "an admirable coherence of policy." It is difficult to think of a legislative object that is more important in a modern community. For coherence, after all, means, first, that the direction in which it is moving is clearly defined; and it means, second, that the source of responsibility for action is beyond mistake. It is difficult to think of anything more important in a democratic society than the achievement of clear responsibility; for nothing else does so much to enable the electorate to make up its mind. Compared to this, the independence of the private member is a mat-

ter of lesser import. As Burke said, nearly two hundred years ago, if a member of Parliament cannot, after election, find a body of members with whom he wishes to work, he must be either a beast or a god.

Mr. Price is able to quote a good deal of evidence, some of it from politicians of long experience, who take the view that members of the House of Commons have little responsible work to do. It is, of course, no easy matter to pit one's judgment against men who, like Lord Baldwin and Sir Austin Chamberlain, knew parliamentary life for over a generation. But my own impression is that this view is disproportionate to the facts. The private member has little responsible work to do if that is his own inclination. But a good deal depends on what we agree to regard as responsible work. I think it is true that a lazy member will have a full opportunity to be lazy. It is also true that any member who is deeply interested in the personal problems of his constituents, in their pensions, in the working of the Rent Restriction Acts, in the location of industry in the area, will find that he has plenty of work on his hands. And if he is wise enough to specialize on a theme which evokes public interest, he becomes the center of a body of pressure groups all of which will seek to influence the action he chooses to take. And few governments, even when they have a comfortable majority, can afford to neglect such men. The questions they put, not least their supplementary questions, the points they make in debate, have an influence it is very easy to underestimate. Mr. Price seems to think that debate has become a lost art. If by that he means the great occasion when the galleries are packed and the orators on both sides of the House feel that they are addressing posterity, the answer is twofold. First, debates of this character were always pretty rare; it is an illusion cultivated by the biographers of great parliamentarians that world history was altered by what their heroes said. Most speeches are dead within

a week of their delivery. It must, in fact, be so save in those rare periods when the speeches from either front bench are almost duds; and a constitutional democracy is unlikely to survive if those periods are frequent in its history.

The other answer is the elementary one that the substance of parliamentary discussion has changed. The franchise, Ireland, and religious toleration have given place to the future of the export trade, the ownership and control of the mining industry, and the amount of the allowances for the dependents of men and women in the forces. This change of substance means, in a large degree, that most parliamentary business turns upon problems of quantity rather than problems of quality. As soon as this is the case, the type of oration which, as with Burke, was a spoken book, or, with Mr. Gladstone, was like a Bach cantata, is utterly unsuited to the medium involved. If such occasions do arise, as in the debate over the Revised Prayer Book, or the issues implied in the illegal arrest of Mr. Art O'Brien, I do not think Mr. Price would find that the House of Commons of our own day is in any way inferior to its predecessors. I should, indeed, go further and argue that on the really great occasion the level of debate in our own day compares favorably with the past. Let Mr. Price read, speech by speech, the discussion in that Narvik debate which caused the downfall of the Chamberlain government with the famous debates between Pitt and Fox over the French Revolution, or between Gladstone and Disraeli over British foreign policy in southeastern Europe, and I suggest that the Narvik debate does not suffer by comparison. And I suspect that Mr. Price would agree with me that the speech of Lord Cranborne, at the time of his resignation with Mr. Eden, or of Mr. Churchill, on Mr. Chamberlain's return from Munich in 1938, are likely to rank high in any collection of documents which seek to illustrate these times.

I suspect, in short, on this head, that

just as Mr. Price thinks that Woodrow Wilson, when he wrote *Congressional Government*, was overinfluenced by the impeachment of President Johnson and by the scandals of the Grant administration and so became the easy victim of Bagehot's brilliance, he has, in his turn, been gravely misled by his belief that what Wilson described was a species in the morphology of institutions not subject to the laws of evolution. The British state of this generation is not the British state of 1900 even; and the change in its purpose and its habits has naturally altered the character of its institutions.

I agree with Mr. Price's account of the defects of the British civil service between the two wars. I do not, however, accept his view that Lord Stamp and Sir John Anderson left the civil service for business and politics respectively because they were "more energetic and ambitious" than their colleagues. Lord Stamp went into private business because he wanted a large income; Sir John Anderson, near the close of his career as a civil servant, was promoted by Lord Baldwin to be the governor of Bengal; when he returned from his five years of office in India the Conservative party immediately offered him a seat in the House of Commons. The real reason for Mr. Price's general conclusion lies in British history in the interwar years. Partly, the civil service, in the administrative grade—itself a reflection of the general social structure of British life—reflected a series of prime ministers whose main ambition it was to safeguard the historic traditions of this country against any invasion of revolutionary ideas from the European continent and, especially, from the Soviet Union; partly, the social composition of the civil service made it tend to be attracted by this attitude. Mr. Price seems to forget that from 1906 to 1918 the civil service had a great record, not least in the first World War, and this record, in which the "energy and ambition" of its leading figures is outstanding, is very largely the reflection

of a government which was engaged in the greatest measures of social reform Great Britain has ever known. It is an elementary principle of administration that a government with an enterprising program attracts a spirit of enterprise among its officials; while a government which seeks to make the degree of change weak and tepid will tend to give a character of weakness and tepidity to the civil service.

Mr. Price is, I think, quite mistaken in assuming that a permanent civil service of the British type would be "unsettled" if its chief officials were brought in from the outside. It is important, first, to note that businessmen have rarely made a success of civil service work; and the main reason appears to be their curious inability to work out reasons for the policy they recommend. They are accustomed to issue orders which they do not have to defend in public; the essence of the British system is that the House of Commons is entitled to receive a reasoned explanation from the minister of the policy he adopts.

Nor can I accept Mr. Price's view that the minister is "primarily a legislative leader, not an administrator." The successful minister in the parliamentary system is a man who can do three things. First, he must have ideas; second, he must know how to make his officials an effective team for carrying out those ideas; and, third, he must be able to secure support for them from Parliament. These have been the characteristics of all great ministers in modern times. They were the qualities of Sir Robert Peel; they were the qualities of Lord Cardwell; they were the qualities of Lord Haldane; they are, today, the qualities of Mr. Churchill and of Mr. Herbert Morrison. And the outstanding thing about any minister who wants a big job done is his ability to find the officials who will do it, with a determination to get rid of the chief administrators he has inherited if he does not think they fit in with his purposes. That was true of Lord Haldane's great army reforms; it was true of

Mr. Arthur Henderson's remarkable record as foreign secretary; and it is true of almost every stage in Mr. Churchill's administrative career in the last forty years. In the context of Mr. Price's remarks, it is worth recalling that when Mr. Churchill became president of the Board of Trade in 1908, he brought Sir William Beveridge from Toynbee Hall and the *Morning Post* to be the director of the labor exchange system he inaugurated. And it is an important footnote to these matters that when Sir William Beveridge left the civil service in 1919 to become the director of the London School of Economics and Political Science he had had a number of years as the very successful second secretary and then permanent secretary of the Ministry of Food.

There are, I think, two main reasons why the permanent civil service has been, since 1870, hostile to the acceptance of outsiders except in wartime. The first is historical: entrance by competitive examination ended that era of corruption and patronage which made so much of the British civil service a means of enabling the privileged classes in this country to provide for their indigent relatives; and there has always, quite intelligibly, been the fear that to tamper with open competition would mean a return to a system in which patronage would gain the upper hand. I say "intelligibly" because no one can analyze the wartime appointments made by nomination to the civil service without seeing how important a part influence plays in securing a post. The second reason is that the civil service, naturally enough, no more likes to see the limitation of its hopes of promotion by the choice of outsiders than do doctors like to see the recognition of osteopaths, or practicing lawyers in England the choice of eminent jurists for the Bench.

But there is no inherent reason at all why this attitude should be accepted. There is a great deal to be said for the appointment to the civil service of men

and women who stay in a department for periods up to four or five years, or for the choice of specialists in a given field (Lord Keynes is a good example in this war) to do some special piece of work. Nor is there any reason at all why the official should be tied to his desk. Already, there are departments, of which the Colonial Office is a good example, in which field-work is done by the young official as part of his normal training; and the Assheton Committee has just reported in favor of periods of leave of absence for the purpose of study or research. If, to this, there is added a real effort to make service in local spheres of government interchangeable with service in the national spheres, most of Mr. Price's criticisms would seem to me to have been met.

There is one other aspect of Mr. Price's comments on the civil service which, I think, deserves a word. Admitting, though he does, that "official caution is common to all large organizations to some extent," he yet seems to regard it as a defect in the British system that "a British civil servant simply must remain noncommittal on policy questions in order to keep out of party politics." On this, I submit, there are two observations at least to be made. The British official must not *publicly* commit himself; I should have thought that the reasons for this habit of conduct were made sufficiently obvious when General MacArthur publicly committed himself on the New Deal in his letters to Congressman Miller. It would hardly have made for effective administration if, when Lord (then Sir Robert) Vansittart was chief diplomatic adviser to his Majesty's government he had, with his typical ardor of phrase, written letters to *The Times* angrily denouncing, say, the foreign policy of Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. Nor do I think it would have contributed to the smooth running of a department if Lord Keynes's brilliant pamphlet on the "Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill" had been written by him not as a

Cambridge don but as an official of the Treasury upon whom Mr. Churchill, as chancellor of the exchequer, relied for advice.

A British civil servant must remain *publicly* noncommittal. But few civil servants of any vigor or determination are lacking in a political philosophy which they express with remarkable freedom in the minutes of the departments or in conversation with their political chiefs. Mr. Price must have read some of the memoranda of Sir Eyre Crowe when he was at the Foreign Office; their pungency seems to me to exclude the prospect that they could be regarded as "noncommittal." Sir Kingsley Wood, when he was postmaster-general, found the peculiar eighteenth-century Whiggism of his permanent secretary incompatible with the positive policy he had decided upon; and Sir Evelyn Murray exchanged St. Martin's le Grand for the quieter atmosphere of the Board of Customs and Excise. Lord Welby, Lord Farner, Sir Warren Fisher, Sir Horace Wilson—to take some examples from both the dead and the living—can hardly seriously be regarded as men who avoided the expression of their convictions "in order to keep out of party politics." They did not address public meetings, nor did they write to the press about the policy of their ministers. But I do not think any minister was ever in doubt about their outlook. And where there was some policy they wished to forward, or some legislation to which they were hostile, they fought for it, or against it, with a tenacity it is impossible to mistake.

It is, no doubt, true that the ultimate decision is in the minister's hands, and that, once he has made the decision, it is the duty of his officials to do all they can to make it effective at its best. But Mr. Price must surely realize that this quality of loyalty to the ministerial decision is a fundamental safeguard against the evils of bureaucracy; it is why men of the type of the Baron von Holstein in Berlin are as

rare as men of the type of Sir Horace Wilson in Whitehall. And to this must be added that Mr. Price's comparison of the minister's role to that of the chairman of a congressional committee save that the rule of seniority gives the latter an experience in the subject-matter to which the former cannot pretend seems to me an elementary confusion of antiquity with wisdom. All in all, I hazard the guess that Lord Haldane, who knew nothing of military matters when he became secretary of state for war in 1905, would compare pretty favorably with Senator Reynolds, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. I was not a great admirer of Lord Halifax' record as foreign secretary; but I prefer that record, with all its limitations, to the record of the late Senator Lodge, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Lord Halifax, no doubt, was profoundly Conservative; but at least he fought in the open, and with a clean sword.

One final remark on the British system is perhaps worth making in the light of Mr. Price's comments. "It is not at all unusual for career civil servants, or public officials temporarily in the [United States] service," he writes, "to help build up support for policies." It is no more unusual in Great Britain than in the United States. The influence of Sir James Stephen on colonial policy was profound; we owe our system of secondary education and our health insurance system more to Sir Robert Morant than to any other person; Sir Charles Trevelyan, the brother-in-law of Macaulay, Sir Antony MacDonnell, Sir Michael Sadler, in the days when he directed research at the Board of Education, Lord Hankey when, as Sir Maurice Hankey, he was secretary both of the Cabinet and of the Committee of Imperial Defense, Sir Henry Tizard, as secretary of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Sir Walter Morley Fletcher, as secretary of the Medical Research Council—all of these, to take but a few names

almost at random, have exercised an influence at least as profound as any American civil servant since at least the Civil War. Their methods may have been different in the sense that they have not publicly "lobbied" for the policies in which they believed. But to suggest of any of these that they would have regarded a "positive" attitude to their jobs as "something improper," only means, I think, that Mr. Price is making his comparisons in terms of "inarticulate major premises" which he has not related to the facts he ought to have considered.

I must not be taken from all this to be arguing for a moment that the parliamentary system, both on its legislative and on its executive side, is not in need of drastic reform. I think it is in such need; but I think the grounds for that need arise out of quite different considerations from any Mr. Price puts forward. For the most part, I suggest, he is arguing not from life but from literature. The real problem the British system confronts is born of the fact that its institutions presuppose, both in the legislature and in the executive, government by the gentlemen in the age of the positive state. And, as most of Mr. Price's quotations from the Select Committee of 1931 make clear, he thinks that nothing can be done because gentlemen like Mr. (now Lord) Baldwin and Sir Austen Chamberlain thought that nothing could be done. He has omitted to notice that they were not anxious that anything should be done, for that simplest of reasons—that they were, broadly speaking, satisfied with things as they were. More than that: I do not doubt for a moment that their successors will insist that nothing can be done. Yet, already, Mr. Herbert Morrison has created a standing committee of the House of Commons to examine and report on all orders and regulations made under delegated legislation; and he has announced the forthcoming establishment of a permanent consultative committee of the Home Office on prisons and prison treatment. Large

scale changes of a comparable kind are on the way in the Ministry of Labour and the Colonial Office. I do not think it is a rash prophecy to suggest that, with victory, there will be large-scale institutional adaptation in the parliamentary system to meet the demands of a new world undreamed of in 1931 or, indeed, in 1939, by the "gentlemen of England" who have ruled Great Britain, with barely an interval, since 1688. At any rate, it is relatively obvious that either the adaptations must be made, or the foundations of the system itself will be in jeopardy.

II

IF I venture some remarks upon Mr. Price's picture of American tendencies, I do so, first, with the sense that few foreigners can ever understand from within the "feel" of a system that is not their own, and, second, because, as I think, the congressional system raises vital problems with which Mr. Price has omitted to deal. He writes:

America is a federation that is becoming a nation; the institutional system that has helped her do so will be of interest to the whole world as it moves toward greater unity. She gets her job of government done by popular control over two cooperating branches—an executive that provides unity and enterprise, a legislature that furnishes independent supervision and the restraining influence of local interests. Members of her public service are as varied in their origins and experience as the mixture of public and private institutions in her society itself; the leading members of that service come from private life and return to it freely, looking on the government as the people's agency open to their participation.

It is difficult for a foreigner not to feel that these remarkable sentences belong less fully to the literature of political science than they do to the realm of poetry. It is true that Mr. Price elsewhere lays stress on the "parochialism of the pork-barrel" and that lack of individual responsibility for the federal program in Congress which "often" overemphasizes "local interests." But he likes the "flexibility" of the presidential

system, the ability it confers "to make progress piecemeal," and the looseness of party discipline that it permits. It prevents, he surmises, the kind of opposition which is "apt to become uncompromising and irreconcilable." In modern society, "if a legislature is to keep the whole organism working in the public interest, it cannot depend on a power to hire and fire the head of it, but it must approve one action and condemn another, encourage here and reprove there, expand this agency and restrict that one." The assumptions of the parliamentary system, he thinks, would, in the United States "handicap the legislative and executive branches alike in their efforts to work together to meet the demands of a new age."

I hope these quotations do justice to Mr. Price's point of view. I note with some surprise the thesis that the executive provides "unity and enterprise"; that may have been true of President Franklin Roosevelt and of perhaps the first two years of Woodrow Wilson's first term. But it does not seem to me a very accurate description of the president's function as that was conceived by Harding or Coolidge or Mr. Hoover. And the "independent supervision" that is "furnished" by Congress could not unfairly, I think, be described in a different way. Partly, of course, the description depends upon whether the president has a majority in both houses of Congress; if that is absent, there is certainly supervision of his policies, but to describe it as "independent" then seems to me the tribute of formalism to geniality. And if the president has a majority, the description seems to omit certain relevant factors. Supervision has one degree of intensity when the patronage is undistributed; it has another degree if the presidential term of office is nearing its close.

The "unity and enterprise" of which Mr. Price speaks is operative in the American system only when there is genuine presidential leadership, and when Congress is prepared to cooperate in its acceptance. What Mr. Price calls "independent super-

vision" seems to me only too often an attempt on the part of Congress to destroy the effectiveness of that leadership. I do not find it easy to accept that phrase as a fair description of the activities of men like Senator Holman, of Oregon, or of Congressman Thorkelson. Indeed, I think a strong case could be made out for the view that when cooperation between the president and Congress is lacking there is, behind either the one or the other, a "sinister interest," in Bentham's sense of the term, which deprives the people of the United States of the legislation to which it is entitled. The "parochialism" to which Mr. Price refers seems to an outsider like myself to have many and more evil results than he notes. It can arrest the development of great projects, as when the hostility of Senator McKellar to Mr. Lilienthal holds up the progress of the TVA. It maintains the evil practice of "senatorial courtesy," which only too often has been no more than a polite name for enabling a particular senator to insist that the power of patronage be used to protect his hold upon the party machine in his own state. It results in a considerable wastage of public funds in the fulfilment of works projects which are not seldom indefensible in conception and inadequate in execution, and when the "independent supervision" of the executive by Congress results in investigating committees like that of Mr. Martin Dies, the abyss between the purpose Mr. Price attributes to the system and the consequences actually achieved seems to me far wider than he seems to admit.

It is easy to say lightly that the United States is "a federation that is becoming a nation"; that seems to pass over not only the degree in which American federalism is obsolete but, also, the degree in which the presidential system intensifies that obsolescence. That emerges, I suggest, in the vastly different standards of education, factory conditions, public health, to take three examples only, in the different parts of the Union. That infant mortality in San An-

tonio should be worse than in any great city save Shanghai is a serious comment upon the results of the division of powers. That the level of educational opportunity in the South should be so different from what it is in the North or in the West raises issues of the first importance for a democratic society. Mr. Price emphasizes the urgency of keeping "the administration of government under the control of the people, to invigorate it for executive action in their behalf," especially in this time of crisis. But he does not inquire whether there is in fact that popular control, nor whether the presidential system is a method of invigorating the administration.

He would, no doubt, agree that there is good reason to suppose that the underprivileged in the United States—not merely the Negro people but poor whites, like the sharecroppers of Arkansas—have a relatively small part in the popular control of the administrative process. He would, I suggest, find it difficult to prove that the action of Congress over matters of war taxation or its abolition of the National Resources Planning Board are contributions to "invigorating the administration." It may well be, as he says, that the scandals of Grant's presidency turned Woodrow Wilson's mind towards the theme of Bagehot's *English Constitution*. But it would be no more surprising if the scandals of President Harding's brief period of office raised the question of whether the American institutional pattern was adequate to the problems it confronted. It is at least open to debate, for example, whether it ought perpetually to require a grave emergency to give the American commonwealth an effectively coherent policy. It is not less open to doubt whether a party system that becomes effectively national only during election-time enables the people really to know what men they are choosing and what issues they are deciding. I see no reason to suppose that there is any real advantage in a cabinet system upon which so able a man as Secretary Franklin Lane can make the incisive criti-

cisms that his letters reveal. And the "independent supervision" of the Senate in foreign affairs which drives any president with an important problem on his hands to the use of "eminences grises" like Colonel House, or to those "agreements" and "understandings" which, by falling short of the status of treaties, enable him to by-pass that supervision, at least makes one reflect that President Wilson may not have been without some ground for the choice he made in his *Congressional Government*.

Nor do I find it easy to be enthusiastic about Mr. Price's praise for a public service in which "the leading members . . . come from private life and return to it." I note, in the first place, that the quality of administration in the United States has, in the main, improved in the degree that the spoils system has given place to the merit system. I note, in the second place, that as soon as the head of a government department has really learned how to handle his office, he is only too likely to return to private life, so that most departments contain some permanent official upon whose advice and judgment his minister is compelled to rely. And I note, in the third place, that every member of the executive, from the president downwards, is driven, as he makes his plans, to bear in mind not merely the objective he may have in view but the fact that, just because it is his objective, the legislature will want to shape it differently lest the full credit for its achievement be accorded to the executive, and not to the legislative, branch of the government. Mr. Price may be content with an administrative process in which the Teapot Dome scandal was exposed and overcome because the under secretary of the interior, Mr. Harry Slattery, gave the late Senator La Follette the material for his resolution by which Senator Fall was broken. He can hardly feel that it is satisfactory that Senator Stephens of Mississippi should be able to prevent the appointment of Dr. Willard Thorp as the head of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in 1933-34.

seemingly on the ground that political fidelity is more important than technical competence; and I submit that his dissatisfaction ought to be even greater if it be true that Senator Stephens was merely the instrument of the postmaster-general, Mr. James A. Farley, who was in quest of posts for "deserving Democrats."¹

I omit from these observations that most remarkable of the institutions in the presidential system—the Supreme Court of the United States. But it is at least necessary to remark that this third chamber of the American legislature has amply justified the comment of Chief Justice Hughes upon its working. "The spirit of the work of the Supreme Court," he has written, "permeates every legislative assembly and every important discussion of reforms by legislative action. We largely subject our political thinking to the conception of law, not as an arbitrary edict of power, but as governed by the fundamental conceptions of justice."² Few better methods could easily be found than that of judicial review for keeping the people in political tutelage, on the one hand, or of slowing down, save in the gravest emergency, both the pace of social change and the interest in attaining it. For once the final word, the cumbrous process of amendment apart, was placed in the hands of the Supreme Court, the American Constitution entrusted the shaping of its final character not to the operation of some abstract principles but to a body of men who are nominated to the court either on political grounds or because they have been successful lawyers. Only the reader of the massive volume of the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Mr. Justice Brandeis' appointment can appreciate the full implications of this confidence. And when he thinks of Chief Justice Hughes's "fundamental conceptions of

¹ Arthur W. MacMahon and John D. Millett, *Federal Administrators* (Columbia University Press, 1939), pp. 401-2.

² Charles Evans Hughes, *The Supreme Court of the United States* (Columbia University Press, 1928), pp. 241-42.

justice," he should study the resounding rhetoric of Mr. Joseph H. Choate in the income tax case, or the dissents of Mr. Justice McReynolds in the springtime of the New Deal, to discover how those conceptions are determined.

Mr. Price does not discuss the Supreme Court in his interesting article, though I should have thought that no account of the presidential system was complete without a survey of its implications. In one sense, perhaps, he was wise to omit the court from his comparison, for it raises issues—about the application of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, for example—which cast a vivid light upon the relations between the court and public opinion. Universal suffrage has its defects, no doubt, but at least in the British parliamentary system it is in fact universal. It is, at least to an outsider, significant that all the combined efforts of the Constitution in the United States have not been able honestly to confront what Professor Myrdal, in his remarkable book, calls the "American Dilemma."¹

Nor is it entirely fair to leave out of account in any discussion of the presidential system the quite special influence it offers to pressure groups by reason of the separation of powers. Julius Caesar Burrows of Michigan and General Sickles were the precursors of that titan with feet of clay, the American Legion, which makes the modest demands upon the British Treasury of the eighteenth-century English aristocrat seem almost childish by comparison. Lobbying in Whitehall is not, of course, any more unknown than lobbying in Washington. But there is, I think, the significant difference between the two places that, in the one, the responsibility for the result is direct and unmistakable, while in the other it is so thinned out by dispersion that it is often beyond the reach of the elector's insight. It would be an illuminating task to discover what interests precisely were responsible for the char-

acter and level of the Hawley-Smoot tariff; in Britain, there is little difficulty in concluding that our protective tariff was a wreath deposited by the Tory party, through the agency of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, on the tomb of his distinguished father. It would be still more interesting to know by what influences a progressive Democrat, like President Roosevelt, was led to acquiesce in policies which could have no other result than the overthrow of the nascent Spanish democracy in the interest of that Franco whose status as a puppet of Hitler and Mussolini was clear even when the President helped to pave his way to Madrid. And, in some ways, it would be most interesting of all to know why American patronage was proffered, first to Pétain and Darlan when they built the evil regime of Vichy, then to Darlan when he achieved his second piece of treachery, and then to that Peyrouton whom every element in the French resistance movement united to hate. Mr. Churchill's patronage of King George of the Hellenes and King Peter of Yugoslavia is, after all, of a piece with all his character; he is an eighteenth-century Whig who has strayed by chronological accident into a twentieth-century war, and, in his mind, "republic" and "revolution" are almost interchangeable terms. But why this outlook should at least equally dominate the mind of President Roosevelt and his advisers in the State Department is, pretty clearly, a longer more complicated story.

It is, further, significant enough that Mr. Price makes no serious comment on the rule requiring local residence for congressmen and senators. It is a rule that has had vast influence, almost wholly evil, on American public life. For, in the first place, it excludes from politics a large number of citizens, except in an indirect way; and, in the second, it makes the congressman or senator balance the alternatives between, for example, a small law practice in a backwoods township and the interest and excitement of life in Washington. The result is twofold: it makes him a perpetual candi-

¹ *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (Harper & Bros., 1944).

date living by the favors he can secure for his district or his state; and, in most instances, it compels him to build or use a machine in his support, lest he be ousted by some ambitious rival. And to this must be added that the very fact that so large a number of people to whom politics is a natural *métier* are excluded from it, multiplies the number of pressure groups through which they may hope to win alternative influence. And the rule of local residence gives by its nature a secret source of power to the great economic interests of America. The Du Ponts in Delaware and the Anaconda Copper Corporation in Montana are only classical examples of this kind. And where there arises this relationship, there is almost bound to arise also intermediate machines to collect "brokerage," as it were, on the service they can render the politicians or the corporations. The Kelly machine in Chicago, the Hague machine in New Jersey, the late Senator Huey Long in Louisiana, the late Senator Penrose in Pennsylvania are only the most striking examples of an underworld of politics which breeds corruption wherever its influence extends. The result is not merely the "parochialism" which Mr. Price deplores; the result is the far more mischievous consequence that the politician and the businessman are engaged either in joint corruption or in mutual conflict at the expense of the common welfare. Judge Peccora's exposure of the practices of Wall Street is one link only in the long chain which reaches back to the classic bargain whereby the capital of the United States was placed on the banks of the Potomac.

III

THESE annotations have, I hope, established the thesis that the problems involved in any comparison between the parliamentary and the presidential systems are far more complicated than Mr. Price is willing to concede. I should not for one moment claim that one system is better than the other, still less that the parlia-

tary system is more suited to the genius of the American people than the presidential. A system of government is very like a pair of shoes; it grows to the use of the feet to which it is fitted. But it is well to remember of governments what is true, also, of footwear—that the shoes must be suited to the journey it is proposed to take. It ought, I think, to occur to Mr. Price that if Lord Baldwin did not examine whether the British system of nineteenth-century institutions could be improved, he himself failed to examine whether improvement was possible in the American system of eighteenth-century institutions.

It is essential for both our countries to realize that we face, in the coming years, problems of a scale and an intensity far greater than any we have known at least in our own lifetime. We shall, neither of us, confront them in a constructive way unless we make up our minds about the purposes we want to fulfill as communities and the methods that are appropriate to those purposes. Both Great Britain and the United States have achieved political democracy; neither has in a serious way approached a democratic way of life in either our social or our economic institutions. As the second World War draws to its close, we ought at least to have learned certain lessons that are implied in its grim experience. Whether the form of our political institutions be parliamentary or presidential, it is quite certain that they will not remain on a democratic foundation unless we deliberately set out to conquer mass unemployment. It is no less certain that democracy will lose the spirit that gives it meaning unless our citizens have that sense of hope and exhilaration which is born only of an economy that, by its power to expand, is capable of raising the standard of life for all our citizens. It is in a high degree probable that the power of successful expansion depends upon the planning of production for community consumption. Free enterprise, in the American sense of the phrase, is only too likely, on our experience, to

make the tragic process of boom and slump once more endemic in our societies. That process is a threat to any political system which seeks to make persuasion, and not force, the main method of social change. If we are to avoid this threat, our task is, above all, to give men and women an equal claim upon what there is of common welfare and to create in them that power to make their experience of life articulate which alone gives reality to their citizenship. If we feel entitled to ask millions to risk their lives for freedom, at least we have the obligation to make the freedom for which they fight come to have significance in their lives. The one thing to which we are not entitled is the purchase of our own freedom at the price of their servitude.

I do not need to point out that by no one was this more clearly seen or more effectively enunciated than by Thomas Jefferson; nor do I need to argue that the significance of America in the last three hundred years has lain in the fact that it made this dream a source of spiritual renovation to millions of poor and oppressed men and women in Europe and Asia and even on the African continent. Those for whom that dream came true were, alas, far

fewer in numbers than those who were sustained by what it evoked of hope. In any attempt to give it a wider fulfilment the first necessity, as I think, is to see life as a whole, to refuse to divorce it into categories which are firmly separated from one another. From this angle, therefore, the attempt to measure political institutions in one country against political institutions in another is a method of analysis which cannot lead to fruitful results. For the political cannot be separated from the economic, and both are set in a context to which history and the material resources of a community give a special meaning. My own main consciousness is of the certainty that we are living in an age which will compel enormous changes. In some ways it will seem a smaller world, and it may well find that the annihilation of physical space means the assimilation of spiritual difference. The vital thing is to make our categories of thought the outcome of examining nature and not the result of imposing a pattern upon it in the belief that it must conform to our ways. For only in the degree that we understand how definitively freedom is the recognition of necessity can we adjust our hopes to our destinies.

A Response to Mr. Laski

By DON K. PRICE

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SINCE Mr. Laski's reputation as a devastating critic of parliamentary government will undoubtedly attract many more readers to his comments than the number who saw my article a year ago, I am inclined to accept the invitation to annotate his annotations, even though the editors of the *Review* were indelicate enough to use the term "rebuttal."

Those who did not read the article on which Mr. Laski comments need to be told that he is essentially in agreement with it, but that he is exemplifying as well as describing the parliamentary tradition; the opposition sometimes likes to criticize in detail and to appear to oppose even measures which it generally supports.

This point requires fuller explanation before any question of importance is raised. If the reader of Mr. Laski's annotations would refer to my original article, he would doubtless be surprised to find that it mainly undertook to argue three general points:

—that those who want a parliamentary system for the United States want it as a means toward more detailed legislative control of the executive, an end which it would prevent instead of effecting;

—that the social, geographic, and political environment make unsuitable to the United States a system that was once suitable in Great Britain;

—and that the changing conditions in Great Britain have already made obsolete there the system that is the model for American imitators.

The reader would also find that the article did not say that the British should adopt the presidential system; that it did

not try either to catalogue or to deny the faults of that system; and that it did not favor unemployment, the Teapot Dome, or a return to the eighteenth century.

The reader will see how Mr. Laski is not disagreeing with me, but only with his assumptions about my "unstated assumptions," if he reads the passages in which I commented on the change in Great Britain from the old system of control by the mercantile and landed gentry through the House of Commons to a more direct popular control by an unsystematic complex of agencies of public opinion; my article was intended to specify a few of the difficulties (on which Mr. Laski generalizes) in adjusting a system of government by gentlemen to the needs of the positive state. Mr. Laski says that "as most of Mr. Price's quotations from the Select Committee of 1931 make clear, he thinks that nothing can be done because gentlemen like Mr. (now Lord) Baldwin and Sir Austen Chamberlain thought that nothing could be done"; since I quoted three widely different points of view from that Select Committee, I can only wonder at Mr. Laski's deductive powers, especially since I had gone to some trouble to show that "the British have been pretty enterprising since the war began in discarding the dogmas of the parliamentary system."

Perhaps the best illustration of Mr. Laski's disagreement with what he imagines I think is this: Mr. Laski remarks, in order to make the point that members of the House are not slaves of the Cabinet, that "Mr. Chamberlain, as Mr. Price has forgotten, had still a majority in the Narvik

debate; but he did not survive the trenchant criticism of his policy"; I had written that the "control of the Cabinet by the House of Commons seems . . . mythical when we remember that . . . Mr. Neville Chamberlain could be made to resign in 1940 while still commanding an overwhelming majority in the House." Aside from the minor question about my memory, these quotations bring out an issue of importance. When a Cabinet is dismissed by public opinion even though it can still muster a considerable majority in the House, I do not follow Mr. Laski in concluding that the House exercises an independent control over the Cabinet.

Mr. Laski is right in saying that my observations on Parliament are less from direct observation than from books—he might have added Congress as well, for I have spent less time in the Capitol than in Westminster. But I do not think Mr. Laski should warn the buyer to beware of a product which he has been so busily engaged in manufacturing for several decades.

It would have saved me trouble if I had quoted Mr. Laski in the original article in support of my major points. But that would have deprived me of the pleasure of seeing the parliamentary system and the British civil service defended by the scholar who in the 1930's was speculating whether a revolution would not be necessary to break the grip of the capitalist forces, including the upper class of the civil service, on national policy. Mr. Laski does not like for me to suggest that party allegiance has turned most members of the House into little more than units in a division lobby, although twenty-five years ago he observed that "where Bagehot could note the overwhelming supremacy of Parliament the fact which confronts the modern observer is the even greater power of the executive body," and that "the exigencies of government had so strengthened party-control as virtually to destroy the independence of the private member. . . . Parliamentary democracy had broken down; sovereignty had patently

suffered transference from the House of Commons."¹

But all this means nothing except that Mr. Laski enjoyed making thrusts at my brash generalizations even though they were rather similar to some of his scholarly ones. I would not be inclined to disagree seriously with many things that he said; I only think he ignored the most important points I tried to make.

Take, for example, the question of responsibility for a legislative program. I raised the question whether the system of cabinet responsibility, along with its well recognized advantages of coherence of policy, did not have marked disadvantages in its inflexibility. In the United States few people pretend to know, as Mr. Laski says, which interests were responsible for the Hawley-Smoot tariff; in Great Britain they can sum up the tariff, if they like, by saying in Mr. Laski's words that it was a wreath laid by Neville Chamberlain on his father's tomb.² But where does that get them? It would be more helpful, perhaps, to go into the negotiations behind the adoption of the tariff policy; perhaps the proceedings of a congressional committee are not usually very informative, but they are more so than any procedure in the parliamentary system, for the committee can ask an administrative official all sorts of detailed questions of policy that he cannot dodge by appealing to his political superior. Each system has its points, but as long as the general public and a myriad of local and special-interest groups help the legislature to review public policy, there is something to be said for sacrificing a little unity to guarantee publicity to the administrative decisions that affect the welfare of society.

Mr. Laski cited notable exceptions to

¹ *Authority in the Modern State* (Yale University Press, 1927), pp. 306, 110.

² Mr. Laski's explanations of parliamentary changes in policy as the result of capitalist control over cabinets and the civil service are much more adequate as an expression of his opinion than this interpretation, but also are less creditable to cabinets. See his discussion with Josef Redlich published by the Foreign Policy Association under the title *The Decline of Parliamentary Government*.

my generalizations about the civil service under the parliamentary system, principally to the point that the defects of the service were not inherent in the parliamentary system itself. I had suggested that the system discouraged initiative and closed the door on a potentially valuable exchange of personnel between private and public employment; the reverse aspects of these points, of course, are the familiar advantages that it discourages political appointments and encourages continuity and thoroughness of policy. Mr. Laski's list of notable civil servants who have influenced British policy does not seem to me as weighty evidence in the question of administrative initiative as the Webbs' observation in 1920, before the period of Conservative inertia, that the

supreme test of the perfect efficiency of a Government Department—in the eyes of its Parliamentary Head and of the Cabinet—is that it should never be mentioned either in the House of Commons or in the press. . . . The special skill in a civil servant which is most appreciated by his Parliamentary Chief and by his colleagues in the Civil Service is not initiative or statesmanship, and not even the capacity to plan and to explain the departmental projects, but either to avoid questions in the House, or, if these are asked, to furnish answers which allay without satisfying the curiosity of the enquirers.¹

It is necessary to balance the advantages against the disadvantages of a closed career service, and I do not think that the dangers of spoils or of contention within the administration are so great in the other type of service as to make the issue a one-sided matter. Partisan appointments have become nearly obsolete in the United States government. Nor is it necessary to keep an administrator in office while he publicly opposes the administration's policies, just in order to make it possible for civil servants to advocate policies before the public. The President or a department head, as I remarked in the article in question, should discharge any administrator whose

¹ Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), p. 68.

public statements are embarrassing, as well as any who fails to give full cooperation in the execution of policies. Mr. Laski has often pointed out the ways in which an administrative group can oppose political decisions without obvious disobedience and may suppress technical suggestions out of prejudice or inertia; with these possibilities in mind I doubt that the tradition of loyalty to the minister is as effective a safeguard against bureaucracy as the tradition of firing those who are obstructive. It is odd that one who would swallow a revolution would strain at returning a few officials to private employment.²

A quarter century ago Mr. Laski wrote a book challenging the theory of the absolute sovereignty of the state—the theory which is the modern version of the medieval conception of unity. He contended that there had developed private "associations of every kind which aim directly at supplementing the work of parties on the one hand, and directly controlling the business of administration. . . . They are the beginning of what will eventually be the definite organisation of every interest that is affected by the action of the state." We shall have, he predicted, "a federalism of functions" in order to avoid making the state omniscient, and so to avoid transforming "every political struggle into an economic conflict." The danger, he warned, was that "decision on great events secure only the passive concurrence of the mass of men."³

It is some such pluralistic society that must be built if great nations are to have freedom as well as power, democracy as well as employment. What kind of an administrative service would the state require in such a society? To further a federalism of functions, it may be desirable to keep government administrators and pri-

² For a penetrating argument in favor of making sure that civil servants have a broader experience in order to deepen their human sympathies and sharpen their initiative, see the excellent chapter on the civil service in Harold J. Laski's *Parliamentary Government in England* (Viking Press, 1938).

³ *Authority in the Modern State*, pp. 382-387.

vate managers from freezing into antagonistic groups. Just as the British Treasury broke down departmental rivalries by systematically promoting administrative officials from one department to another, so a nation may well make the executives of its public and private agencies more inclined to cooperate with each other by seeing that they have some experience of each other's problems. The war production program has proved that, even after improvising a national system, we have productive efficiency to spare; as government broadens its sphere of interest it may well sacrifice some degree of managerial efficiency in order to broaden the participation of its citizens in its affairs. And society as a whole would gain in efficiency if such an interchange would make for greater understanding between public and private institutions.

As for the relation between the executive and the legislature, the old dogmas of the parliamentary system seem closely connected with the theory of indivisible sovereignty. The responsibility of a prime minister for the action of any cabinet member (and vice versa), the responsibility of each minister for each action of a subordinate,

the absolute neutrality of the civil service, the alternative between dismissing a ministry and accepting its budget to the last penny—these ideas do not hamper the British only because they apply to an aspect of the Constitution that is more ceremonial than efficient. In informal consultations with private interest groups, party leaders and civil servants alike, unrestrained by the classic parliamentary dogmas, decorously adjust national policy and make unnecessary the unseemly maneuvering of legislative committees.

But the constitutional approach of the United States is more literal and less sophisticated than that of Great Britain. Americans cannot, like Mr. Laski, easily dismiss the problem by saying that "the function of a parliamentary system is not to legislate." Congress is still inclined to legislate and even to take over occasionally a share of the supervision of administration. And as long as Americans feel obliged to make their constitutional theory and practice coincide—well, anyway, vaguely resemble each other—it is up to us to check pretty closely on the actual operation of theories we propose to imitate.

Reviews of Books and Documents

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations

By Carl H. Chatters, Municipal Finance Officers Association

STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, by ALVIN H. HANSEN and HARVEY S. PERLOFF. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1944. Pp. vii, 310. \$3.75.

I

SELDOM is a new book as stimulating, as readable, and as fresh as the present work of Hansen and Perloff. Readers may find there is some duplication between various parts of the book, and they may think that the material could be better organized. Critics may feel that some of the material is not pertinent to the subject and that it is a combination of fundamentals on the one hand with transitory and ephemeral materials on the other. Some readers might even wish that the book had been confined more generally to principles with the omission of some of the more current material. But if all this would make the book less readable and less lively, then it might better remain as it is. There can be no question that the authors have thought through clearly the questions involved and that their major conclusions on local financial policy are sound. Whether or not a particular individual will agree with the social and political philosophy expressed will depend very much on the individual's own ideas as to the part of the national government in establishing national minimum standards of social services.

The first chapter has little to do with the rest of the book. It shows that the deficiencies in local finance have been brought to the surface by the war. The location of war plants, which has created pressing problems for the centers of war activity, has much to do with the difficulties. Students of public administration will be concerned with the reasons for placing the plants where they are. The conclusion that war centers, uncertain of their future, "should

take advantage of the current opportunity to raise large tax revenues in order to provide for current and future needs" is sound advice. California citizens, for example, might object now to a high rate of taxation on incomes or on sales, and they might not now wish to build up reserves for the future. However, if California loses population after the war and if problems are left on the doorstep of the state and its municipalities because of the present influx of workers, then it would be convenient to have on hand large reserves created from the war earnings of its temporary residents. Such a procedure of present high taxes would not be an imposition on the permanent residents but rather would be a protection to them. Other states and localities may well take the advice that "it is far better to err on the side of liberality in the setting of current tax levies than to be faced with the necessity of increasing tax burdens at a time when such burdens may accelerate an economic decline." The basic maladjustments and deficiencies of the states and localities which aggravate the war and postwar problems are well summarized. They have to do with the uneven distribution of income throughout the country, the depletion of natural resources, and serious depreciation of property values. Urban communities suffer from lack of overall planning, and states, as well as local governments, face limitations on the taxes and tax rates which they may apply. Local responsibility for services is frequently greater than the necessary fiscal capacity. Finally, the states and localities have not pursued fiscal policies which would contribute to the stability of the national income as a whole, nor is there the proper degree of coordination and cooperation between all the levels of government. The deficiencies, say the authors, can be measured most fruitfully in terms of the pro-

vision of an adequate level of social services for all, the extension of the democratic ideal in terms of equality of opportunity and equity in tax burdens, and the making of the maximum contribution to the progress and stability of the economy.

II

THE authors apparently hold as a major thesis that "gross inequalities in basic and essential social services are wholly incompatible with the democratic principle of equality of opportunity." No one will doubt that an attempt to eliminate such inequalities would bring about a complete revolution in the finances of the state and local governments as well as the national government. There is the implication that only the federal government, through national fiscal policy and national expenditures, can take the major steps necessary for the equalizing of opportunity and financial ability. The authors might have given greater consideration to the probability that the states themselves would do all that they could to establish the minimum level of services. Of course, the book raises the question as to whether or not the federal government should try to raise the level of living in certain states when the citizens of those states through their own governments are unwilling to go as far as they might in providing a decent tax system and a decent level of public services. Chapter 8, entitled "Federal Underwriting of Minimum Service Standards," revolves around the question as to whether or not the federal government should underwrite a national minimum of services for the more expensive and more important activities, such as education, social security, and health. The authors say that the arguments for a national minimum are incontrovertible but that a large number of states and localities do not have the economic resources necessary to finance the minimum standards. In this phase of the argument, social philosophy and financial policy seem to be greatly in conflict.

State and local taxes bear most heavily on those least able to pay. State taxes are made up largely of consumers' taxes, while the local property tax is considered equally regressive. The authors say that about one-third to one-half of all real property taxes are imposed on

residential real estate and that the taxation of residential housing is borne by owner-occupiers and tenants. The authors do not mention it, but their opinion would be appreciated on the proposal recently set forth that an individual living in an owner-occupied home should be compelled to report and add to his income the net rental value of his home. Even if the economic theory of such a proposal is sound, its social implications are highly undesirable. People who own their own homes usually make some sacrifice to pay for them, and communities consisting of owner-occupied homes are generally looked upon as being most desirable. A policy of federal, state, or local taxation which would remove the incentive to home ownership appears undesirable from a human standpoint even though it may look attractive to an economist.

III

THERE is little disagreement with the statement that the fiscal policies of state and local governments have not been consistent with the fiscal policies of the national government. An attempt to bring better coordination is seen in the present activities of the states and localities in setting aside reserves for post-war uses and in the action of many in retaining present tax rates even though they might be reduced. It is well known that governments generally have a tendency to spend their money for large public works in times of prosperity and to curtail spending in times of depression. Even though many municipalities wanted to borrow during depression years they could not do so. Consequently, the federal government made loans for construction as well as heavy contributions for relief and work relief. Experience has indicated that grants-in-aid from the national government made on a matching basis usually give the greatest return per capita to the states which already have the greater economic and financial resources.

Every urban community with a population of 35,000 to 50,000 or more should be organized as a single local metropolitan government with a single administrative agency for all activities now performed by separate units such as county, city, school, and other special districts. Such an integration would be desir-

able from the standpoint of service as well as of taxpaying ability. The forces resisting change in the form of local government have so far been successful. There is need to consider modernization of local government as an organic whole rather than to attack the problem piecemeal. It is important for public administrators to note the conclusions of the authors that "the success of democratic government depends in very large part on its capacity to make adaptation to change." The states have been violating this principle by failure to amend their constitutions and by their practice of earmarking state funds for specific purposes as well as their general policy of writing legislative details into their constitutions. The local governments would be more susceptible to change if they had the constitutional and statutory authority for fiscal reorganization as well as broader powers of taxation.

Local governments have too long overlooked the conclusion of the authors that "all taxes ultimately must be paid out of income." In many places a study of community income would indicate the ability of a community to carry its debt much better than the old rule of basing the debt on assessed value of property. While there will be many who will disagree with the authors on certain phases of urban redevelopment, particularly the financial aspects of it, most of them will agree in theory that from the standpoint of local finance alone the tax base will continue to be whittled away unless slum and blight are eradicated and functional disintegration is prevented.

IV

Most of the conclusions of the authors are sound, but it hardly seems reasonable to agree with them that "national aid is an important instrument for the preservation of state and local governments." Federal aid can raise the quality and quantity of specific services, but no formula and no program have been developed yet by which grants-in-aid are administered by the central government without influencing the states and local governments receiving the money. The integrity of the states and local governments

might be preserved if federal grants were given for broader purposes, as the authors suggest, and if the federal grants were used to finance programs clearly administered by state and local government agencies.

The federal government itself, operating through regional organizations, could do much to improve efficiency in local government and to realize more adequate standards of performance and a greater degree of intergovernmental cooperation.

Chapter 10 alone makes the book worthwhile reading. The conclusions and recommendations on financial planning and fiscal policy of states and local governments should be read by every local official and by every other public official who has any interest in the improvement of local finance. The chapter contributes greatly to an understanding of the fundamental differences in reaction to the federal policies as contrasted with state and local policies. The authors conclude that, while it may not be possible for state and local units to act in complete harmony with the federal policy, it is nevertheless intolerable that they should pursue policies which intensify the swings of the business cycle. The authors make a challenging statement when they say:

There are many things in the realm of fiscal policy that the federal government can do which state and local governments cannot do. Indeed, state and local units of government must in many respects be guided by the same financial precepts as those that should guide a conservatively managed private corporation. The federal government, on the other hand, has powers that vastly exceed those of private corporations or of local units of government.

Note that the authors do not mention the powers of the states. Many seem to have forgotten that the states possess all the attributes of sovereignty and that the limitations on their powers are mostly self-imposed, since they retain all powers except those which are specifically taken away in the federal constitution or in their own constitutions. A better recognition of this fact might give clearer understanding of the possibility of the states meeting some of their problems without calling on the national government.

The authors defend one thesis which appears sound and reasonable and yet is gen-

erally overlooked by economists. They say, "Basically, for most state and local units, borrowing is similar to the receipt by a national government of credit from abroad." This is revealed by many depression experiences in which communities could not pay their debts without closing their local banks as a result of the export of capital or could not pay their debts because the community itself had no income from which taxes could be raised to meet the debt. Many local problems would appear in a clearer light if the fundamental truth expressed by the authors were more generally believed in and acted upon.

V

THE recommendations with respect to local debt policies are quite generally accepted. The authors believe that the states might support local credit more generally than they have. They cite loans made by California to its counties for relief purposes and Massachusetts loans to local governments with tax liens as security. A federal intergovernmental loan corporation is suggested to purchase the securities of states and local governments at interest rates somewhat in keeping with the cost of federal borrowing. Such federal support of state and local credit would be some justification for removing the exemption of state and municipal bonds from federal taxation. With respect to debt policy the authors also suggest that the basis of a debt limit might better be a percentage of revenue than the present limits based on assessed valuation. Had the United States Treasury acted upon another one of the suggestions made by Hansen and Perloff, the state and local governments would have accumulated reserves much greater than they now have for postwar uses. They suggest that the Treasury give consideration to a special issue of notes or bonds for states and local governments for the purpose of building reserves.

VI

THE section dealing with improvements in local government finance is practically complete by itself. The financial difficulties of the cities are clearly analyzed, and the kind of program they need to work out of their dilemma is presented. It is true that local governments are in an unenviable position because they are under pressure to expand social services at the same time that their tax powers are extremely limited. The authors rightly conclude that "the local property tax is a much abused instrument." They state what so few have seemed to understand; namely, that the property tax is in difficulty because it has too heavy a load to bear. They might have contrasted this with the occupancy tax in Great Britain, which is not as burdensome as our property tax because of the very large grants given by the central government in England and the consequent fact that the occupancy does not carry the burden that the local property tax carries in the United States. Other causes of the acute situation in local finance are listed as the process of urban development and the decline in property values which can be corrected primarily by wise land use, planning, and redeveloping programs. The authors believe, too, that a classified property tax and far better administration of all property taxes would be useful. They recommend increased local sharing of state-collected taxes, especially the gasoline and automobile taxes.

This book, because of its content, is worthy to be read by everyone who is concerned with a fundamental revision of the financial structure of the federal, state, and local governments, particularly as each relates to the other. In a period such as this, when most of the problems of government center around intergovernmental relations, the book is particularly deserving of study.

Looking at Under-all Management

By Fritz Morstein Marx, U. S. Bureau of the Budget

GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA: SELECTED READINGS, edited by F. A. BLAND. Government Printer, Sydney, New South Wales, 1944. Pp. liv, 761.

I

GREAT undertakings often spring from small causes. This impressive volume is a case in point. A recent revision of the examination syllabus for the higher administrative grades in New South Wales directed candidates to extend their reading to specified reports of Australian royal commissions and other public bodies. Because many of these reports were no longer available in sufficient numbers, the new requirement might have given rise to much embarrassment. Fortunately, Professor Bland of Sydney University, one of the country's most distinguished students of public administration, proved equal to the emergency. For years he had built up a large collection of pertinent documents. Thus forearmed, he was able, with the help of the duplicating machine, to furnish on short notice an amply adequate selection of readings. The present book is the second edition, the first to appear in print.

The arrangement of materials reflects Mr. Bland's frankly acknowledged special interests. More than half of the space is given over to topics of personnel administration. Two chapters deal with current trends of Australian federalism, especially federal-state relationships and the movement toward formation of new states. Two other chapters outline the main issues confronting local government; one of these is devoted to metropolitan areas. The three closing chapters are centered on the research function of government, fiscal management, and the administration of public enterprises of a business character.

Although this grouping of subject matter is quite unorthodox, the editor has managed to achieve both continuity and coherence of presentation. This is in large part the result of his keen perception of the importance of management in the daily chores of the modern Leviathan. It is also due to care in selection. Despite some repetition—hardly avoidable in a venture of this kind—one cannot fail to be

impressed with the sustained depth of inquiry into the less accessible aspects of public administration. Unity of approach and clarity of perspective are further enhanced by the incisive introductory essay in which the editor surveys the basic problems of Australian government—a little masterpiece by itself. While Mr. Bland has taken his stand on many questions of public policy, he could not have been more judicious and temperate in setting forth the pros and cons of controversial propositions.

A book staked out as wide as this compels the reviewer either to content himself with a cursory appraisal or to single out for special comment a few individual themes. Neither course is likely to do justice to Mr. Bland's labor, but the second alternative might come closer to it. Choice, however, is difficult in the competition of absorbing themes. There is the much debated question of the future of Australian federalism; there is the record of experimentation with forms of local and metropolitan organization; there is the large array of problems of public service personnel—commonwealth, state, and municipal—many of which have been ably discussed by Mr. G. Lyle Belsley in a recent issue of this *Review* (Spring, 1944). But there is still something else—the rarely explored quagmire of office work hidden to the so-called over-all point of view. By way of contrast, let's call it the area of under-all management.

II

As I suggested earlier, one of the most remarkable things about this collection of readings is the degree to which it sheds light on the day-by-day practice of government. There is a strong temptation for control and investigative establishments to treat problems of administration in general terms, to seize upon illusive principles, and to formulate findings in language too wide to fit small-scale but troublesome realities. The documents here assembled tend to show that Australian public bodies are by and large indifferent to this temptation. Many of their reports reflect a sharp eye for the significant detail of govern-

ment business. Many of them persistently focus on the intricacies of operations. As a result, the reader gains a close look not only at the concrete working of administrative machinery but also at the pathology of official conduct and usage.

It is in this sphere that bureaucratic tendencies find their most fertile soil. Policies and programs—the key points of departmental action—attract public attention by their very nature. They touch upon group interests and thus seldom escape public scrutiny. Only to a very limited extent is this true of the large bulk of ordinary office transactions which occupy the great majority of government employees. Nearly all of these transactions are as unexciting and inconspicuous as the individual revolutions of a spinning wheel. Most of them are in themselves trivial and do not engage the minds of those who perform them in assembly-line fashion. Habit and inertia combine to keep each such transaction the exact replica of the previous one. The need for order and accountability translates itself into red tape. As control is piled on control, red tape slows down the speed with which the departmental end-product can be manufactured. And institutional immobility renders red tape well-nigh untouchable.

Australia is far from having a monopoly on ineffectual under-all management, but nowhere do we find it exposed and lampooned with equal zest. To quote from the findings of one of the two Anderson inquiries into commonwealth administration,

Familiarity does not seem to lessen the shock one gets at the exceedingly long journey a very small matter has to take before it can be remedied. For instance, the Federal Territory is within the State of New South Wales, but the school teachers are very properly under the direction of the State Education Department. If some small repair had to be effected one would think that the school teacher would write to the nearest person who had to do with it, but this is not the case. The school teacher writes through the local inspector to the Department in Sydney, and the Minister addresses the Premier of New South Wales, who gravely communicates to the Right Honorable the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth information that the woodwork of a closet at a provisional school in the Federal Territory is in a state of decay owing to the ravages of white ants, and that the cesspit requires emptying, and begging him to bring the matter under the notice of his colleague, the Minister for Home Affairs, with a view to the Administrator of the Federal Territory being instructed to have the closet attended to, and concludes by having the "honour to

be his obedient servant." The Prime Minister does as desired, and ultimately the work is put in hand. Presumably notification of its having been completed is sent back by the same tortuous course. Surely one would think that the teacher might be put in direct touch with the Administrator of the Federal Territory, for the delay is necessarily long to obtain redress by the present method, and in one part of the complaint, at least, the need for remedy seemed pressing.

No less illuminating are the following passages from the report of the Ross commission on the conduct of departmental business in Victoria:

Requiring a filing cabinet, an officer of the Department of Agriculture (1) approaches the head of his branch, and convincing him that same is necessary, (2) gets that officer to sign a requisition (Form 5). This officer then (3) obtains the approval of the Head of the Department, who in turn (4) obtains the approval of the Minister. The requisition is then (5) forwarded to the Public Works Department, where it is registered, and then (6) passed to the Chief Architect, who marks it to (7), the officer in charge of the appropriate sub-section of his branch to supply an estimate of the cost. The Architectural Officer (8), after making up an estimate of the cost, then returns the form to (9) the Chief Architect, who recommends same, and (10) forwards to the Secretary. In accordance with a Treasury instruction, the Secretary forwards the requisition to (11) the Secretary to the Treasury for (12) the approval of the Treasurer. When this is obtained, (13) the Secretary to the Treasury returns the requisition to (14) the Public Works Department. It is then (15) scheduled along with other similar matters, and (16) placed before a meeting of the Board of Land and Works, where it is (17) approved by the Board, the Minister, and Secretary for Public Works Department, who are respectively Vice-President and member, initialling each requisition, which is then (18) given an approval number and passed to (19) the Architectural Officer in charge of the required work.

It might be thought that after being approved by three Ministers and three Heads of Departments sufficient authority would exist for the cabinet being acquired, but not being a contract line, the following additional action is necessary:—(20) An inspector is instructed to obtain quotations from at least three firms. When this is done (21) a new requisition is attached to the earlier one, giving particulars of the "quotes" obtained and sent to (22) the Chief Clerk to sign and forward to (23) the Tender Board for approval. This body, consisting of the Heads of several large Departments, after signifying its approval as to which was the most suitable quotation to accept, would then return the requisition to (23) the Public Works Department, which would then be authorised to (24) make out an order for the purchase of the item.

Behind this dignified rigmarole—and who would not immediately think of parallels under his very eyes?—are causative factors which Australian investigators have by no means

overlooked. One of these factors is the distortion of responsibility, involving both concentration at the top and avoidance throughout the whole series of subordinate levels. As Commissioner Allard put it in one of his three reports on public management in New South Wales,

This avoidance of responsibility is undoubtedly, in my opinion, due to the apparent want of confidence—if not of actual want of trust—in subordinate officers, admittedly expert in their own lines. I was astonished to find that the Under-Secretary insists upon seeing every paper that comes from the Ministerial table. Certain of the senior officers have the right, apparently accorded by the Under-Secretary, of submitting routine matters direct to the Minister, but no matter how trivial or formal such matter may be, the Under-Secretary insists that the paper shall be subsequently placed before him, and each individual paper is marked by him "Seen." No business firm would tolerate for a moment the general manager of the concern spending—or rather wasting—his presumably valuable time upon the mass of trivial departmental routine matters through which the Under-Secretary—I am convinced under an earnest sense of duty—goes daily.

III

WHAT can be done about the vices of under-all management? Exposure and exhortation, patently, are not enough. Nor does it help to surround the department head with a force of assistants. In fact, given his remoteness from the scene of under-all management, his own performance is relevant to this matter only in so far as real leadership succeeds in quickening the pulse of the whole department. But it is only through a systematically developed sense of participation throughout the organization that new vitality can be maintained. This is truly everybody's business. In the words of the commonwealth public service commissioner,

Let each and every officer forthwith break the drowsy spell of ennui. Let each ask himself whether the system in operation in his particular branch is the best and most economical that can be devised, or that he is capable of suggesting; and whether he would adopt the present practice, procedure, and system if he were a private employer endeavouring to conduct his business so as to ultimately reap a competency. Let each set himself new problems, take up a new attitude, and become an original investigator, and cease to follow a practice that has not reason and commonsense to justify it. Let him initiate, or at least suggest, reforms whereby time and money might be saved, and I feel sure that the economies that should be effected within the next decade would have a startling, although a very welcome, effect, on the public mind. It is, I submit, axiomatic that in a large Service such as this

there must exist leakages which can by careful investigation and proper supervision be stopped; and where they exist they should, if not totally checked, certainly be minimized. But to effect this each must put his shoulder to the wheel; each must begin to look around him and endeavour to bring about a better and more economical system in his particular branch. The drawback inherent in the old system appears to be this: all reforms, all changes, all suggestions, were the prerogatives of, and emanated from, the higher officials only; and very few juniors cared to risk the consequences of offering suggestions to their superiors. That system was, I am convinced, radically bad. It meant that the Service was controlled and administered by a mere handful of officials, who, perhaps, were less prolific in ideas and less ardent for reform than many of their subordinates. The Commonwealth has a Service of 12,000 officers; it has the brains and ideas of 12,000 persons to draw upon. Why, then, should it not avail itself of such vast resources, instead of limiting itself to but a small fraction of that number?

This paragraph is contained in a report dated 1906. It reads as fresh as if it were written for our day. Indeed, it specifically refers to American industrial experience with one device which of late has had a triumphant comeback—the suggestion box. We know today that employee suggestion systems must be carefully organized and intelligently administered in order to yield tangible returns over longer periods. But we also know that economic incentives are not the only means of bolstering a widespread sense of participation. Still more important, perhaps, is the fact that sense of participation does not flourish without actual opportunity for participation in critical examination of working methods.

IV

IT is a strange paradox that our conception of productivity has been permitted to conspire against our natural interest in refining and improving the way in which we perform our daily toil. Progressive division of labor and continuous growth of specialization have made the average employee more and more a mere recipient of specified techniques and procedures. Both have curtailed to the same extent his role as originator. Little premium is put upon his initiative in devising shortcuts in working methods, principally because his own share in processes playing from one departmental unit to another is infinitesimal, relatively speaking. Concern with methods has become the province of control or auxiliary services. Typically, these are centrally organ-

ized. But even departmental management staffs are usually far away from the dust and clatter of operations. All too frequently a gulf exists between staff and auxiliary activities on the one side and the conduct of line business on the other.

More recently this point has found increasing attention. But it is one thing to lament unsatisfactory relationships and another to fashion remedies. Obviously, effective readjustment would involve a redirection of line business toward operation analysis on a continuing basis. How could that be done?

One answer, rich in potentialities, suggests itself in the experience of large-scale organizations with simple tools of activity review so designed as to place in bold relief any anomalies in routine transactions. These simple tools include the work distribution chart, the process chart, the correlation chart, the layout-flow chart, and elementary aspects of work measurement, such as the work count. There is nothing new about any of them, but under wartime manpower pressures their application has been developed to a high degree of perfection. They have contributed to an astonishing degree to increased efficiency not only in

private enterprise but also in the military and civilian departments of government.

We have discovered that without such special tools there is virtually no chance of laying bare periodically the rationale of those working processes which entail the greatest amount of paper work and employ the highest proportion of employees. Examination of the reasons, in detail, why things are done the way they are done supplies a photographic picture of the peculiar contortions of established procedure. Once these contortions are made explicit nobody is willing to rise to their defense.

Meanwhile the effort to redesign these tools for ready use by the ordinary supervisor is being carried forward. We have at least a concrete formula by which operators are enabled to overhaul their own shop. True enough, active top-management support and staff assistance are indispensable to give this drive full impetus. But its greatest significance would lie in the promotion of a questioning attitude and inquisitive competence among the rank and file. These are ends to which Mr. Bland consistently alludes in his stubborn quest of "new ideas for old."

Fable for Wise Men

By Rowland Egger, Bolivian Development Corporation

A BELL FOR ADANO, by JOHN HERSEY. Alfred A. Knopf, 1944. Pp. vii, 269. \$2.50.

I

FOR some years thoughtful persons interested in the art and science of public administration have been attempting to push back the frontiers of our knowledge of the administrative personality in an effort to help isolate the elements of a science of public management. The committee on public administration of the Social Science Research Council has sponsored a number of interesting and highly important psychological studies of the personality of successful administrators. Macmahon and Millett have published a descriptive and analytical study of *Federal Administrators* which has shed much light on the experience and background of the higher bureaucracy. Several biographical articles on outstanding

public servants which have appeared in *Public Administration Review* have cumulated additional important data bearing on the problem.

It has remained for John Hersey, in *A Bell for Adano*, to write the classic study of the administrative personality. In 269 pages of simple, beautiful, vivid fiction, Hersey has said more that is valid for all sincere and humble men everywhere who are honestly attempting to discharge their administrative mandates than is contained in all the pompous tomes which have so far appeared on the subject of public administration.

John Hersey has probably never heard of the science of public administration, or of the worthy journal of the learned American Society for Public Administration. Indeed, since he is a product of Hotchkiss, Yale, and Clare College, Cambridge, it is reasonable to

suppose that his acquaintance with the general field of political science, if existent, is no more than perfunctory. He is a newspaper man, unsullied by professional piffle and unspoiled by the gobbledegook of the government service.

Since this is a novel, and since I know less than nothing about the techniques of plot construction and fiction writing, I should like at the outset to disclaim any pretension of appraising the book by Mr. Hersey from the standpoint of literary criticism. Since it is not a formal study organized along the stereotyped lines with which a student of public administration is generally familiar, it cannot be "reviewed" in the stereotyped way with which I may claim a limited acquaintance. Since every page of the book is pregnant with meaning for those who are seeking the realities of public administration, I shall not presume to resay in a dull and involved way what Mr. Hersey has already said with beauty and distinction. The knowledgeable reader can, therefore, at this point write off the following piece as a sort of publisher's blurb *in extenso*, written from the profound conviction that *A Bell for Adano* is a tremendously important book which every serious student of public management ought to read and reread many times.

This is the story of Major Victor Joppolo, USA—the Allied Military Government officer assigned to the town of Adano, a small Italian seaport, during the early days of the invasion. He was an Italo-American from the Bronx and a product of the New York municipal civil service. One may suppose that he was trained at The School of Military Government in Charlottesville, from which he seems to have suffered no permanent ill effects. But the story of Major Joppolo is concerned less with the academic antecedents of men in the AMG than with their performance under fire. The important thing about Major Joppolo is that he was a good man, with a fair mind, sound instincts, and ordinary human weaknesses. He is important because he represents, in miniature, what America can and cannot do in the rebuilding and stabilizing of governmental institutions in Europe. "Since," as the author explains, "he happened to be a good man, his works represented the best of the possibilities."

II

MAJOR Joppolo and his adjutant, Sergeant Borth, arrived in Adano on a hot day in July. Fighting was still going on in the area, and the sound of mortar fire and machine guns could occasionally be heard as they plodded along through the dirty streets of the town toward the Palazzo di Città. Here and there they encountered the fly-covered bodies of the still unburied dead. The entry was not triumphal.

After reaching the city hall and settling down in an office, all the while feeling a little ill, Major Joppolo dispatched his adjutant to the Fascist headquarters in the city to look for records on the local gentry, and then got to work on his instructions.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS.
First day: Enter the city with the first column. Cooperate with C.I.C. in placing guards and seizing records. Place all food warehouses, enemy food dumps, wholesale food concerns, and other major food stocks under guard. Secure an estimate from local food distributors of the number of days of food supplies which are on hand or available. Make a report through channels on food situation in your area. See that the following establishments are placed under guard or protection: foundries, machine shops, electrical works, chemical plants, flour mills, breweries, cement plants. . . .

As Joppolo read page after page of the multitudinous tasks which he and his adjutant were expected to perform the first day, he was overcome with a great weariness and a deep sense of frustration. His watch told him that it was eleven-thirty in the morning, and that almost half of his first day was gone. He took the instructions for the first day and slowly tore them into small pieces, and dropped them into the wastebasket. Then he sat and stared out the window into the street for a long time, a very tired and defeated man, who did not know what to do.

He stirred and reached into his brief case again and took out a small black loose leaf notebook. The pages were filled with notes on his Amgot school lectures: notes on civilian supply, on public safety, on public health, on finance, on agriculture, industry, utilities, transportation, and all the businesses of an invading authority. But he passed all these by, and turned to the page marked: *Notes to Joppolo from Joppolo*.

And he read: "Don't make yourself cheap. Always be accessible to the public. Don't play favorites. Speak Italian whenever possible. Don't lose your temper. When plans fall down, improvise. . . ."

That was the one he wanted. When plans fall down, improvise.

Plans for this first day were in the wastebasket. They were absurd. Enough was set forth in those plans to keep a regiment busy for a week.

Now Victor Joppolo felt on his own, and he no longer looked tired. He got up briskly, went out onto the balcony and saw that there were two flagpoles there. He went back in, reached in his briefcase and pulled out two flags, one American, the other British.

He tucked the Union Jack under his arm as he walked out again, felt for the toggles on the American flag, mounted them on the halyard on the left-hand flagpole, and raised the flag.

Before the flag reached the top of the pole there were five Italians in the Piazza. Before he had the British flag attached to the halyard on the right-hand pole, there were twenty. By the time he had both flags up, forty people were shouting: *"Bon giorno, bon giorno, Americano."*

He waved to them and went back into his office. Now he was happy and quick.

III

JOPPOLO was in some ways a cautious man. He did not attempt on taking over the civil administration of Adano to make a clean sweep. He did not worry too much about the previous affiliations of the municipal employees, provided they carried out his instructions with reasonable efficiency. So it was that Gargano, chief of the carabinieri under the Fascists, was permitted to remain in office.

Gargano, shortly after Joppolo arrived, went one morning to the baker's shop, where a line of housewives was waiting for bread. In exercise of his customary prerogatives under the Fascist administration, he went to the head of the line and squeezed himself into place. This action met with highly derogatory comment. Gargano was not a subtle man, and reacted in the only way his previous experience had taught him. He arrested the most outspoken of his critics, one Carmelina.

Gargano dragged Carmelina off screaming and kicking, and the anti-Gargano, anti-Fascist screams in the line grew louder and louder. Even Mercurio Salvatore, although as crier he was more or less an official and should have remained neutral or even taken the side of Gargano, raised his huge voice in a careful shout: "Down with injustice!"

When Gargano pulled Carmelina into Major Joppolo's office, she was still screaming. . . .

"What is this all about?" the Major asked.

Gargano said: "This woman questioned my authority." . . .

Major Joppolo said: "Your authority to do what,

Gargano?"

Carmelina shouted: "To push his way to the head of the line in front of Zapulla's bread shop."

Gargano said: "It is a privilege the officials of the town have always enjoyed."

Major Joppolo said: "Is that so?"

Gargano said: "I charge this woman with disturbing the peace and questioning authority." Gargano was shrewd in saying this, for he saw that things were going against him, and now he had put the matter on an official rather than a personal basis. The Major would have to decide the case officially.

The Major decided with a speed that dazzled Gargano. He decided that the woman was right but that he could not say so, because if he did the Chief would never regain his authority, and the Major wanted to keep him in office. Therefore he said: "I sentence this woman to one day in jail, suspended sentence. Let her go, Gargano, and gather all the officials of Adano for me at once."

In the Major's office, the officials gradually assembled. Some were held-over Fascists, some were new appointments to take the place of Fascists who had fled to the hills. In whispers, and with ample gestures, Gargano described to them the humiliation he had suffered; until Major Joppolo said: "Silence, please."

"I want you to be my friends," he said. "As my friends, I will consider it my duty to tell you everything I think, for we do not want Adano to be a town of mysteries and a place of suspicion.

"Adano has been a Fascist town. This is natural, because the country was Fascist, therefore the town was also. But now that the Americans have come, we are going to run the town as a democracy.

"Perhaps you do not know what a democracy is. I will tell you.

"Democracy is this: democracy is that the men of the government are no longer the masters of the people. They are the servants of the people. What makes a man master of another man? It is that he pays him for his work. Who pays the men in the government? The people do, for they pay the taxes out of which you are paid.

"Therefore, you are now the servants of the people of Adano. I too am their servant. When I go to buy bread, I shall take my place at the end of the line, and I will wait my turn. You too must behave now as servants, not as masters. You must behave as the servant of the man without shoes just as much as of the baron. If I find that any of you are not giving the type of service that I desire, I shall have to remove you from office.

"Remember; you are servants now. You are servants of the people of Adano. And watch: this thing will make you happier than you have ever been in your lives."

IV

A WEEK or so after Joppolo arrived in Adano a General Marvin, commanding officer of the 49th Division and in charge of the offen-

sive in that sector, passed through the town. Whether, as some affirm, Marvin is a thinly disguised version of Patton, and Joppolo a miniature of Poletti, we shall never know. It isn't important, because Marvin might be any one of a half-dozen public officials that everyone has met at one time or another. The best that can be said of Marvin is that he was undoubtedly a great fighter; the worst is that he lacked many of the elements of the humanness that make a man valuable on the long pull.

As Marvin was coming into Adano in his armored car a mule cart got in the way. The cart driver was on top of his cart sleeping off the effects of too much *vino*, and consequently did not move rapidly enough to suit the General. The General therefore ordered his adjutants to dump the cart over into the ditch, and when this was done he had one of his men shoot the mule through the head. After that, he proceeded to Major Joppolo's headquarters in Adano and ordered him to keep all carts of whatever description off the highways and bridges leading into Adano and off the streets of the town itself.

The command was an irrational one issued by an irrational man, but Joppolo had no alternative. He gave the necessary instructions to the military police and then called the town officials to his office.

When they were all in Major Joppolo stood at his desk and said: "I have promised to tell you every important thing which the American authorities decide to do in this town. I do not want this to be a town of mysteries. In a democracy one of the most important things is for everyone to know as much as possible about what is going on."

"The American authorities have decided that because of military necessities it will no longer be possible for mule carts to come into the streets of town."

Major Joppolo could see his audience suck in its collective breath. He said: "I am not happy to have to announce this decision. It is because of military necessities. I am sorry. That is all."

The officials of Adano, a comic-looking collection, turned sadly to go. They did not protest. They had learned during the years of Fascism how to swallow their protests. But Major Joppolo could tell that they were not with him, that for the first time in nine days they were against him.

Before the first of them reached the door, Major Joppolo said: "I wish to tell you that I will do all that is in my power to have this unjust order revoked."

And when the comic-looking officials of Adano went out of the door of the Major's office, they were still sad but they were for him.

Later, when the effects of the order became apparent and the town was without water and food, Joppolo received a delegation of cart drivers, and, after hearing their stories, called the officer in charge of the military police on the telephone and, on his own responsibility, rescinded the order of General Marvin.

Major Joppolo hung up. He turned to the three cartmen and said: "You may bring your carts into the town."

For a long moment they did not understand. Then they stood up and began shouting and waving their caps.

"We thank you, we thank you and we kiss your hand," they roared.

"Oh, Mister Major, there has never been a thing like this," the fat one named Basile shouted, "that the poor should come to the Palazzo di Città, and that their request should be granted."

"Especially," shouted the loud one named Afronti, "especially without a wait of two to three weeks."

"It was not necessary to write you a letter," Basile shouted.

"The police did not even examine us," roared Afronti.

The cartmen went out, shouting and congratulating America.

But, of course, Marvin eventually had the last word.

V

CITIES, like men, live by their symbols. The symbol by which Adano had lived was the bell in the tower of the Palazzo di Città. Sometime before the story takes place, the Fascists had taken down the bell and hauled it away to be melted down for cannon. Joppolo was a wise man, and when he found out how important the townspeople considered the bell, he was not above inquiring into the matter. He asked them why it was so important.

Zito said: "Because the tone of the bell was so satisfactory."

"No," said Cacopardo, "it is because of the history of the bell. When the bell spoke, our fathers and their fathers far back spoke to us."

Even Craxi was swept into this argument. "No," he said, "it was because the bell rang the times of day. It told us when to do things, such as eating. It told us when to have the morning egg and when to have pasta and rabbit and when to drink wine in the evening."

Zito said: "I think it was the tone which mattered. It soothed all the people of this town. It chided those

who were angry, it cheered the unhappy ones, it even laughed with those who were drunk. It was a tone for everybody."

Father Pensovecchio said: "This bell was the center of the town. All life revolved around it. The farmers in the country were wakened by it in the morning, the drivers of the carts knew when to start by it, the bakers baked by it, even we in the churches depended on that bell more than on our own bells. At noon on the Sabbath, when all the bells in the town rang at once, this bell rose above all the others and that was the one you listened to."

So Joppolo decided that he would either recover the original bell or find a good strong bell—a bell with some history to it—to replace the town hall bell. Being an orderly man, he first made sure that the old bell had actually been shipped off to one of the armament factories of the Fascists in the north of Italy a few weeks before and by now was undoubtedly melted down. He then took the matter up with Lord Runcin, his AMG superior, who authorized Joppolo to proceed through channels to get another bell. So Joppolo wrote to the quartermaster depot in Algiers, and received a reply to the effect that the U.S. Army, goddamit, doesn't have a stock of seven-hundred-year-old bells.

But Joppolo was a tenacious fellow. He went to see his friend Lieutenant Livingston, USN, in charge of the port of Adano. Livingston had been a hard nut to crack, and in the beginning Kent and Yale had not been too cooperative with the Bronx public schools and the New York City civil service. That they were now good friends was due to Joppolo's innate diplomacy and Joppolo's fairness in going out of his way to give the Navy credit for a number of good jobs it had done for Adano.

Livingston didn't have a bell handy, but the Navy's sense of tradition enabled him to appreciate that it was an important problem. So he called in Commander Robertson, who was in port with his destroyer:

The Commander said: "How would this be, Major? There's a ship, a destroyer, she's named for an Italian-American, the U.S.S. *Corelli*, you know her, boys. Well, all destroyers have ship's bells, they have to be loud and clear so that the men can hear them all over the ship, to tell the hours of the watches. . . ."

"There's a reason why the *Corelli* is in on this invasion. You see, the Navy thinks about that kind of thing. There was something about Captain *Corelli*, the guy it was named for, he did something in the

last war over here in the Mediterranean. Italy was our ally then, you know."

"The good thing is that Toot Dowling, he has the *Corelli*, he was in my class at the Academy, he used to substitute for me in football. Hell, I'm sure I could persuade him, if I could just find him."

The communications officer said: "Wait a minute, I think I remember seeing something about the *Corelli* in that intercept I decoded last night. Do you remember that, skipper?"

Commander Robertson said to the communications officer: "Farley, would you mind going out to the ship and finding that order. I think we ought to tell the Major whether there's any chance of helping him out. . . ."

Farley came back with the order in his hand: "It's secret, sir, equal to British 'most secret.'"

"Okay," Commander Robertson said, and he began to read the message to himself. "Let's see, *Corelli*, *Corelli*. Here it is." He smiled.

He looked up. "Major, I think we'll get you your bell."

Major Joppolo stood up. "Gee," he said, "I didn't expect action like this. If you think you could. . . ."

Commander Robertson said: "Leave it to me, Major. . . ."

Major Joppolo left quite abruptly.

Commander Robertson said: "If that bugger thinks the Navy is efficient, he's really going to get a surprise this time. We'll get him that bell within a week. The *Corelli*'s putting in day after tomorrow at that port just up the line. . . . We'll have time to run up there while these teapots are unloading here, and maybe we can bring the bell right back with us."

VI

A MONTH or so after Joppolo came to Adano, a group of the town officials came to his office one day and asked him to go to a certain address in the town. They refused to tell him why, but he was by this time sure of their friendship, so he decided to do as they requested. The address was that of a crusty old photographer, who with many caustic remarks finally managed to take the Major's picture.

The town officials secured the photograph and commissioned Lojacono, the painter, to prepare a portrait of the Major. Despite an enormous amount of advice from his clients, the portrait was eventually finished, and when one considers that Lojacono was a house painter as well as a portrait painter, it must have been a pretty good picture.

One afternoon when the Major returned to his office, Zito, the usher, asked him if he would receive the municipal officials.

"Yes, Zito."

Now when the officials came in—old Bellanca first as usual, then the others, Gargano, Saitta, D'Arpa, Rottondo, Signora Carmelina Spinnato, and Tagliavia—Major Joppolo could see by their cheerful expressions that there was to be no unpleasantness in this interview.

Old Bellanca spoke: "We have something we wish to give to the Mister Major."

First the usher came back carrying an easel. He went out again. Then he brought in Lojacono's portrait of the Major.

It was really good. When the Major saw it, he stood up in delight. He said: "So that is why you wanted my picture taken!"

Old Bellanca cleared his throat. The group were silent, as if they had been called to order. The Mayor said: "I was for so many years just a Notary here in Adano, I never made speeches, I do not intend to begin now. But these others have asked me merely to tell you, Mister Major, that this picture may not be the best picture that was ever painted, although it is very good for Lojacono, but even if it were very bad, we would still give it to you, because we wished to show you that—"

Old Bellanca was very embarrassed. He cleared his throat again and said: "What these others asked me to tell you was that this portrait—"

The old Mayor looked at the others in despair. Gargano stepped forward and said: "What the Mister Mayor wishes to say is that the eyes . . . of the portrait are honest."

D'Arpa said, pointing at the picture: "In the chin there is strength."

Gargano grabbed one of his own ears with one hand and pointed at an ear in the picture with the other: "In the ears there is alertness."

Saitta the street-cleaner said approvingly: "In the fix of the hair there is neatness."

And finally old Bellanca remembered enough of his coaching to say: "In the cheeks there is a sympathetic warmth."

Then Gargano said, and this time his hands stayed still by his sides, in proof of his absolute sincerity: "And you can see in the picture that that man wishes that each person in the town of Adano should be happy. That is a very big thing in a face."

Old Bellanca said: "Lojacono has painted a good picture. We wanted you to have it."

"Thank you," Major Joppolo said. That was all he had time to say, for the officials of Adano left the room quickly. In any case, it was all the Major was able to say.

VII

THE bell came, as Commander Robertson had promised. Joppolo had planned quite a ceremony for the dedication and had written a very fine and very sincere speech, but he never got to give it. Despite some of the most skilfully planned misdirecting and misfiling (by Joppolo's friends up the line) of the report on his action countermanding Marvin's order about the mule carts, the memorandum eventually reached the General's desk. Joppolo was ordered immediately to return to A.F.H.Q. in Algiers, for reassignment, if any. There had been a big party for Joppolo the night before the bell was to have been dedicated, and Borth had hidden the order for Joppolo's removal which arrived that day so that it would not spoil the party for him. But early the next morning he had to turn the order over to the Major.

As Joppolo's jeep carried him up the road to Vincinamare, where he was to embark for Algiers, there was a fine pure sound on the summer air. The tone of the bell must have been very loud to have carried that far.

This is a good book about a good man. But Joppolo was not only a good man, he was a tremendously important man. Nobody realizes this better than John Hersey, and nobody can argue the case more forcefully than he does in his foreword.

America is on its way into Europe. You can be as isolationist as you want to be, but there is a fact. Our armies are on their way in. Just as truly as Europe once invaded us, with wave after wave of immigrants, now we are invading Europe, with wave after wave of sons of immigrants.

Until there is a seeming stability in Europe, our armies and our after-armies will have to stay in Europe. Each American who stays may very well be extremely dependent on a Joppolo, not only for language, but for wisdom and justice and the other things we think we have to offer Europeans.

Therefore I beg you to get to know this man Joppolo well. We have need of him. He is our future in the world. Neither the eloquence of Churchill, nor the humaneness of Roosevelt, no Charter, no four freedoms or fourteen points, no dreamer's diagram so symmetrical and so faultless on paper, no plan, no hope, no treaty—none of these things can guarantee anything. Only men can guarantee, only the behavior of men under pressure, only our Joppolos.

News of the Society

Preliminary Announcement of the Annual Meeting

THE annual meetings of the American Society for Public Administration, the American Political Science Association, and the American Economic Association will be held jointly in Washington, D.C., February 1-4, 1945. Headquarters will be at the Statler Hotel. Each member of the Society will be sent a postal notice in January.

The general theme for the program this year will be "Problems of the Postwar World."

In preparation for the meeting, the presidents of the three participating organizations—Luther Gulick of the Society, Leonard D. White of the American Political Science Association, and Joseph S. Davis of the American Economic Association—have conferred on program arrangements.

G. Lyle Belsley, executive secretary of the War Production Board, has been designated by President Gulick as the Society's program chairman to work in collaboration with the program chairmen for the American Political Science Association and the American Economic Association, James W. Fesler, chief of the policy analysis and records branch of the War Production Board, and Joseph S. Davis, director of the Food Research Institute of Stanford University. Chairman of the Society's committee on arrangements is Henry Reining, Jr., educational director of the National Institute of Public Affairs.

Since transportation difficulties and restrictions will probably make it impossible for members to travel to the annual meeting, plans were made to hold it in the city where the greatest possible number could attend without traveling.

Chapter News

THE Alabama Chapter held a dinner meeting October 17 at the Montgomery Country Club. W. J. McGlothlin of the personnel department of the Tennessee Valley Authority spoke and led the discussion on "Bureaucracy and Special Training."

The Southern California (Los Angeles) Chapter held its autumn meeting on October 25, jointly with the Governmental Administrative Group. The speaker was Hugh R. Pomeroy, director of the National Association of Housing Officials, who talked on "Is Planning More Than Management?" About sixty-five people attended.

Since the annual election of officers in July, Garrett R. Breckenridge, chief research technician, Los Angeles County Bureau of Administrative Research, has been reappointed secretary of the chapter.

The Massachusetts (Boston) Chapter held its first meeting of the 1944-45 season on October 19, at the Engineers Club. The topic of discussion was "Bureaucracy." The speaker and discussion leader was Professor Herman

Finer, who is now lecturing on comparative government at Harvard University and engaged in writing a book on "Bureaucracy of Today." Professor Finer was formerly adviser to the International Labour Office.

The Albany-Schenectady Area Chapter held its first autumn meeting on September 26, at the DeWitt Clinton Hotel in Albany. The discussion at the round table, "When Johnny Comes Marching Home," was led by Charles L. Campbell, administrative director of the New York State Department of Civil Service. The speakers were Major Charles F. Henderson, veterans' personnel officer, Selective Service System, and William F. McDonough, executive representative, Association of State Civil Service Employees.

The New York Metropolitan Chapter held the first meeting of its sixth season on October 10, at the New York University Faculty Club. The speaker was Walter Gellhorn, vice chairman of the Regional War Labor Board, professor of administrative law at Columbia University, formerly assistant to the Secretary of

the Interior and director of the Attorney-General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. The topic for discussion was "Group Representation in Administration." About forty-five people attended.

The chapter program committee has planned six dinner meetings during the 1944-45 season, in conformity with the practically unanimous request of the chapter members as shown in answers to a questionnaire circulated last spring. Meetings will be held on December 12, January 9, February 13, March 13, and May 8, at the New York University Faculty Club. The members have asked the program committee to arrange for some panel discussions to alternate with meetings addressed by speakers.

The Washington, D.C., Chapter held its first meeting of the program year on October 5, at Barker Hall of the Y.M.C.A. Herbert Emmerich, associate director of Public Administration Clearing House and recently commissioner of the Federal Public Housing Authority, was the speaker. His subject was "The Lessons We Have Learned in Public Administration in Civilian Agencies from the Wartime Experience."

At the dinner meeting, held October 8, Brigadier General Otto Nelson spoke on "The Problems in the Development of the Organization of the War Department."

The chapter program committee for the 1944-45 season has planned six monthly dinner meetings for general, unlimited attendance and four series of round tables on the following topics: "Budgeting," "Liquidation of Federal Agencies," "Administrative Services," and "Comparative Personnel Administration in Various Countries." Additional round table groups may be started later if there is sufficient demand. In order to encourage discussion each round table is limited to twenty members. All round tables will meet as dinner discussion groups at Brookings Institution.

The first meeting of the round table on "Liquidation of Federal Agencies," was held October 17. The twenty panel members present, representing thirteen federal agencies, voted to hold bi-weekly meetings. Lt. Charles Mills, U.S.N.R., is chairman. The group will draw upon the experience of liquidated agen-

cies to determine common factors likely to occur in future liquidations. It will also discuss new problems of existing agencies.

The first of the "Budgeting" round table meetings was held October 24, under the chairmanship of Verne B. Lewis, Foreign Funds Control. One of the objectives of this round table is the development of useful written materials concerning budget organization, presentation, and execution. A total of twelve meetings will be held on the second and fourth Tuesdays of each month (except Christmas week) during the program year.

The first of the "Administrative Services" round tables was held October 25, with A. Ross Fox of the Bureau of the Budget as chairman. Seven meetings to discuss the various administrative services are planned. Subsequent meetings will be on the fourth Wednesday of each month throughout the program year.

The schedule of meetings of the round tables on "Comparative Personnel Administration in Various Countries" was discussed October 11. The chairman of this series is Lt. Don. K. Price, U.S.C.G.R. Those present at this first meeting from other countries were W. P. Barrett, British Civil Service Commission; J. B. Bridgen, counsellor, Australian Embassy; Fernando Lobo, minister-counsellor, Brazilian Embassy; Tsmen Ling Tsui, first secretary, Chinese Embassy.

The chapter program committee for 1944-45 has as its chairman Lt. Leland Barrows, U.S.C.G.R. His assistants are Richard Cooper of the Foreign Economic Administration, Miss Martha Mooney of the Bureau of the Budget, Lt. Don K. Price, U.S.C.G.R., and Paul T. David of the Bureau of the Budget.

The first number of the Washington, D.C., Chapter *News Letter* was published in October. The executive committee of the chapter has instituted this regular monthly *News Letter* as a medium for informing and reminding members of the monthly dinner meetings, the schedule of round tables, and other news items of interest. The editor is Manlio F. DeAngelis (a charter member of the Society) of the U. S. Civil Service Commission.

Roy L. Wynkoop, chief of the coordinating and procedure division of the Social Security Board, has been appointed chapter secretary for 1944-45.

